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Abstract 
Neoliberalism is having a significant and global impact on political, social and economic life 
across spaces. This work illustrates how neoliberalism is attempting to change the ways in which 
the urban poor - particularly those that participate in street vending - use urban spaces in Lima, 
Peru. Using municipal policies, newspaper articles and local academic texts I argue that there is a 
changing marginality in Lima that is being experienced by street vendors, and currently in los 
canas of Lima. In particular, I discuss formalization, a neoliberal strategy in street vending 
policy, which is used with eradication and social assistance strategies in attempts to re-regulate 
street vendors. 
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cuidado que viene la municipalidad y que te quitan tu 
merca 
ayayayayay que triste es vivir 
ayayayayay que triste es sonar 
ambulante soy proletario soy 
ambulante soy proletario soy 
vendiendo zapatos 
vendiendo comida 
vendiendo casacas 
mantengo mi hogar 
ambulante soy proletario soy 
ambulante soy proletario soy 
watch out the municipality is coming and they will take 
your merchandise 
it is so sad to live 
it is so sad to dream 
i'm a street vendor, i'm a proletariat 
i'm a street vendor, i'm a proletariat 
selling shoes 
selling food 
selling jackets 
i keep my family afloat 
i'm a street vendor, i'm a proletariat 
i'm a street vendor, i'm a proletariat 
-Ambulante Soy by Los Shapis, 1980s1 
The ideal solution would be to ... increase the vendors' entrepreneurial energies and to allow them, within 
the competitive process in which they are immersed, to use their talents to the full and serve the 
community more effectively. (de Soto, 1989, p. 92) 
Th[e] pedagogicalization of vendors' citizenship [through formalization] denies structural inequalities by 
framing them as questions of culture that can be eradicated through education, while contributing to the 
stability of current political and economic models ... informality is a product of the formal market, and 
poverty is an inherent outcome of capitalism; these are thus structural problems that cannot be overcome 
by educating individuals or groups to surpass their cultural limitations. (Hunt, 2009, p. 347-8) 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Discourses on street vending in Lima, Peru have changed dramatically since the 1980s. The 
notion of street vendors in the 1980s as the heroes ofthe masses (Chion and Ludefia Urquizo, 
2005) who work to maintain their families has been challenged along with the legitimacy of 
appropriating public space for subsistence activities. Street vending policies and broader social 
relations have challenged the identity of street vendors as a working class with a "Right to 
Work" in public spaces. Rather, vendors are now framed as entrepreneurs with a "Right to 
Property" in order to compete in the market. The pervasiveness ofneoliberalism as both logic 
1 No known reference. Los Shapis are a chicha music group that started in the 1980s. All of their works are 
bootlegged, pirated, sold by street vendors and in commercial centres throughout Peru. 
5 
and practice has been the impulse of this change. de Soto's neoliberal advocacy (both formally 
and informally), best illustrated in his book The Other Path, along with the arrival ofneoliberal 
policy changes in Peru. during the late 1980s and early 1990s, are strong indicators ofa 
movement to redefine street vendors as entrepreneurs. Street vendors have become subjectivized 
as entrepreneurs, who must formalize their practices and enter marketplaces or commercial 
centres in private properties as businesses. 
In the neoliberal era, vending practices that are primarily conducive to competitive 
market conditions, the right to property ownership and capital accumulation replace practices of 
appropriating public spaces for representation, visibility and social reproduction. These changes 
result in a significant reduction in - and sometimes a complete eradication of-street vendor 
populations, who either appropriate public spaces or use formerly government-regulated areas to 
exercise the "Right to Work". Neoliberalism as a logic and practice demands street vendors be 
responsible for their poverty and their "choice" to appropriate public spaces: they must follow 
the rule oflaw and engage in the property market, meet stringent criteria to receive conditional 
authorization to work in public space, or pay the consequences of appropriating public spaces. 
The precarity of many street vendors is exacerbated by a combination of eradication and 
formalization strategies. Marginality produced by eradication policies is not new (see de Soto, 
1989; Hays-Mitchell, 1994). Marginalization emerging for street vendors who mayor may not 
comply with formalization is, however, recent. Formalization has in part produced this new 
marginality by differentiating street vendors into complying and non-complying groups based on 
the ability to initiate the formalization process, with state assistance provided to only a small 
group of vendors deemed qualified by the municipality. Non-complying vendors are subjected to 
long-standing municipal practices of eradication and delegitimized for their so-called "choice" 
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(under neoliberal rationality) to avoid formalization. Complying street vendors are subjected to 
market forces, and their informal status is not resolved but rather made more uncertain and even 
exacerbated by the impoverishment caused by a neoliberal free-market system. In these cases, 
vendors that cannot complete formalization and access to private property are also deemed 
responsible (again, under neoliberal rationality) for their poverty. 
In this thesis I discuss the problems created for street vendors by formalization policies 
through examining municipal policies on street vending, as well as documents from district 
municipalities and local media, all from Lima, Peru. I argue that neoliberalism is changing the 
face of marginality in Lima, and especially in los canas of Lima. I show that informality is an 
important part of marginality as it unfolds in street vending. By examining the regulation of 
street vendors in Lima I develop the argument that neoliberallogics and practices operate at two 
different scales in producing this marginality: the citizen and public space. At the scale of the 
citizen neoliberal discourse produces exclusions through the reassertion of right to property, and 
through governing, compliance and production of norms, which can be described as the 
confluence of the colonial present with neoliberalism. At the scale of public space street vendors 
become perceived as a problem that must be removed Neoliberal urbanization creates conditions 
for public space to be used for accumulation strategies and therefore assists in the mobilization 
of strategies to remove street vendors from public spaces, including formalization. 
I explore how neoliberalization produces new forms of marginality at these two scales in 
three chapters. Chapter Three develops the first part of the argument about marginality produced 
through formalization schemes at the scale ofthe citizen. I critique neoliberal citizenship for its 
homogenization, highlighting that through formalization policies street vendors have constraints 
in how they may be citizens in the city. I highlight how exclusion works through formalization in 
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ways that disallow participation for those who are not governed as formal citizens - that is those 
who do not comply with formalization policy. In this chapter I reassert the normative claims to 
the right to appropriation and participation in space as part of substantive citizenship and ways to 
belong. In Chapter Four I describe the reorientations of property under the ownership model- a 
requisite and a norm for neoliberal social organization. I discuss the relationship of property to 
exclusion by highlighting how property rights under neoliberalism are practiced through 
dispossession, enclosure and violence. This includes the role of racism in the colonial present 
which produces violent responses to street vendors by the local state. 
In Chapter Five I address how marginality is produced at the scale of public space. In this 
chapter I argue that neoliberal urbanization tries to resolve the problem of street vendors by 
prohibiting almost all forms of appropriation of public space, and it does so by using 
formalization strategies. I review urban renewal as a part of neoliberal urbanization, including 
the cases of the Historic Centre of Lima (in the district Cercado de Lima), Independencia and 
San Martin de Porres. These strategies become integral to formalization and sometimes include 
street vendors into the development plan via purchasing or renting property in the area. 
Ultimately, however, they operate by relegating vendors out of public spaces. In both cases, I 
argue, the right to appropriate public spaces is compromised by these growth-first urban renewal 
projects. 
Chapter Two addresses methodology, with an emphasis on the ways the analysis was 
shaped by my own subjectivity, as well as the particularities and contingencies of my field work. 
I explain how this thesis is constructed as a montage out of rigorous readings of all relevant 
literature, the conditions ofthe field work, my subjectivities, and daily life in Lima during short-
term visits between 2005-2009. The goal is to address how all authors are situated, and in 
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particular, how I am situated as a white Anglo-North American male writing about street vendors 
in Lima, Peru, and how my experiences in Lima and daily readings of news and blogs from Lima 
also shape my understanding of the research. The chapter also addresses how I strategized data 
retrieval in the most effective ways I knew and how those strategies resulted in the data set. 
The present introductory chapter outlines the relationship of street vending to informality, 
explains how informality is part of state regulatory strategies, what neoliberalism and neoliberal 
urbanization (urbanism) are and why the street vending policies in district municipalities of los 
conos are the preoccupation ofthis research. In order to do this, I describe the context of street 
vending in Lima, and discuss the variety of ways the practice is conceived (and represented). I 
also defme a number of key concepts - informality and formalization, neoliberalism and 
neoliberal urbanism - and their relationship to the transformation of Lima through 20th Century 
urbanization. 
I begin by defming neoliberalism and neoliberal urbanism both theoretically and in the 
context of Lima. I then relate street vending to informality, formalization, and the transformation 
of Lima. By doing so I provide theoretical context for the research as well as assert the 
importance ofthe period following 1996-2009 and the geography of los conos of Lima to the 
literatures of Urban, Economic and Political Geography I use to describe this new marginality in 
produced in Lima. 
1.2 Neoliberalism in the Context of Lima 
In this section I briefly describe the terms neoliberalism and neoliberal urbanism. My aim is to 
establish how neoliberalism and neoliberal urbanism have made important changes in Lima from 
the period ofneoliberal shock in the late 1980s to the present. First, I establish what 
neoliberalism is as rationality, focusing particularly on its prescription for states and for 
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individuals. Second, I define neoliberal urbanism as the way in which neoliberalism unfolds in 
everyday life in urban spaces. I then demonstrate how my research is informed by the recent 
history ofneoliberal urbanism in Lima and the employment ofneoliberallogics through the 
formalization. 
Neoliberalism is a renaissance of 19th Century liberalism and its tenets of freedom, 
equality and property (Jessop, 2002). Yet it is more than just the return of 19th Century 
liberalism. It is a response to what is deemed the perversion ofthe tenets ofliberalism and it 
advocates dismantling centralized state economic and social reproduction (Harvey, 2005; 
Hackworth, 2007). Further, it claims that market structures such as private property and personal 
and institutional competition are superior instruments in the distribution of society's resources in 
comparison to centralized political powers, which are deemed inefficient, unjust or biased in the 
allocation of resources (Peck, 2001; Harvey, 2005). As neoliberalism problematizes the state as 
the main distributor of resources, it privileges the role of the state as protector of free exchange 
and the rule oflaw (Harvey, 2005; Hackworth, 2007). Ironically, this produces a paradox in the 
orthodoxy, leading to a stronger and more authoritarian state under neoliberalism (Bates and 
Krueger, 1993). 
Neoliberalism also prescribes the empowerment ofthe individual based in the rules ofthe 
market generalized throughout society. Ostensibly the individual will encounter political 
freedom and satisfaction through responding as a market actor which requires that they become a 
homo (Economus. As Foucault notes, the difference ofthe neoliberal subject from the liberal 
homo (Economus is that "he" not only make rational choices in market exchange but also he must 
be "an entrepreneur of himself [making wise investments in himself], being for himself his own 
capital [creating marketable returns through educational, social, health and cultural 
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investments] ... his own producer ... the source of his earnings" (2008, p. 226). This neoliberal 
subject is ultimately responsible for every aspect of their life - happiness, wealth, and health. The 
neoliberallogic has been most popularized in Margaret Thatcher's claim ''there is no such thing 
[as society]! There are individual men and women and there are families and no government can 
do anything except through people and people look to themselves first" (1987, as cited in 
Margaret Thatcher Foundation, 2010, URL). 
I describe neoliberal urbanism as the lived experiences of people in cities that both 
produce and contest the neoliberalization of urban spaces. These spaces are the privileged sites 
ofneoliberalism, and local government actors likewise hold privileged positions in producing 
and contesting it. The emergence ofinterlocal competition and increased capital mobility (Peck 
and Tickell, 2002), and a rescaling of development responsibilities to cities, implicate local 
governments in reproducing neoliberalism and in regulating its tensions. With a larger 
dependency on locally-generated revenues, urban renewal has emerged as a global strategy for 
local economic growth (Smith, 2002). Hackworth (2007) refers to this strategy not only as 
neoliberalization of urban space but also as the knife-edge ofneoliberal urbanism: it is the 
assertion of local governments' role as market facilitator and, as Keil (2009) would claim, 
indicates the internalizing ofneoliberallogics through spatial governing practices. 
Klein's (2007) description of policy shocks has particular relevance to neoliberalization 
in Peru. Economist Hernando de Soto became an important figure for neoliberal shock reforms 
as his Instituto de Libertad y Democracia policy recommendations were implemented en masse 
under the final years of the Garcia administration (1985-1990) and the first Fujimori government 
(1990-1995; de Soto, 1989, p.xxxi) during a period of immense political instability. Fujimori's 
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immediate change to a neoliberal policy regime upon his election2, signified by the adoption of 
de Soto into his policy team and a trip to Washington DC, led quickly to reforms: 
deregulatedlreregulated fmance and labour markets, privatized public resources, and further 
integration of Peru into the international economy (Roberts, 1995; Portes and Roberts, 2005). 
The immediate impacts of the reforms had their own ability to shock, particularly on much of the 
poor: increasing income inequality, unemployment, and informal economic activity (Portes and 
Roberts, 2005). 
Neoliberal urbanization and one of its key strategies, urban renewal, have unfolded in the 
context of the transformation of Lima, including the massive appropriation of public space in the 
Historic City Centre of Lima (see de Soto, 1989). The destruction ofthe cultural property ofthe 
Historic City Centre of Lima, which Andrade attributed to the presence of informal vendors and 
the consequent years ofurban decline, was responded to by an urban renewal project in 1996 
(Gandalfo, 2009). The project was not just about recuperating cultural property from decline and 
ridding the streets of informality (see Gandalfo, 2009). It was also an expansion ofneoliberal 
urbanization, intended to improve property values by attracting tourists and investments such as 
hotels to the city centre (Leonard, 2000). In this urban renewal project - neoliberal urbanization 
- the confluence ofneoliberallogics and practices with eradication policies came about. The 
project aimed to remove street vendors from the Historic City Centre and it did so through 
attempting formalization strategies. 
I highlight this case because "relocating" street vendors through formalization became 
responses elsewhere shortly after the implementation of Andrade's plan in the Historic City 
Centre, and in districts of los conos: in San Juan de Miraflores , Villa Maria del Triunfo, and San 
2 In the 1990 elections Fujimori ran on a platform that countered Vargas Llosa's promise to impose neoliberal 
reforms. Fujimori won the election, and then he adopted neoliberal reforms. 
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Martin de Porres, for example (desco/Alternativa, 2001). The responsibilization of structural 
factors onto individual street vendors (Hunt, 2009) demonstrates neoliberallogic of creating the 
subject homo reconomus through urban renewal. The success of the recuperation project has 
arguably created the impulse to replicate these policies elsewhere, and to employ formalization 
as a way to eradicate street vending; 
Beyond the case ofthe Historic City Centre, the sites of informal claims to work and 
subsist are being challenged by neoliberal discourses that expect street vendors to be responsible 
for their poverty. The production of new marginality, I argue, can be seen by the attempts to 
formalize second and third wave migrants in Lima who live in los conos and practice street 
vending. For this reason, my interest is to study street vending policies in districts located in los 
conos following the period Historic City Centre evictions, which occurred from 1996 until 
roughly 2000. 
1.3 Street Vendors, Ambulantes, Informals? 
The literature on economic trade ofthose who take to public space utilizes multiple terms: 
itinerant vending (comercio ambulatorio), street vending, and informal vending (comercio 
informal). These terms are often used interchangeably and are not easily distinguished from each 
other. The key shared feature is informality, which I will discuss at length in order to clarify its 
relation to vending activities and in order to set up one ofthe primary concerns of this thesis: 
formalization. 
Itinerant vending, street vending, and informal vending share the commonality of being 
economic activities that can occur in public spaces. In Peru, the activity is most often referred to 
as comercio ambulatorio and those practicing as ambulantes. The precise meaning of comercio 
ambulatorio refers to something different than street vending or comercio informal. Comercio 
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ambulatorio literally refers to the practice of individuals who wander (deambular) through 
streets, shopping centres, or any other location that potential customers can be found to engage in 
small-scale vending, whether holding onto their merchandise or pushing it with mobile carts. The 
term often becomes conflated with street vending, which can include both vending from a fixed 
location and comercio ambulatorio. de Soto (1989) suggests that comercio ambulatorio is an 
early stage in the process of street vending (the next stage is vending in a fixed location) in a 
series of informal vending practices. This definition differs from the understanding of comercio 
ambulatorio in currently valid law. The Metropolitan Lima By-Law 002-1985-MML defines it 
as "[a] small-scale economic activity that is developed in fairgrounds (campos feriales) or in 
regulated areas of the public thoroughfare (via publica) to sell prepared, manufactured and/or 
natural products". Thus, comercio ambulatorio may also be understood as fixed-post vending 
under the municipal defmition. Furthermore, with this defmition it may be an activity that does 
not occur as street vending, as not all campos feriales in regulated areas are located in the streets 
(in this study, however, any campos feriales referred to are located on streets). I understand the 
common use in Lima of comercio ambulatorio to refer to all forms of street vending as stated in 
By-Law 002-1 985-MML but acknowledge that those referred to as ambulantes may no longer 
deambular, even if they have likely done so in the past. In this work, as in vernacular speech in 
Lima, comercio ambulatorio can refer to all forms of street vending. 
The term street vending refers to the soliciting or trading of goods and services in street 
spaces (e.g., shoe-shining, selling prepared food or groceries, workers that take potential clients 
into private businesses (jaladores), outdoor sex work), as opposed to all employment in street 
spaces (e.g., security guards, police officers; Bromley, 2000). As earlier suggested, the practice 
of street vending can take on fixed or itinerant forms (de Soto, 1989; Bromley, 2000). 
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Nevertheless, in most cases street vending is never fixed in a particular space given the fact that 
the struggle for the opportunity to sell in public space is challenged by state desires to normalize 
the use of streets for transportation (de Soto, 1989; Bromley, 2000). Thus, some forms of street 
vending actually are temporally predictable - the vendors return to the same location day-after-
day for months or even years - but lack formal authorization: they are both temporary and 
permanent. The Caqueta-area, which has been appropriated by street vendors for over 50 years, 
is proof ofthis. All vendors in the area are still referred to as ambulantes by the District 
Municipality of San Martin de Porres3 despite that the area is popularly known as a marketplace 
and that some vendors have booths built into the public thoroughfare. Because street vendors 
lack authorization to permanently be there they remain informal and mobile. As their practices 
are labeled informal by the local state and state representatives, and consequently street vendors 
are deemed ambulantes for being informal, there is much overlap between street vending and 
comercio ambulatorio. 
There is another explanation for why street vending and comercio ambulatorio overlap 
significantly. In English academic literature street vending is used as a synonym for comercio 
ambulatorio (see Hays-Mitchell, 1994; Bromley, 2000; Cross, 2000; Roever, 2005; Roever, 
2006; Swanson, 2007; Donavan, 2008; Bromley and Mackie, 2009; Crossa, 2009; Hunt, 2009). 
The use of these words as synonyms is quite common, and interchangeable as there is no 
linguistic equivalent to street vending or street vendors: "[i]n Peru street vendors are called 
ambulantes" (Hays-Mitchell, 1994, p. 427). Not only are the terms street vending and comercio 
3 Raul Ramos, the Director of the Office of Economic Development and Auditing at the District Municipality of San 
Martin de Porres, corrected me a number of times when I did not refer to street vendors as ambulantes in May 2009. 
The rationale according to Mr. Ramos was that ambulantes had no right to public spaces and should not be 
stationary or semi-permanently fixed in space. 
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ambulatorio synonymous but these terms are also linked to the practice of comercio informal and 
also treated as interchangeable with that term. I too treat the terms as interchangeable for reasons 
I return to after discussing informality. 
1.3.1 Informalitv 
Informality cannot be easily defined, but it is often and naively understood in dualistic terms that 
treat informality as an extralegal subsistence practice of the marginalized that contrasts with the 
fIfm-based state-approved economy (see Castells and Portes, 1989; Roever, 2005). This naIve 
conceptualization can conflate street vending or comercio ambulatorio with a problematically 
teleological version of informality. In order to avoid this I suggest that informality should be 
understood from both a "from above" and "from below" perspective. I explain why the dualist 
model of marginal is false as I define informality through the proposed arguments. 
Academic contributors to the literature on informality agree that it is in part a product of 
state policies and practices (de Soto, 1989; Alsayyad and Roy, 2004; Bromley, 2004; Roy, 
2005). Perhaps one of the more influential theories of informality is de Soto's legalistic 
perspective. de Soto (1989) treats informality as a product of the inefficiencies of state 
bureaucracies and regulations, which lead to relatively more efficient, extralegal solutions. For 
example, these solutions take the form of squatting in housing markets, and street vending or 
micro enterprises in trade and production. de Soto's legalistic perspective (1989) suggests that 
interventionist policies ofthe state are precisely what keeps people out of formality, and leaves 
informals searching for security through other means than market behaviour. Ultimately, the 
state should engage in legalizing informality by both recognizing the property of the poor and by 
reducing ''red tape" thus allowing ''the invisible hand ofthe market" to do its work through 
market actors (de Soto, 1989; see Roy, 2004). By making formality accessible to everyone 
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informals will avoid becoming political: as de Soto might word it, formalization would assure 
that vendors realize their entrepreneurial nature instead of acting as partisan organizations (see 
de Soto, 1989, p. 90). 
What is useful about de Soto's observations is his acknowledgement of the state as 
regulator of informality, which I describe further below. Nevertheless, de Soto' s position that 
those practicing informality are merely "legally excluded" from formal market participation and 
thus left to fend for themselves in a parallel economic system fails to acknowledge structural 
inequalities in capitalist markets and social exclusion apparent in informality - both of which 
require political representation. There are nuances to the argument that informality is a parallel 
system ofthe excluded (however defined), which I will describe in this section. The de Soto 
argument that informals engage in political acts as a result of market distortions is challenged in 
Chapter Three where I discuss neoliberal citizenship. 
Castells and Portes (1989) challenge the notion of informality as the exclusion ofthe poor 
by state regulation as well as informality as parallel to a formal system. Like de Soto they see 
informality as a product of state regulation but they suggest that unregulated practices are a result 
ofthe changes within capitalist social relations, often with the tolerance and acceptance ofthe 
state. They claim that the formal and informal economies are quite integrated, and often 
informality is used by producers as a fix for high production costs caused by regulations and 
organized labour, and accepted by states trying to gain a comparative advantage in the global 
economy (Castells and Portes, 1989). Thus, informality is not just a practice of subsistence but 
also a practice ofthose who control and regulate the means of production to by-pass the costs of 
certain regulations. Informalization is a catalyst in the production of precarious labour as well as 
in a heterogeneous, de-collectivized labour movement (Castells and Portes, 1989). 
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A strength of Cast ells andPortes' (1989) understanding of informality is that it does not 
crudely separate formal from informal, nor assure that informal economic activities are 
necessarily marginal. In fact, informalization is deemed as both a process of liberalization that 
benefit producers (e.g., formal and substantive environmental and labour deregulation and the 
"roll-back" ofthe welfare state) and a product ofthe need ofthe poor to engage in survival . 
strategies under contemporary capitalism - whether as own-account operators/"entrepreneurs" or 
as workers of subcontracting (informalized), smaller firms (Castell and Portes, 1989). 
Informality is not marginality, nor does a marginal sector exist on its own: the well-to-do engage 
in informality, and they do so by mixing formality with informality (see Bromley's (2004) 
discussions ofthe high-class Utopia Night Club disaster in Lima, Peru, the Enron Scanda~ and 
Capecchi's (1989) discussion ofltalian frrms). Second, de Soto's (1989) notion that formality 
would emerge by dropping regulations to the level of the informals proved the opposite effect. In 
liberalizing economies, particularly in Latin America, there has been a shrinking of formal work 
conditions, most notably for the middle class, and a rise in informal economic activities, 
particUlarly microenterprises and informal employment (Centeno and Portes, 2006). In fact, 
liberalization under neoliberal reforms brought rising unemployment, falling wages, and rising 
informality throughout Latin America from 1990 to 2003 (Leiva, 2008). de Soto's prediction that 
formality would emerge through liberalization has been contradicted in practice. Furthermore, 
the substantive outcomes of neoliberal reform raise questions about the role of informalization 
and neoliberalism in producing precarious environments for the urban poor (see Sections 1.3.2, 
1.4). 
Roy and Alsayyad (collaboratively and individually) have also addressedthe-structural 
factors of informality. Informality, from above, is a strategy of the state. According to Roy 
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(2005) the power ofthe state is to use its sovereignty to suspend the rules, to determine what 
belongs in the category of formal (planned, ftxed) and informal (flexible), and to determine what 
forms of informality should and should not appear. Thus, the state has capacity to relegate 
certain lands, practices and institutions fIXed (formal) and others under constant negotiation 
(informal). As Alsayyad and Roy (2004) argue the logic ofthe state in the neoliberal era of 
economic flexibilization is to ask the following: which forms of informality should exist? The 
state determines which practices are necessary for the organization of urban space and the 
economy, and which practices must not be. Certain forms of informality can enjoy (unstable) 
legitimacy while others may be annihilated (Roy, 2005). 
My understanding of informality derives from the analyses of Cast ells and Portes and 
Alsayyad and Roy. Informality must be considered a state strategy for organizing people across 
space, and, a set of practices for circumventing regulations - as much as for engaging in wage 
repression in the service of accumulation as it is a survival strategy for those whose workplaces 
have become informalized, or remain underemployed and unemployed. Informality is useful in 
regulating economies by the state as it is also a useful tool for urbanization and development 
(Castells and Portes, 1989; Al Sayyad and Roy, 2004; Roy, 2005). To simply suggest that people 
organically create informal systems as a response to "barriers to entry" fails to acknowledge the 
ways in which the state has power in producing informality, negotiating its terms and later 
fostering or annihilating it. 
The state also plays an important part in determining which occupants or activities in a 
territory are legitimate, and how that legitimacy unfolds in informality. Race, class and gender 
are particularly important in the use of informality as an organizing logic. Yiftachel and Yakobi 
(2004) demonstrate how informality can be produced to create spaces of exception for certain 
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ethnic groups, only to determine later how those groups will be integrated. The legitimacy for 
action against those whose modes of existence depend on informality comes from the fact that 
they are made exceptions. Perlman (2004) notes those living in/avelas (settlements founded on 
squatting) in Rio de Janeiro, Brasil have an informality shaped by repression and exclusion from 
the state. The marginality of these spaces and the individuals that dwell in them results from 
deliberate exclusion based on identity categories. 
Informality from below is more than just the reactions to state regulations. Indeed, from 
an instrumentalist and reactionary position some actors may choose to function inside or outside 
formality based on the benefits they can procure from practicing in either realm (Castells and 
Portes, 1989; Roever, 2005). Yet what is most important for this thesis to recognize about 
informality from below is how one's security and political representation are constituted by 
informal claims made through the appropriation of space. This is of particular importance to 
groups that are differentiated Others - those of identity categories deliberately excluded by the 
state and placed in the "state of exception" (Agamben, 1998). Roy (2005) states the claims made 
in urban informality are akin to the "Right to the City" (see Lefebvre, 2002) and contrast with 
formal claims such as "Right to Property". These claims do not necessarily represent active 
political movements (although sometimes they do; see the 1980s activism of FE DE V AL, a street 
vendors' organization in Lima operating from 1979 to the present). Informals tend to use active 
and substantive claims to belonging in order to have security in the face of being located outside 
the dominant society. Bayat (2004) notes that informal vendors actively claim space and, in 
doing so, resist the ordering of public spaces by the state. 
Often such claims are attempts by informals to accommodate themselves comfortably 
within dominant structures rather than to dismantle them (Bayat, 2004; Roy, 2005).Whether 
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efforts by informals are to revolutionize society is debatable both in the geographies of theory, 
and in analysis. In Latin America, the politics of informals have been represented as socially 
transformative, emancipatory and resistant of the state (see Bayat, 2004). Throughout the 
informal urbanization process (1960s to 1980s) in Peru the po litical mobilization of informals for 
social change has been particularly prevalent and, consequently, transformative (Leeds and 
Leeds, 1976; Matos Mar, 2004). Yet the theory ofinformals as engaging in social change, 
especially in Peru, is suspect in the present context (1995 to the present) especially after over a 
decade ofintemal conflict in the 1980s and 1990s (see Matos Mar, 2004). In this thesis I do not 
suggest that or verify if struggles of street vendors are active attempts at social transformation -
although they may be. I argue that street vendors engage in struggles, which have, in the past 
been motivated for social and political change, and in the present approximate important 
prescriptions for social change, in order to create another possible world. 
I now return to the issue of Lima's street vendors' informality. I argue that comercio 
informal overlaps with comercio ambulatorio and street vending. From a technical perspective, 
street vendors are deemed informal as they are categorized as such by state agencies and NGOs. 
In this regard they are a significant portion of all informal economic activity constituting 20-25% 
of Lima's informal sector (see Roever, 2005). In addition, street vendors represent a group that 
are treated as an exception (to formal businesses), and exposed to both policies of eradication 
and tolerance in oscillation. Like all other forms of informality, their claims are constantly being 
negotiated. By-Law 002-1985-MML is a good example ofthis negotiation, as it partially 
authorizes street vending on conditions of stationary vending in regulated areas (see Roever, 
2005), while punishing those engaged in mobile forms; In the contemporary era offormalization 
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policies there are several ways that informals are differentiated and subsequently tolerated or not. 
This is the topic of Chapter Three. 
1.3.2 Street Vendor Marginalitv and Informalitv 
Street vendors suffer the economic, gendered, racia~ and class dimensions of marginality that are 
reproduced through exclusionary practices in state regulation of informality. Economic 
restructuring under neoliberalism, along with the racist policies ofthe state, have influenced how 
certain economic practices are to be treated. In this section I explain the marginality of street 
vendors as part of the category of informal. 
Accounts of urban informality between 1980 and 2000 show that informal vendors are 
primarily rural migrants most of whom are from the Andes (de Soto, 1989; Matos Mar, 2004; 
Gandolfo, 2009). Thus informal vending, at least in the contemporary period in Lima, is still 
attributed to rural migrants from the Andes that remain especially racialized as non-whites both 
phenotypically and discursively (de la Cadena, 2000). Although the period of mass migration has 
passed high proportion of informal vendors are still racial minorities. According to a study of the 
informal vendor population of the district Independencia in 2002 almost 70% of informal 
vendors were identified as rural migrants or migrants from smaller coastal cities, the 
overwhelming majority of whom come from rural locations in the Andes (Municipalidad 
Distrital de Independencia, 2008, p. 35)4. 
Women comprise a disproportionate share of vendors in Lima's los canas. Ypeij (2000) 
highlights the gendered and spatial division oflabour that limits the access of women practicing 
informality to larger, formal markets for employment and places their economic activities closer 
4 These statistics do not take into consideration what percentage of sons and daughters of rural migrant parents 
engage in informal street vending practices. 
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to their homes or in smaller sites of material distribution. In the District Municipality of Comas, 
the municipality counted 71 % of informal street vendors as women (Municipalidad Distrital de 
Comas, 2005, p. 8). In the District Municipality ofIndependencia, a study in 2004 showed that 
women constitute 69% ofthe street vendor population (Municipalidad Distrital de 
Independencia, 2008, p. 35). While women are increasingly incorporated into the labour force in 
Peru (INEI, 1999, as cited in Municipalidad Distrital de Independencia, 2008, p. 37), their 
disproportionate numbers in informal vending demonstrate women's tendency towards 
precarious labour activities. 
Street vending occupies an exploited place both in the continuum of informal economic 
practices and in relation to the formal economy. In the informal economy there are significant 
wage gaps between actors occupying entrepreneurial status and wage working status, and also 
within both categories. Chen (2005) demonstrates that there is a gendered division between 
entrepreneurial and wage-working informals with income disparities that affect womens' 
livelihoods negatively. Between these categories there is liminality where "entrepreneurs"-
labelled own-account workers (i.e., they employ themselves; Chen, 2005) - fit closer to the wage 
labour section due to the precarious work conditions: precarious sources for earnings, poor 
working conditions, and lack of rights and political representation (International Labour Office, 
2002). These conditions are often experienced by women and ethnic minorities; groups that often 
form much of the informal economy (International Labour Office, 2002). 
Informal vendors in Lima, Peru tend to occupy the category of own-account operators 
that self-exploit for survival on limited gains. As well as the conditions identified for informal 
own-account operators by the International Labour Office (2002), the income generation of 
informal vendors in Lima is largely low. In the case ofIndependencia, 78% of vendors and their 
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families receive less than a minimum wage for "survival"s of Sf. 510 per month ($190 CDN as 
of June 29, 2010; Municipalidad Distrital de Independencia, 2008, p. 47). The low incomes of 
informal vendors and their families are due to their inability to earn a sufficient wage through 
vending activities: over 50% generate revenues that are less than halfthe minimum wage for 
"survival" (Municipalidad Distrital de Independencia, 2008, p. 47). 
The poverty of informal vendors, coupled with their persecution through municipal 
policies and practices, demonstrates that street vending largely qualifies as a survival strategy in 
Lima for the marginalized urban poor. The groups that participate in informality are already 
noticeably differentiated Others that are excluded from dominant society based on the identity 
categories of race, class and gender. In Chapters Three, Four, and Five, I demonstrate how these 
hostilities produced by eradicating certain forms of informal practices are driven by neoliberal 
logics and the colonial present and produce new forms of marginality for differentiated Others in 
Lima. 
1.4 Formalization 
Formalization can be understood in two opposite yet complementary ways. The first is the 
informalization of formality, which has happened during and after Latin American neoliberal 
reform (1990s to the present).lnformalization is the deregulation ofa once-regulated institution 
of practices in the legal and social environment (see Castells and Portes, 1989). The second Is the 
formalizing of informality: the regulation ofan institution of practices in the legal and social 
environment. According to de Soto (1989) the goal is to bring every practice by all actors to the 
level of formality. For de Soto (1989) this means formalizing informal claims to property and 
5 Surviving on Sf. 510 per month is not possible if one needs to obtain a minimum nutrition level, pay for clean . 
water, and pay for transportation to work. 
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thus bringing access to legal institutions to those who practice informality, as well as 
informalizing formality by liberalizing and deregulating in order to make the conditions of 
formality accessible for all. 
de Soto (1989) argues that state acceptance of informal claims is not formalization if 
property rights are not respected. Re-regulating informal street vendors in public spaces and 
adjacent public properties, such as is done in By-Law 002-1985-MML is precisely the problem 
of extensive regulation with no promise for formality (de Soto, 1989). His answer is to place 
informals on the path to private property to achieve full formalization. For informal street 
vendors this path to privately-owned marketplaces will enable vendors to realize their informal 
claims to security as property claims and an effective state that ensures competitive market 
conditions for wealth generation (de Soto, 1989). As public property is administered by the state 
there is danger, according to de Soto (1989), of informal claims to be secured through politics -
they must be secured through the law, and thus through the right to property. 
According to de Soto, as competitive market conditions require compliance with the law, 
there is a tension between regulations for necessary controls and the problem of extensive 
bureaucracy. The other goal of formalization then is to establish what controls are important . 
while reducing bureaucracy. For informal vendors, de Soto's version of formality requires them 
to first have access to property and then access business licenses, tax registries, and health and 
sanitation checks, all of which would be provided with the least amount of paper work, time and 
effort. 
Yet, as Roever (2005) suggests, de Soto' s version of formalization (access to private 
property and bringing regulations to the level of informal practices) is not always feasible for the 
state. Rather, the regulations of the state are a partial formalizing of informal claims, such as in 
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By-Law 002-1985-MML. This by-law establishes some regulation of street vendors' economic 
practices to the extent that the state and vendors have agreed to. In this case, there is no decisive 
regulation ofthe property; the ability remains for the state and street vendors to renegotiate the 
conditions of use of space. Roever (2005) states this is the recurring state and social practice of 
formalizing informality: the repeated negotiation of the terms offormalization, and to what 
degree formalization will occur. 
Formality and informality are organizing logics of the state, and strategically negotiated 
by both the state and the collective political and encroachment practices of street vendors. I show 
formalization in the contemporary era in Lima has been used alongside eviction strategies as a 
way of eradicating large numbers of informal street vendors from public spaces. The state's push 
for massive evictions of street vendors and its intention to subsequently relocate them to 
marketplaces or commercial centres on private property demonstrates that de Soto's vision of 
formalization is adopted by the state. The substantive reality, however, is that vendors will resist 
eviction and attempt to renegotiate the conditions of their appropriation ofpublic space. 
1.5 Transformation of Lima 
The research is informed by the transformation of Lima into a megacity with a large population 
of migrants and their families (primarily) from the Peruvian Andes. Urban informality, while 
growing under neoliberal reforms, is also a product ofthe legacies of informal urbanization, 
including the opportunities available to rural migrants in the context ofthe political, social, 
economic and demographic processes occurring during the time oftheir migration and 
settlement. As I describe the transformation of Lima I seek to highlight ftrst, how informality 
has been a factor in the urbanization of Lima and, second, the geography of Lima's . 
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transformation, particularly through the growth of los canas (literally translated as ''the cones" 
referring to peripheral sections ofthe city). 
By highlighting Lima's transformation through the migration of people from the Andes to 
the city to - largely - los canas I have two goals. First, to show how the current attempts to 
formalize street vendors results in their socio-spatial exclusion and the production of a new 
marginality, which emerge out of the context of Lima's informal urbanization. Second, to show 
that attempts to eradicate certain forms of informality through formalization and the prohibition 
of street vending are occurring in spaces produced through informal (and as I describe later, 
neoliberal) urbanization. The changing face of marginality for street vendors is caused by the 
renegotiation of formality and informality (although mostly eradication of the latter) in the 
spaces where many Andean migrants and their families have made their informal claims to 
security. The spaces of los canas are being re-regulated, producing new forms of exclusion for 
those inhabitants. 
The urban transformation of Lima is due to the period of mass migration from the Andes 
to Lima that occurred between the 1940s and the present. The growth was due to planned 
developments of working-class housing in1940s and 1950s, and from 1950 onwards larger-scale 
squatting in the spaces now known as los canas (Leonard, 2000). Barreda and Ramirez Corzo 
(2004) have highlighted the growth in three stages. There was a fIrst wave of barriadas (literally 
translated as neighbourhoods but refers to "squatters"; 1940-1954) along the Lima-Callao axis 
(e.g., Los Olivos, Rimae, San Martin de Porres). These barriadas were populated by the urban 
poor escaping the aftermath in the city centre of the 1940s earthquake as well as by rural 
migrants moving to Lima during emergent industrialization (Barreda and Ramirez Corzo, 2004, 
p. 206). The population more than doubled from 600 000 to 1.38 million people in that time 
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period (Leonard, 2000; Matos Mar, 2004). The characteristics of this migration are significant in 
comparison to later migrations. First, they occurred in some sections that would now be deemed 
los conos but by and large constituted growth within the current urban core of Lima (see Matos 
Mar, 2004). Second, the earlier migrations have been categorized as part of an "emergent" city 
versus the idea of a "miserable" city. According to Ball6n, migrants that arrived to the city in 
that circumstance and during that era [and spaces] have had a different level of inclusion and 
adaptation to the city, primarily representing this "emergent" city (2004, p. 8). This is due to the 
conditions during the migratory process (migration with opportunity during industrial growth; 
Ball6n, 2004). Academics have recognized that these conditions have produced a disparity 
between the different waves of migrants to Lima. Both Matos Mar (2004) and Ball6n (2004) 
suggest the fIrst wave of migrants from the 1940s and 1950s came to los conos as successful 
migrants while the second wave of migrants has struggled with economic instability and 
exclusion. 
The second wave of migration (1954-1980) was characterized by significant growth 
outside the established urban core/centre in areas with little or no market value on public 
property (Barreda and Ramirez Corzo, 2004). These areas also later became known as los conos. 
During this period of mass migration urban informality became the dominant mode of 
urbanization for racialized rural migrants. Although migrants found different options than 
servitude and unpaid work, or living in haciendas or in rural communities, the transformation of 
Peru from a primarily rural to an urban popUlation followed exclusionary premises and strategies 
for survival, which often took the form of informal urban practices - squatting, and street 
vending, for example. 
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The informality from above was in part due to the exclusive and insular composition of 
the traditional criollo state that excluded rural migrants from state protections and benefits (see 
Matos Mar, 2004). Yet, despite the insular nature ofthe criollo state, it often permitted 
informality while exculpating itself from responsibility of urban development in los conos6. In 
the 1960s the state recognized settlements formed by squatting, but used "self-help" policies to 
place the responsibility of development on the squatter community organizations (Leonard, 
2000; Barreda and Ramirez Corzo, 2004). The partial formalizing of the informal urbanization 
process, gave some legitimacy to Andean migrants making claims to security through 
spontaneous and creative survival activities. It also produced a "passive permissivity" on the part 
of the state to practices such as squatting and street vending. 
The second wave of migration makes up a significant part of Lima's population growth. 
The city had expanded significantly by the end of this period to 4.6 million people with those 
living in squatted settlements accounting for approximately 30% ofthe population of Lima 
(Leonard, 2000). This wave has produced the majority of urbanization in the area of los conos. 
The third wave of migration (1980- 2004) was characterized by slow growth rates from 
migration, a population growth to 8.5 million inhabitants, and a consolidation of los conos 
formed by 5 million limeiios (a person from Lima; Figure 1.1). Migration to Lima in this period 
came with fewer opportunities, and as a result of internal conflict in Peru (Barreda and Ramirez 
Corzo, 2004). This wave of migration came with neoliberal reforms, the consolidation of global 
capitalism producing more inequality in Lima, and a rise in informality (Matos Mar, 2004). The 
opportunities to squat on land became fewer as most habitable land had been appropriated, and 
6 The popularity from the 1960s onwards in Lima of John Turner's "self-help" policy, which encouraged and 
responsibilized squatters to build their own housing is evidence ofthis. 
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primarily marginal land was available for appropriation, creating conditions of substandard 
housing (Barreda and Ramirez Corzo, 2004). As stated earlier (Ballon, 2004) it is this wave of 
migrants that experience the greatest spatial marginality, and difficulty in being economically 
and socially included in the city. This research is conceived mainly with the group of recent 
migrants and second wave migrants who face economic and social marginality more openly, and 
must engage in informal claims in order to subsist in Lima. They not only live in los conos, but 
also appropriate public spaces in los conos for work. 
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LOS TRES CONOS DE LA GRAN LIMA 
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Figure 1.1 The North, East and West 
cones of Lima (clockwise from the 
top: eono Norte, eono Este, eana 
Sur) representing the second and third 
wave migrants that now form the 
majority of Lima's population. 
(Source: Matos Mar, 2004, p. 153) 
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1.6 Conclusion 
This review 0 f the concepts of street vending, infonnality, formalization, neo liberalism, 
neoliberalism in Lima, and the historical transformation of Lima establishes a context for the 
arguments I provide in the following chapters. It also helps establish why I have chosen to 
investigate this new marginality in Lima, why I have chosen los conos as the sites to be 
analyzed, and why neoliberalism is important to discussing this new marginality. 
As I navigate the arguments in each chapter I aim to account for the changes in citizenship 
practices, property, and public space that are preoccupations of urban geography literature. More 
importantly, I, second, establish a framework for street vendors' struggles based on critical 
literatures on citizenship, property, and public space that incorporate debates about the current 
political economy. Third, my analysis broaches and synthesizes materials from a series of 
debates in three subdisciplines of Geography, urban, economic and political, as well as 
interdisciplinary debates. First, it covers economic geography by discussing the effects of 
economic restructuring under neoliberalism, and elucidating already-existing claims of the 
contradictions and crisis tendencies ofneoliberalism (see Peck, Theodore and Brenner, 2009). 
Second, urban geography debates on property rights, public space, the right to the city, urban 
informality and the processes of exclusion produced by neoliberal urbanism are incorporated. 
Third, I engage with political geography literature on citizenship, including discussion of the 
ways in which citizenship claims can be made through substantive practices and through public 
spaces. 
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Chapter 2 - Methodology 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I highlight the inherent contingencies and the subjective, partial nature ofthe 
research process, which shape both the data available for analysis and the overall presentation of 
the thesis. I ftrst demonstrate my positionality, including theoretical and political commitments 
that shape the research. I then engage in a two-fold argument that demonstrates how this research 
both intellectually and logistically is a "montage" produced by multiple actors. In this second 
section I focus on fteld work, which has shaped how I can discuss the changes of street vending 
and the "new" production of marginality through neoliberalism as a process. The chapter as a 
whole highlights this research as a "montage" both intellectually and practically. 
2.2 Positionality 
In order to describe how this research and its resultant thesis is a confluence of partialities I give 
a brief account of my positionality. The need to establish my positionality results from an 
acknowledgement. Haraway and others have rejected the notion that epistemological claims can 
be universal, on the basis that (a) universal claims rely on "a god trick of seeing everything from 
nowhere" and (b) they enact an epistemic and political violence that subjugates certain 
knowledges and creates uneven power relations that oppress those actors whose subjectivities are 
subjugated (see Haraway, 1988, p. 581; Rose, 1997). Rather what must be acknowledged are the 
contingencies oftruth claims over space and time, which constitute the historical and present 
constellations of subjectivity - the culmination of our differentiated positions (Haraway, 1988). 
Epistemological claims to truth are produced by the particular space-time relationships between 
actors. The way we navigate and practice knowledge from the environments we interact with 
shapes how we gaze at the world to make sense of it from our particular perspectives (Rose, 
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1997). In terms of my position, my relationship to those from whom I acquire "data", the 
supervisory committee, and the intended audience of this thesis all shape the knowledge I 
understand the world and my research topic. Less directly, yet not less important to how this 
research is shaped, are those with whom I converse day;;.to-day or less frequently, and those -
both alive and deceased - whose discourses have also shaped my position. 
My research in Lima, about Lima, is informed by my rather dynamic positionality, which 
cannot be easily positioned along an insider/outsider continuum (Mullings, 1999, as cited in 
Butz, 2010, p. 149). I participated in the spaces of my research as an outsider: an economically 
privileged, university educated, white, Anglo, Western male in los conos of Lima (in particular 
Canto Grande, San Juan de Lurigancho) with personal and political commitments to the 
university as an institution. The experience ofliving in Lima in los conos, engaging in informal 
economic practices that provide the livelihood ofthose who I lived with, experiencing in my own 
way the pressures of informal economic relations by state actors, the tensions of the colonial 
present, and the disparities between my everyday practices and the livelihood practices of others, 
has in some ways reasserted my position as outsider as it concurrently destabilizes that position. 
My experiences locate me as a boundary dweller - one whose research is written from personal 
experience and also as "authorized" knowledge-producer engaged with an object of study (see 
Butz, 2010, p. 150). Being a boundary dweller reflects the particular position I write from and 
my subjectivities in space and time. The thesis, and ofthe life ofthe researcher, is a part ofthe 
process ofthe self-construction: an exploration ofthe dynamics of one's position, or the 
changing relationship ofthe individual to the outside world (see Jensen and Glasmeier, 2010, p. 
83). I perceive my work to be a reflection of the uneasiness between the resultant personal and 
political commitments from living in Lima, Peru on and off from 2005 to 2009 and the 
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connections I made there during that time, and the more permanent aspects of my identity (white 
male, middle-class) coupled with newer aspects and commitments as an academic. 
As a student of critical geography, I recognize the need to challenge existing structures, 
dominant discourses, and assumptions (see Blomley, 2006). I think that privilege should be used 
for producing representations of reality that, in the process oftheir creation, reflect on both the 
problems of representations by the researcher of the researched and that advocate for social 
change by challenging dominant representations. I exemplify Bromley's observations regarding 
researchers on street vending "[typically those] who do research on street vending [and informal 
vending] end up as advocates, developing strong links with their subjects and tending to identify 
with them" (2000, p. 13). However, my advocacy is expressed with the caveat that privileged as 
a boundary dweller, I produce authorized knowledge from my personal experiences (see Butz, 
2010). This work is an expression of the power of that privilege, and engages my own sense of 
reality through problematically representing the world of others. It is also a normative work that 
seeks to produce empirically-driven observations with political commitment (to street vendors as 
a precarious group within the working class). More generally, I seek to use the various tools of 
Critical Geography (Blomley, 2006) to satisfy what Martin (2001) believes is the duty of 
geographers to challenge exclusion and marginality (in Lima's street vending policy) in order to 
inform a different kind of social action. Challenging these injustices must involve representations 
that are critical of the realities of the present and that also constitute a normative project of better 
futures (Blomley, 2007). 
2.3 Research Methods and Field Work 
Academic work always relies on a confluence of disparate and incomplete sources. Our works 
are always products ofthe (cited and non-cited) sources of knowledge we bring together shaped 
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by supervisory committees, intellectual interests, and the existing collection of available 
information, among other things, which together produce this "montage" called the thesis (Crang 
and Cook, 2007, p. 177-9). There is nothing to suggest this research could be anything but "bits 
and bobs from here, there and everywhere" (Clifford, 1992, as cited in Crang and Cook, 2007, p. 
178). But the montage form is not just a product of the subjectivity of the individual; it is also an 
intentional organization ofthe different pieces assembled in a particular way to have the reader 
consider reality differently. In this research my intention is to utilize a montage sensitivity to 
assemble information in ways that both problematize the neoliberalization of street vending in 
Lima, Peru, and to advocate against the oppression of street vendors. I do this through the 
collection of whatever pieces of information I can to make that argument. The presentation of 
this argument is a montage of the bits and pieces I take from Western Anglo 
geography/academic literature, Peruvian academic literature, Lima newspapers, municipal laws, 
my personal experiences, and the shared stories of the personal experiences of informants, 
strangers, friends, and family in Lima. The montage approach is especially appropriate for 
research that relies on Access to Information requests, as I do in my research. The inevitable 
denial of some request makes it impossible to gather the appropriate data for a systematic and 
comparative analysis. 
Producing empirically-informed research on the neoliberalization of street vendor 
policies in Lima, Peru required that I engaged in compiling information that could ostensibly be 
done in part from Canada (in hindsight), but mainly required a research period in Lima7• My 
experience in navigating through Lima in order to gather this information was shaped by the 
7 Without the research period in Peru I would not have been able to explore the different institutional histories or 
know the extent to which I could request and compile information. I would, however, have had access to the some of 
the published By-Laws, Decrees and Council Accords and some online news content and municipal press releases. 
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research question (informed by prior reading and my personal experiences in los conos), my 
ability to navigate different geographies (familiar and unfamiliar), and how I worked through an 
unfamiliar legal process for discovering what information exists and is available established 
through the Law of Transparency and Access to Information. But, as I highlight, the role of 
municipal government actors significantly shaped what information was available to me (both 
information for my research and information about accessing information) and thus what further 
questions (both formal information requests and informal requests about accessing information) I 
asked. 
The frrst set of information collected for this research was obtained from five district 
municipalities, and a sixth, Lima, which serves as both a provincial/metropolitan and district 
municipality. In order to obtain the information that I have, I approached about 1/3 of all of 
Lima's municipalities (14 of 43 municipalities) and solicited copies of documents, media and 
even recordings that relate to informal vendors, ambulantes and use of public spaces and 
commercial activities in public space through Law 27806 and its amendments - the Law of 
Transparency and Access to Information. The outcomes ofthese requests for information are 
summarized in Table 2.1. I initially requested the following for the time period following the 
evictions in the Historic City Centre of Lima (2002-2009): municipal press releases, municipal 
council agendas and/or meeting minutes from the council, By-Laws, Decrees, Council Accords 
and other Legal ActslNorms, and antecedents (i.e., reports and other documents that help 
substantiate the enactment ofa law) of By-Laws and/or Decrees. This search was widened to 
current legal norms (i.e., in force) and relevant legal norms and municipal documents. My search 
for older government documents was possible through the website of El Peruano, the national 
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government newspaper that prints laws from all government levels and government institutions. 
Their archive begins in 1996 and is completeS to the present date. 
The choice of the municipalities for Access to Information requests primarily reflects my 
interest in how neoliberallogics and practices in regulating street vendors have expanded to los 
conos. With the exception of La Victoria, Surquillo, and Metropolitan Lima all ofthe 
municipalities I visited were part of los conos. I chose to request information about the District 
Municipalities of La Victoria and Surquillo as both municipalities were known publicly to have 
performed evictions on informal vendors (see En Surquillo comenz6 demolici6n de 150 puestos 
de venta construidos en area destinada a parque, 2007, URL; Ambulantes exigen reubicaci6n, 
2008, URL) and I wanted to analyze for neoliberallogics and practices in these regulations. 
Further, both ofthe offices ofthese municipalities were located near transfer points to districts 
that I visited9, so they were convenient to include in my study. In the case of Metropolitan Lima 
there were two reasons for requesting information. First, I was interested in what regulations 
were passed and if any interventions occurred after the evictions in the Historic City Centre of 
Lima and outlying areas. Second, the Municipality of Metropolitan Lima has two functions that 
are relevant to my study: it acts as a District Municipality and thus regulates street vending 
(including evictions), and prepares and executes district development strategies, and it acts as a 
Metropolitan government and as such can regulate street vendors across all districts (see By-Law 
8 All By-Laws and Decrees are published in El Peruano. In some cases, municipalities omit publishing Resolutions 
and Council Accords. 
9 The District Municipality ofSurquillo is located near one of the public transit transfer points to Cono Sur. The 
Municipality of La Victoria is located just outside the city centre and roughly six city blocks from a popular 
transportation transfer point that I used daily. 
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002-1985-MML) as well as the use of major public thoroughfares 10 (see By-Law 341-2001-
MML). 
Name of 
Municipality 
Ate 
Carabayllo 
Table 2.1. A comprehensive list of the Access to Information Requests by 
municipality including what was solicited and what the response was. The 
municipalities listed in the first column that are in bold and underlined are 
primarily used for the research. 
Solicited Response 
First Request (I was requested to separate it I received three very clear responses by June 
into three parts): (1) Municipal Council 10,2009 regarding each individual part of the 
minutes and meeting agendas; (2)By-Laws request. 
and their Antecedents, Council Accords, Acts, 
and Decrees; (3) Municipal press releases (1) The municipality claims that no such 
(June 3, 2009) information exists, and further, in the 
case that the entity (municipality) is 
not obliged to give out such 
information by Law it may inform 
the party requesting the information 
requested does not exist (according 
to Article 13 of Supreme Decree 043-
2002-PCM, my emphasis). 
(2) The By-Laws and Decrees requested 
can be found online on the 
municipality's website (with no 
mention of the Antecedents). 
(3) The requested information does not 
exist. 
Given the limited availability of information, 
and the fact that I had seen Municipal 
meeting agendas made available publicly in 
other municipalities, I decided not to pursue 
this request further. 
First Request: Municipal press releases; I revoked the request after visiting the 
Municipal Council agendas and meeting municipality twice to inquire about the status. 
minutes; Legal norms (By-Laws, Council On the second visit, June 15,2009, I visited 
Accords, Decrees, etc.); Antecedents of By- directly with the personnel in charge of 
10 All the districts I discuss in detail have major thoroughfares regulated by the Municipality of Metropolitan Lima. 
As well, the informal markets of Caqueta in San Martin de Porres and La Chancheria in Villa EI Salvador are 
located in and adjacent to thoroughfares regulated by By-Law 34I-200I-MML. 
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Laws only (May 29,2009) processing the solicitation. It was still in their 
inbox. At that moment I informed them that I 
would not be returning for the information. 
Furthermore, the District of Carabayllo is in 
the outer part of Co no Norte of Lima, which 
was a great distance from where I lived 
(approximately 100 minutes in bus). It was a 
very unfamiliar part of the city for me and I 
did not feel comfortable when I travelled 
alone to the municipal offices. 
Comas First Request: Municipal press releases; The first request was partially fulfilled; some 
Municipal Council agendas and meeting By-Laws were received (none with 
minutes; Legal norms (By-Laws, Council Antecedents or municipal minutes or agendas 
Accords, Decrees, etc.); Antecedents of By- corresponding to them), and the municipal 
Laws only (May 29,2009) press releases were quite different than what I 
had anticipated as they were closer to NGO 
Second Request (presented as a clarification drafted reports and statistics (including one 
of the first request): ten different Acts of pertaining to poverty levels and district 
municipal council sessions; reports; population sizes in Lima). I informally 
Antecedents of nine different resolutions, received a 2005 diagnostic of informal 
Decrees, and By-Laws (July 20, 2009) vending in Comas when this request was 
Third Request: By-Laws 092-2003-CIMC, 
processed. 
180-2005-CIMC, 245-2007-CIMC with their The second request was partially fulfilled as I 
Antecedents; Decree 1O-2004-A/MC with received seven of the municipal council 
Antecedents (August 3, 2009) session minutes, but not all reports and 
antecedents were received. I was directed to 
request some reports from the sub-Agency of 
Enterprise Promotion and Employment in the 
office of Economic Development, and I 
received two there informally. 
The third request was not responded to by the 
municipality. 
EI Agustino First Request: Municipal press releases; I received very little attention from this 
Municipal Council agendas and meeting municipality despite contacting them a 
minutes; Legal norms (By-Laws, Council number of times by phone and in-person. 
Accords, Decrees, etc.); Antecedents (June 3, Three weeks after the making the request I 
2009) received an email prompting me to go to the 
webpage to gather information. Further, the 
contact person I was given attended me in 
very informal settings (in the waiting area) 
and did not allow me access to speak with 
those managing my request. I decided it was 
not worth pursuing four weeks after starting 
the request. 
Inde)!!lndencia First Request: Municipal press releases; For the first request I received three Decrees 
Municipal Council agendas and meeting and two By-Laws through the formal process. 
minutes; Legal norms (By-Laws, Council I was also introduced to a technician in the 
Accords, Decrees, etc.); Antecedents of By- Office of Economic Development, who 
proceeded to assist me with what I should look 
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Laws only (May 29, 2009) for, and later introduced me to a technician in 
the Office of Institutional Image, who 
Second Request: Municipal Council minutes provided me with a 2008 Diagnostic on street 
for each session that discusses informal vending, press releases, two 
vending, and; the Regulation of the magazines/reviews, and contact names for 
Application of Sanctions (RAS) and the Table workers in other municipalities (Oscar 
of Infractions and Sanctions (CUIS; June 24, Caceretes in Villa Maria del Triunfo and Julio 
2009) Alzola in Metropolitan Lima). 
Third Request (three parts): (l)By-Laws 082- The second request was partially fulfilled. I 
2004-MDI, 102-2005-MDI, l76-2008-MDI requested they only consider the latter part of 
and their respective Antecedents and the request for the RAS and CUIS and that I 
municipal council minutes, and Decrees 004- would draft another request for the Municipal 
2005-MDI, 005-2005-MDI, 006-2005-MDI, Council session minutes. The latter part of the 
and 007-2005-MDI and their respective request was fully realized. 
antecedents; (2) Reports 08-2003-
SGRTRlGRlMDI, l3-2003-SGRTRlGRlMDI The second part of third request was addressed 
and 335-2003-SGRTRlGDRlMDI; (3) by the municipality. I received Reports 08-
Dictation 02-2005/CDELCIMDI, and Reports 2003-SGRTRlGRlMDI and 13-2003-
2002-2005-DP AECDC/GDELIMDI, 082- SGRTRlGDRlMDI (335-2003-
2007 -GDELIMDI, and l68-2008-GDELIMDI SGRTRlGRlMDI was lost). No other part of 
(July 24, 2009) this request was addressed. 
La Victoria First Request: Municipal press releases; A week after placing my request I met with 
Municipal Council agendas and meeting the Secretary General of La Victoria Jorge 
minutes; Legal norms (By-Laws, Council Andujar (June 10,2009). He informed me of 
Accords, Decrees, etc.); Antecedents (May 28, the relevant By-Laws and claimed that the 
2009) request would be sent to the relevant sub-
agencies of the municipality. I was then 
passed to the manager oflnstitutional 
ImagelPublic Relations, Fermando Llamosas, 
informed me that all the information from the 
previous administration had been erased and 
provided me with two magazines published in 
2009. 
Upon reviewing the information that Mr. 
Andujar gave me, I cross-referenced with the 
Municipal website. The information he 
provided me was already public. I received no 
further communications about the status of my 
request. 
Metrol!olitan First Request: Municipal press releases; I received National Laws pertaining to the 
Lima! Municipal Council agendas and meeting regulation of health and safety of marketplaces 
Cercado de minutes; Metropolitan Assembly agendas and and privatization of public marketplaces, and 
Lima meeting minutes; Legal norms (By-Laws, zoning regulations for the Historic City Centre 
Council Accords, Decrees, etc.); Antecedents and regulations of street vendors dating from 
(May 28, 2009) 1985 to 2001 (no Legal Norms that were 
passed during the period following City 
Second Request (two parts): (1) Request a Centre evictions). There was only a partial 
meeting with Luis Gayoso, Manager of the realization of my request. 
Office of Business Development; (2) Request 
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a meeting with Julio Alzola, Manager of the 
Office of Public Relations and Social 
CommlUlication (JlUle 17, 2009) In subsequent conversations following the first 
receipt of documentation, the Public Official 
Third Request: Request a meeting with responsible for Access to Information requests 
Marcia Montero Lara, COlUlcillor ofthe Tullo Mapelli informed me that I would have 
Municipality of Metropolitan Lima (JlUle 25, to provide specific information of the 
2009) documents I required For this reason I needed 
to solicit meetings with public officials for the 
Fourth Request: Seven distinct By-Laws sole purpose of asking them what 
relating to regulation of informal vendors documentation existed. My solicitations 
(informed by meetings from second request; yielded audience with three subagencies, of 
July 3, 2009) which the only one was available the day I 
was given access: Denis Bardales Manager of 
Enterprise Promotion (the other two offices I 
was given access to the secretaries of the 
divisions of Formalization and Regulation and 
Supervision of Public Thoroughfare in the 
sub-agency of Commercial Authorization). 
Using my meeting with Denis Bardales, who 
at one time worked in the sub-agency of 
Commercial Authorization, I obtained the 
names of other possible by-laws, some of 
which were useful (others were inaccurate). 
I also received a meeting with Julio Alzola, 
who at first promised that he could deliver the 
information I asked for and later denied that 
he made that promise and that he was in 
charge of municipal press releases. 
On August I finally spoke with Guillermo 
Silva, Manager of the Division of Regulation 
and Supervision of Public Thoroughfares, who 
immediately provided me with a Resolution 
for permitting ambulantes for the purpose of 
Formalization, and a Decree that permits street 
vending for those with scarce resources. 
San Juan de First Request: MlUlicipal press releases; Through the first request I received By-Laws, 
Lurigancho MlUlicipal Council agendas and meeting Decrees, Resolutions, COlUlcil Accords and 
minutes; Legal norms (By-Laws, COlUlcil Reports (nine in total). Resolutions and other 
Accords, Decrees, etc.); Antecedents of By- antecedents could not be obtained through 
Laws only (May 28, 2009) sub-agency offices due to archiving issues and 
a lack of knowledge in locating documents. 
Second Request (two requests): (1) Municipal Therefore, the clerks in the Secretary General 
press releases (of different media type); A office suggested a second request of a 
complaint of an administrative docmnent complaint of a regulation which would have 
regarding informal commerce that has been all the relevant documents included. 
legally resolved, and the Regulation of the 
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Application of Sanctions and the Table of Both parts of the second request were 
Infractions and Sanctions (June 19,2009) completed in full, although press releases were 
only available until 2007 and a few editions 
were missing. The file I received gave 
extensive account of the complaints, 
regulations, and resolutions concerning street 
vendors in both a district-wide and particular 
context. 
I had planned to place a third request for 
Municipal Council meeting minutes and 
agendas, but hours-long clerical confusion in 
processing my Sf. 1 charge (which is not 
sanctioned by Law 27806), and warning that 
any request for such information would not be 
realized left me without any further want to 
process the request. 
San Juan de First Request (I was requested to separate it For the first request I received no response. 
Miraflores into two parts): (I)Municipal press releases For the second request I received three By-
and the Antecedents of By-Laws (directed to Laws, already publicly available, with no 
the Office ofInstitutional Image); (2) Antecedents. 
Municipal Council agendas and minutes, and 
By-Laws, Council Accords, Acts, and Decrees 
(directed to the Secretary General of the 
Municipality; June 4, 2009) 
San Martin First Request: Municipal press releases; The first request resulted in a meeting with 
de Porres Municipal Council agendas and meeting Raul Ramos, manager of the Office of 
minutes; Legal norms (By-Laws, Council Economic Development and Supervision, who 
Accords, Decrees, etc.); Antecedents of By- gave me access to the Caqueta work plans 
Laws only (June 3, 2009) (one in presentation format and the other in 
report format), the majority of known By-
Second Request: A complaint of an Laws, Decrees, Council Accord, and some 
administrative document regarding informal Reports, a Resolution, and the Regulation of 
commerce that has been legally resolved or a the Application of Sanctions (RAS) and the 
report for an eviction of street vendors Table ofInfractions and Sanctions (CUIS). 
executed by the Municipality during the 
current Administration (June 22, 2009) The second request was not fulfilled. 
Third Request: A study or a diagnostic report For the third request I received something like 
of informal commerce produced by/for the a Diagnostic that was used to for a 
District Municipality of San Martin de Porres participatory budgeting workshop (without 
(July 9, 2009) date). 
Fourth Request: By-Law 42-2003-MDSMP The fourth request was almost completely 
and its antecedents and the Act of the fulfilled with the exception of an error for By-
municipal session in which it was approved; Law 042-2003-MDSMP (instead I received 
the antecedents of By-Law 049-2003- the municipal session for May 27, 2003 where 
MDSMP and the Act of the municipal session Council Accord 042-2003-MDSMP was 
in which it was approved; Council Accord discussed). 
004-2003-MDSMP and its antecedents and the 
Act ofthe municipal session in which it was For municipal press releases I received two 
approved; Mayoral Decree 16-2004-MDSMP recent magazines/reviews outside the formal 
request. Nevertheless, the municipality had 
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and its antecedents (July 24, 2009) numerous press releases on their website -
many of them relating to street vending and 
informality - dated from 2007 to the present. 
Santa Anita First Request: Municipal press releases; No press releases available (Sub Agency of 
Municipal Council agendas and meeting Public Relations and Institutional Image); By-
minutes; Legal norms (By-Laws, Council Laws (3) and a list of the names offormal and 
Accords, Decrees, etc.); Antecedents (June 3, informal vendor associations, including five 
2009) lists of association members including the 
names, addresses and national personal 
identification numbers (DNl) of the members 
(a violation of the privacy rights of both 
informal and formal vendors according to 
Article 15-B of Law 27806). 
To obtain the information I struggled for six 
weeks to get the information. With the 
resistance I received from the office (no fixed 
period for response, multiple phone calls and 
visits that ended without guarantees for 
delivery of information) I decided it would be 
not worth pursuing given time constraints. 
Surquillo First Request: Municipal press releases; After six weeks of receiving no indication that 
Municipal Council meeting agendas and information would be available, and having 
minutes; Legal norms (By-Laws, Council found out that the solicitations were not in the 
Accords, Decrees, etc.); Antecedents (June 4, locations the person managing the document 
2009) said they would be, I decided that pursuing 
any further would be futile. 
Villa EI First Request: Municipal press releases; The first request was partially realized. I 
Salvador Municipal Council agendas and meeting received some By-Laws regarding street 
minutes; Legal norms (By-Laws, Council vending, one Council Accord and a Mayoral 
Accords, Decrees, etc.); Antecedents (June 4, Resolution. A combination offeedback from 
2009) the Secretary General's office and successful 
responses from other Municipalities gave me 
Second Request (four parts): (l)A complaint some ideas for crafting new requests. 
of an administrative document regarding 
informal commerce that has been legally The second request for a complaint, diagnostic 
resolved; a diagnostic about street vending or studies produced no responsive records. I 
and/or informality and/or marketplaces; received a response to my request for both 
studies about street vending or marketplaces; print and visual media, and I have municipal 
(2)Bulletins, notes, news articles, Municipal propaganda in video format regarding both the 
press, and other written or visual pUblications history of the district and citizen security. I 
relating to: disorder, reordering or also received some bulletins but very few 
recuperating space; informality; press releases were otherwise available and 
modernization; citizen security and health and older press was not archived. I received copies 
safety (directed to the Communications Unit); of the recordings of Municipal Council 
(3) Copies of the recordings of the Municipal sessions. The tapes are very extensive in 
Council sessions that discuss informal length but their quality varies. Lastly, I 
commerce (informal markets and received the RAS and cms when it became 
itinerant/street vending); (4) the current available in August 2009. 
Regulation of the Application of Sanctions 
and the Table of Infractions and Sanctions From the third request I received all parts with 
the exception of the second. The reason for 
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when it is available (June 23, 2009) not receiving the second part was due to the 
fact it violated Article 15-B of Law 27806. In 
Third Request (five parts): (1) Report 256- this case, the documents could reveal the 
2008-GDESUR-MVES; (2) Reports 127- administrative or judicial strategy of the 
2008-PPM-VES and 130-2008-PPM-VES Municipality. 
(public Attorney ofthe Municipality); (3) The 
Diagnostic on street vending created by the 
National Police presented in 2007 known as 
Report 01 -2008-Vll-DIRTEPOL-LIDIVTER 
lJEF-DIST-VES-OPOI or Document 962-
2007-VII-DIRTEPOL-LIDIVTER lJEF-
DIST-VES-OPOI (directed to the Office of 
Economic Development, who I was told was 
in possession if it); (4) Office Resolutions 
278-2008-GSCIMVES, 286-2008-
GSCIMVES, 296-2008-GSCIMVES, 297-
2008-GSCIMVES, and 301-2008-GSCIMVES 
(directed to the Office of Economic 
Development); (5) Reports 103-2008-
MVESIPESCfFDC, 106-2008-
MVESIPESCIFDC, and 107-2008-
MVESIPESCIFDC (directed to the Office of 
Economic Development; July 22, 2009) 
Villa Maria First Request: Municipal press releases; The first request was not responded to, and, 
del Triunfo Municipal Council agendas and meeting given new information received at the offices 
minutes; Legal norms (By-Laws, Council of San Juan de Lurigancho and Independencia, 
Accords, Decrees, etc.); Antecedents (June 4, I cancelled the first request and provided two 
2009) new requests. 
Second Request( two parts): (I) A report for I received two mayoral resolutions from the 
an eviction of street vendors executed by the municipality during a discussion with a 
Municipality during the current manager of a sub-agency of the municipality, 
Administration; (2) By-Laws and their Oscar Caceretes (I received his contact 
Antecedents and any debates surrounding information from a colleague in charge of 
them, Reports previous to and in relation to Institutional Image in Independencia). 
the By-Laws, Council Accords, and the 
Regulation of the Application of Sanctions My new requests were poorly responded to, 
and the Table ofInfractions and Sanctions and in order to obtain the requested 
(June 19,2009) information, which I would have no control 
over its size, the municipality informed me 
that I would pay Sf. 3.20 per sheet (about 
$1.20 CAD in July 2009). Given that the cost 
contradicted the rules surrounding charges for 
copying documents, and given that the 
possible final cost could be around $100 CAD, 
I withdrew my solicitation (during this 
conversation and my subsequent decision the 
clerk who attended me and worked for the 
Secretary General stated that the office of the 
Secretary General was corrupted). 
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The remaining 11 District Municipalities that I visited to request access to information 
(i.e., those in los conos) were chosen based on their relevance to my research in combination 
with my familiarity with these districts and the ease of access to them. Four of the municipalities 
that I requested information from were in Cono Norte (CarabayUo, Comas, Independencia and 
San Martin de Porres), and three municipalities each were in both Cono Este (Ate, San Juan de 
Lurigancho and Santa Anita) and Cono Sur (San Juan de Miraflores, Villa EI Salvador and Villa 
Maria del Triunfo). For Cono Norte, my decisions were based on (1) familiarity ofthe area, (2) 
time-saving measures, and (3) knowledge of policy changes to informal street vending. 
Knowledge of the large-scale evictions was an important factor in my choice to visit San Martin 
de Porres, for example, as the Caqueta area evictions began in 2008 (Pomareda, 2008, URL) and 
were unfolding during the research period. Aside from being unprecedented for the Caqueta 
market, which has been appropriated for over 50 years, the evictions were also a part of a 
strategy for an urban renewal plan and thus highly pertinent to my interests. Ofthe districts I 
visited and obtained records from, I narrowed my focus to four district municipalities (Comas, 
Independencia, San Martin de Porres, and Villa EI Salvador) and Cercado de Lima, because they 
yielded the richest information for my purposes (see Figure 2.1 for details). 
There are a number of issues with obtaining the data requested through the Law of 
Transparency and Access to Information, including institutional differences in archiving and 
responding to freedom of information requests, the role of actors, and ethical issues surrounding 
releasing and obtaining information (regarding the latter see "Santa Anita" in Table 2.1). The 
former two of these . issues significantly shaped the responses and thus the data I obtained. The 
specific practices of different municipalities determine what type of information exists and 
whether it still exists. Legal norms, municipal council minutes and agendas, antecedents of laws 
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(i.e., reports, resolutions, memorandums, etc.) are recorded and archived differently (if they are 
at all) 11. Standardized requests can produce different results. For example, requesting 
information in the same way may yield different results, and a request may be denied because it 
does not specifically match what the municipality has, or does not yield a result due to the 
institution's modes of archiving. Also, municipalities enact laws using different strategies. 12 
Specifically, Antecedents may not exist for many legal norms (i.e., Council Accords), or certain 
legal norms may not be discussed in a Municipal Council and therefore appear as different forms 
(i.e., Decrees, Resolutions). 
The second notable factor is the role of actors in the municipal framework. Requesting 
information requires that actors within the municipality facilitate between the inquirer and the 
information itself, which is filtered through very different legaVtechnical frameworks of Access 
to Information as well as the interests ofthe municipality and the actors handling or authorizing 
the release of information. These actors, however, were typically the Secretary General and 
clerks and assistants working for the Secretary General, but in some cases they were clerks in 
llIn one municipality, San Juan de Lurigancho, the archiving system would not put antecedents with legal norms nor 
would the relevant sub-agency respond to the request for relevant information. As a strategy to obtain vendor 
regulations in San Juan de Lurigancho, I had to request a case file of a complaint about street vending that was 
resolved in order to receive all reports and legal norms pertinent to the issue. When I tried to reproduce my strategy 
used in San Juan de Lurigancho in other municipalities it rendered no results. In San Martin de Porres requesting 
antecedents for specific laws rendered a result that included all relevant information (verified by reading the cited 
laws, reports and resolutions in the specified law), whereas in Comas it did not work. When it came to requesting the 
minutes for Municipal sessions, the data was readily available in text format for Comas and San Martin de Porres, 
and in Villa EI Salvador it existed in audio format only. 
12In Comas, a significant number of legal norms to regulate and even·formalize and prohibit street vendors were 
enacted through Council Accords (e.g., Council Accords 23-1996-CIMC, 80-1996 CIMC, 51-1997-CIMC, 52-1997-
CIMC, 40-1998-CIMC, 41-1998-CIMC, 30-1999-CIMC, 20-2002-CIMC, 67 -2005-CIMC and 28-2007 -CIMC). 
Council Accords require no antecedents to be reviewed but rather .they are decisions made by the council. For these 
laws there was no indication of antecedents. Further, the legitimacy of this method of producing legal norms is 
questionable for purposes of regulating as Council Accords (Acuerdos de Consejo) are designed to either express the 
agency of the municipality in realizing a particular action, conduct or institutional norm or making a decision of 
public interest (Article 41, Law 27972, Republic of Peru) but have no function in establishing regulations 
themselves. 
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archives, technicians in the Institutional Image offices, and managers of other offices and sub-
agencies. In addition to how the actors that handle requests they may also act as facilitators or 
gatekeepers to the information (Lorimer, 2010). The autonomy of district municipalities, and the 
protections afforded to municipalities in responding to freedom of information requests, and the 
variety of strategies to respond to freedom of information requests determined and limited my 
access to information. The District Municipality of Ate provided a good example of a 
combination ofthe strategies and interests of municipal actors with the existing legaVtechnical 
framework. They informed me that they had no obligation to provide me with certain 
information or confirm its existence prior to stating that the information I was looking for did not 
exist. These short responses, which negated the existence of request documents whilst alluding to 
the protection of and the will of the Municipality to deny the existence of certain information 
(which existed elsewhere), deterred me from pursuing requests there. In other municipalities, 
only certain information was willingly released and there was cooperation to certain degrees. At 
the District Municipality of Villa EI Salvador almost all formally requested information was 
received with the assistance of clerks with knowledge of and access to the archives. Yet clerks 
dissuaded me from requesting Antecedents and instead I was encouraged to make requests for 
particular documents, which I could glean as citations from recently enforced law. Further 
illustrating how actors working through the legaVtechnical framework of Access to Information, 
the only request for documents that was denied pertained to documents that form part of an 
active judicial process, which would violate Article 15 B of Law 27806. Strategies of 
"gatekeeping" and avoidance - for reasons unknown -:- were employed in the District 
Municipality of Independencia. The only person to whom I could speak regarding the formal 
responses to requests was the assistant of the Secretary General. This failed to provide answers 
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as to why sections of my requests were not formally responded to, and protected access to the 
Secretary General, thus preventing my access to Antecedents of Legal Norms and Municipal 
Council session minutes. Lastly, access to information was frustrated by the tensions between the 
autonomy ofthe Municipality to establish its own rates and the National Law that protects 
requesters from paying significantly more than the cost of reproduction of data as stated in Law 
27806 and its amendments. At the District Municipality of Villa Maria del Triunfo, the cost per 
sheet for information was irregularly high and deterred me from accessing information as it 
likely has done to other interested parties. 
Another noteworthy issue is the researcher's own limitations in obtaining the desired 
information (if it exists and if the actors are willing to release it), which includes conveying what 
the research wants in ways that are comprehensible to actors. I argue that research using Access 
to Information requests has similar dialectical tensions as suggested by Lorimer (2010) regarding 
archival research: the desire for the quickest route to the data and the need for technical 
knowledge of how to request and obtain information. Indeed, my first requests (less the District 
. Municipalities of Ate and San Juan de Miraflores, which intervened and demanded separate 
requests) manifest this as they contained multiple requests on one form asking for all information 
that exists on my research topic. The first round of requests provided me with a slightly better 
understanding of how to request information more effectively given the institutional structure 
(although institutional differences were still difficult to discern). Feedback both from 
conversations with municipal actors and the requests themselves informed me of how to improve 
future requests. In subsequent rounds that municipalities were willing to respond to requests the 
improved clarity ofthe requests yielded better responses (see Comas, San Martin de Porres, San 
Juan de Lurigancho and Villa El Salvador in Table 2.1). 
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Figure 2.1 A map of Metropolitan Lima that highlights the District 
Municipalities 1 include for the case studies. 
(Source: Ian Wood, 2011) 
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A second set of information, newspaper articles with stories related to informal street 
vending, were collected both through the Peruvian National Library (Biblioteca Nacional del 
PerU) and using the newspaper websites for La Republica and El Comercio. In tota~ two daily 
newspapers, La Primera13 and El Correo, were reviewed from the period of2002 to mid-2009, 
and a paper dedicated to municipal government affairs, Polemica Municipal, was also observed 
for the same period. The other newspapers had little or no internet archiving of news articles 
before 2005 and data could only be obtained for the periods of2005 to 2009. Due to time 
constraints in my research period I could either perform internet searches for the other two news 
sources or collect as much data as possible in the time available. I chose the former as it could 
yield quicker results than manual searches and could be performed from anywhere with internet 
access and Adobe Acrobat or a printer14• 
In physical newspaper searches I looked for visual and textual cues that would refer to 
street vending and informality in Peru, and would copy articles broadly. In the writing stage, I 
then determined what was valuable to use for the research topic. For internet searches, I was 
limited to a series of words such as ambulante, comercio informal, comercio ambulatorio, 
vendedor(es) ambulante(s), desalojo (eviction) in order to yield the appropriate results. 
The newspaper articles retrieved are bits and pieces for this montage in two ways. On 
one hand they provide context to both the reader and to me (sometimes at the same time, 
sometimes just to me) regarding the political and social changes regarding street vending in the 
districts that I have data from. On the other hand, they complement and in part substantiate the 
13 The fIrst edition of La Primera was published in early 2004. 
14 My commute to the new locale of the Peruvian National Library was more than 90 minutes each way. It was 
located in a part of the city that I did not frequent (San Borja). 
51 
arguments regarding Lima's colonial present, violence against street vendors, the securitization 
of public space, and similar trends of marginalization in other districts of the city. 
2.4 Conclusion 
The research is both practically and intellectually a montage work. The montage is a product of 
the contingencies ofthe research experience and my positionality. First, my concerns with the 
conditions of street vendors in Peru, my commitment to workers' rights, my sustained 
engagement with political and urban issues in Lima, Peru, and the construction of my identity 
and the privileges associated with that construction. Second, the theoretical and intellectual 
explorations on the topic of street vending under neoliberalism in Lima, Peru, including my 
interest in workers' rights and political economy. Third, the experiences offmding information 
to answer questions about street vending in contemporary Lima through the field work. The 
product, this thesis, is possible precisely because ofthe exploratory nature ofthe research, and 
the possibilities of knowledge production that come from having a critical, pro-street vendor 
position, and a deep interest in the political, social and urban landscapes of Lima. 
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Chapter 3 - Exclusion at the scale of the street vendor: governing through a locally-
embedded version of neoliberal citizenship 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I argue how in street vending regulations in contemporary Lima, Peru, neoliberal 
logics and practices operate at the scale of the street vendor. I demonstrate that governing 
individuals, producing norms, and compliance in a neoliberal era are changing the face of 
marginality in contemporary Lima. The dominance ofneoliberal discourse has shaped local state 
policies and practices significantly, and, in turn, has also strongly shaped how an individual's 
status, and thus belonging, in society is determined by the state. Street vendors' claims for 
inclusion and belonging through the appropriation of public spaces are especially mediated by 
Lima's district municipalities, and, more specifically, by the combination of governing strategies 
such as formalization, conditional authorizations, and eradication schemes that they employ. 
These strategies are differentiating: they attempt to inculcate street vendors with a neoliberal 
subjectivity of self-sufficiency in a free market environment, punish them for failure to do so, or 
provide state support for vendors determined by the municipality to be deserving of it - with 
rigid conditions that reflect a racist colonial present: a way of thinking and acting that is still 
influenced by colonial discourses and relations (Gregory, 2004). 
First, I provide an overview ofthe differences between formal and substantive citizenship 
in order to argue that substantive citizenship - as opposed to formal citizenship under 
neoliberalism - is preferable. Using the field data I then explain how current district municipal 
street vending policies attempt to formalize informality through neoliberallogics and practices, 
thus redrawing the limits between acceptable and unacceptable forms of informality in public 
spaces, thereby limiting citizenship to formal and neoliberal versions over substantive claims. 
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Furthermore, I describe how permissive authorizations to use public space are granted based on 
ability (to participate in the market or by physical and mental abilities), and demand vendors 
comply with norms of cleanliness and sobriety in order to be citizens in public spaces. With 
these empirical observations I then conclude that formal and neoliberal citizenship in the context 
of contemporary Lima first homogenizes and limits the multiplicity of ways one can claim to 
belong, and second reproduces a racist colonial present. 
3.2 Formal and Substantive Citizenship 
Formal citizenship is a status oflegality and legitimacy granted to a person by a polity. The 
person receiving that status is recognized as having rights and responsibilities by the state entity 
(Isin and Turner, 2002; Sassen, 2002). A polity can refer to different scales of the state, yet in 
terms of citizenship that polity tends to be defmed at the scale of the nation-state even despite the 
expansion of formal citizenship to other scales: from supranational institutions (formed by 
nation-states) to provinces and municipalities (Sassen, 2002, p. 278). The territory ofthe nation-
state remains the centre of formal citizenship and the producer of the citizen despite 
reterritorialization and re-orientation of citizenship (Purcell, 2003). 
I stress the importance of the relationship of the individual to the nation-state in the 
production of formal citizenship as suggested in other works that broach the geohistorical 
legacies ofthe state in relation to citizenship (see Painter and Philo, 1995; Isin, 2002). Yet I 
argue that other polities, such as municipalities, also have important roles in producing formal 
citizenship. The nation-state has been an important nexus of citizenship: the construction of a 
system of states through the Treaty of Westphalia allowed for the stability of territorial claims 
and the emergence of the nation-state, which permits the question of government to be asked by 
administrative apparatuses in order to shape and regulate the population, including a legal 
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arrangement of rights and responsibilities, and to assure the reproduction of the state (Hindess, 
2002; Isin and Turner, 2002; Purcell, 2003; Foucault, 2007). Historically, the work of state 
apparatuses has been to shape the conduct of its citizens according to state rationalities. 
These apparatuses may be rescaled institutions of what is now (ex-post-facto) the nation-
state: for example, the Office of Business Development in the Metropolitan Municipality of 
Lima. These state apparatuses, regardless oftheir scale, are possible because ofthe system of 
states guarantees - in theory - respect for the sovereignty of a state: all states receive their 
authority and sovereignty by existing in relation to other states whose sovereignty and authority 
is also guaranteed (Hindess, 2002). The municipality and its apparatuses are possible through the 
nation-state, and serve to reproduce the sovereignty which grants these entities their authority. 
In order to examine the differences between formal and substantive citizenship, and the 
inherently problematic nature of formal citizenship, I engage in a geographical and historical 
analysis of formal citizenship, its production of exclusion and its inadequacies. Such analyses 
problematize formal and liberal citizenship and elucidate their relationship to colonialism. First, 
formal citizenship is imagined as a universal mode of citizenship and superior to other modes. 
Yet formal citizenship as a tradition is inherently Western and reproduces itself in Western 
discourses: Greek, Roman and medieval European traditions are deemed superior forms of 
citizenship inherited from the ancient West by the contemporary West (lsin, 2002). The 
consequence of a Western inheritance ofthe tradition of citizenship is a conflation of the 
traditions of citizenship with urban government, which creates a perception of civilization as 
based in Western urban spaces (Isin, 2002). 
Occidental traditions such as liberalism (and, recently, neoliberalism) dependent on state-
society relations mediated through state institutions are thus naturalized as the mode of 
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citizenship of Western society. Furthermore, through the establishment of the nation-state and 
subsequent processes ofliberalization and neoliberalization, they have also become models for 
citizenship in non-Western spaces. As such, formal citizenship has been and is a cultural 
imposition that overtakes other forms and practices of citizenship. For example, in Peru, the 
internal border between Spaniards and "Indians" created by colonization has been reproduced 
through independence since 1821. The border was reproduced in independence from Spain 
creating a highly centralized state in metropolitan coastal spaces-limeno, urban, and Western-
in contrast to a periphery of andinos and amazonicos located in the interior (Poole, 2004). The 
distinction has not only produced illegitimacy - and even illegality - for most non-coastal 
Peruvians and many ofthose racial and ethnic minorities located in the coast. It also has acted as 
a pretext for expanding the frontier of the state in problem or strategic locations outside of its 
reach (Poole, 2004). It is precisely those living in spaces with minimal reach ofthe state-
particularly informals living in Lima - who are othered by various state policies. Those living at 
the margins ofthe state's reach, such as groups like informal vendors, make claims to security 
and belonging for themselves and their communities 15, which take on forms that are often as 
much outside as inside state-society relations (Poole, 2004). Isin (2002) highlights this 
incongruity between state institutions as the source of citizen-building and governance in urban 
spaces, and the practices that citizens engage in to make claims to belong in both historically 
Western and contemporary cities throughout the world, calling into question this mode of 
citizenship in relation to substantive practices. This incongruity between state-derived 
15 See for example the informal networks of street vendors that organized to protect themselves from police violence 
(see Bayat, 2005; Crossa, 2009), or Poole's (2004) example of the rondas of campesinos during the insurgency in 
1990. 
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citizenship - formal citizenship - and the practices of those living within the state-territory 
elucidates the first problem of colonialist exclusion produced by formal citizenship. 
Formal citizenship as universal produces exclusion and oppressive social relations. There 
is acknowledgement that inclusion produces exclusion (Isin, 2005; Lister, 2007; Staeheli and 
Mitchell, 2008) and therefore no inclusion can ever be without some exclusion. Nevertheless, 
there is a difference between particular events that may be exclusionary and processes - such as 
formal citizenship - that constitute an oppressive permanence in the socio-spatial world (Dike9, 
2001). The geohistorical production of the ideal citizen is a strong example of permanence in 
exclusion: it includes the European/Western, masculinity and males, the dominant class, ability, 
and heterosexuality and (at least in part) excludes other bodies and identities. I want to discuss 
two intersecting ways this oppression is identified: the normative prescriptions for citizenship 
through the state-territory-identity axis, and the norms ofneoliberal citizenship. 
The state-territory-identity axis identified by Philo and Painter (1995) suggests a formal 
citizenship based on a normalized identity of the subject. State-society relations as the basis of 
this citizenship determine inclusion through who, within a state territory, fits the appropriate 
identity for citizenship (Painter and Philo, 1995). This logic and practice has produced exclusion 
through racist legacies of othering in two ways: ''them there" and ''them here" (Painter and Philo, 
1995). In Peru, the effect ofthese racist legacies is a hierarchical ordering of citizens, which is 
determined by the proximity of markers of phenotype and discursive practices to European 
civilization. Those who face exclusion based on markers of identity experience this Otherness of 
''them there" in their segregation from those who embody European discursive practices and 
phenotypical markers. The asentimientas humanas in las canas of Lima are strong examples of 
this segregation and exclusion created by differentiation of "us here" from ''them there": they are 
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spaces produced and lived in by historically racialized and ethnically excluded people 16. Within 
nation-states spaces dominated by formal citizens and citizenship practices are contested by the 
presence of the Other, such as street vendors. Nevertheless, these Others are rendered illegitimate 
by those structures. Lima's criollo17 Mayor Andrade provides a discourse regarding informal 
vendors that highlights precisely how their appropriation of city centre space by racial and ethnic 
groups from the Andes was a transgression of national identity and state authority: 
When I returned to the centre after a long time ... [I felt] my identity had been erased and 
occupied by someone who had come from a different place. There were cultural values 
that were not mine ... You have to realize that Lima was the capital, the political, cultural, 
religious centre of the [Spanish] viceroyalty ... with very special characteristic[s]. As 
limeiios we were concerned with recuperating our identity ... [What the informal street 
vendors and squatters did to the city centre produced] complete lack of authority. (as 
cited in Gandolfo, 2009, p. 63-4) 
As the nation-state identity within territorial limits is transgressed, the historical legacies of 
Western domination and European identity operate to identify the Other and perpetuate 
oppression against them. It becomes the right of the state, on behalf of those with Western 
embodiments, to respond through force, or to make invisible those transgressors. As 
Painter and Philo (1995) state ''them here" often conjures desires of ejecting ''them'' by ''us 
here". Andrade's response to recuperate the city is based on racist colonial values that are 
embedded in those whose identities are legitimated by the nation-state identity (in Peru, 
this identity is a continuation ofthe colonial past) and who feel threatened by the presence 
16 Yet it is important to note that sections of los conos, especially earlier formed settlements have been able to 
benefit and grow into middle class districts from better economic conditions in what is - and was - a racist society. 
Places like Las Flores in the District of San Juan de Lurigancho, the District of Los Olivos, and parts of the District 
of Comas are good examples of exceptional Otherness. 
17 I use criollo in the sense of a mixed coastal heritage which may contain elements of European, African and -
indigenous tradition but historically holding more cultural legitimacy than Afro-Peruvian or indigenous persons (see 
Aguirre, 2008). 
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ofthe Other. Street vendors continue to operate in spaces such as the city centre, but often 
face issues of legitimacy in their right to be in those spaces. 
Formal citizenship is also deeply connected to liberal and neoliberal citizenship as a 
result ofthe complementary relationship between the Occidental tradition ofthe nation-state and 
liberalism. Colonialism and liberalism intersect and operate together in nation-states that have 
gained independence from European empires. Mckay (2000) argues former colonies that have 
become nation-states should be understood as liberal projects. According to Mckay (2000) these 
nation-states attempt not only to instil liberalism (even if in variegated forms) on people in the 
spaces they claim as territory but also to control and contain competing, antithetical and 
indigenous discourses, those who embody them, and those spaces. The racist nationalist colonial 
aspects of formal citizenship should be understood as privileging Occidental traditions such as 
liberalism that have emerged with the nation-state. Furthermore, as Losurdo (2011) 
demonstrates, liberalism has been a colonial and elitist project that allows for freedom ofthose 
who own the means of production while subjecting both the working class and colonized 
subjects to pseudo-slave conditions. The individual freedoms that are promised by liberal 
philosophy benefit elite, white males while subjecting the ''unfree'' to harsh material conditions 
(Losurdo, 2011). Liberalism's legacy of subjecting Others to the power ofthe wealthy and the 
propertied continues in neoliberalism, as does its legacy of privileging the rights and freedoms of 
some under formal citizenship. 
While classical liberalism as a project is no longer its rationalities have been used to 
produce a renewal of liberal theory known as neoliberalism. As a political philosophy it is a 
continuation ofthe liberal order and is based on classical liberal tenets (liberty, equality, and 
property) despite being a different project (Jessop, 2002; Plehwe, 2009). The project has been 
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criticized for its elitist logics and practices, and, I argue, represents a perpetuation ofthe colonial 
present: a way of thinking and acting that is still influenced by colonial power (Gregory, 2004). 
The development ofneoliberalism as a political philosophy occurred for decades with material 
and intellectual support from business elites (Harvey, 2005; Plehwe, 2009). Since the 1970s, 
neoliberalism has been used as a new mode of capital accumulation for further emichment and 
consolidation of class power through the spread of violence, imperialist practices, and enclosure 
(Harvey, 2005; for more on neoliberalism and enclosure see Chapter Four). 
According to Hindess (2002), neoliberal citizenship is a form of formal citizenship that 
demands a certain docility of citizens in accepting infringements on political and social freedoms 
for the sake of economic freedoms in an era of global capitalism. Rights produced from the state-
society relationships are ultimately compromised on the grounds of proper market function, and 
states are expected to limit their involvement in politics to good governance practices for the 
functioning of markets with provisions for minimal and basic (often internationally-determined) 
rights (e.g., property rights; Hindess, 2002). Indeed, neoliberal citizenship privileges economic 
freedoms by way of governance to produce competitive market function. This is especially the 
case in countries like Peru where neoliberal structural adjustment, the Washington Consensus 
and bilateral free trade agreements configure governments to produce such conditions. As a part 
ofneoliberal citizenship the state must privilege also rights to property in order to ensure the 
practice of economic freedoms. This requires the violence and exclusion that reflects the colonial 
past (more on this in Chapter Four). 
Classical liberal and neoliberal citizenship produce exclusion based on class, gender, 
ability, age, sexuality, and race. Marx's critique highlights theclassist dimension of liberal 
citizenship: the (re )production of inequality occurs by favouring the rights to liberty of the 
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bourgeois, such as the right to own property, over claims for other forms of rights such as 
collective social rights ofthe working class, the precariously employed and non-employed poor 
(Isin and Turner, 2002). For Lister (2002), citizenship depends on how one's identity is shaped 
by class, gender, sexuality, age, ability and race, and their level of citizenship depends on how 
they compare to the white male heterosexual construct. Lister (2002) argues that in the liberal 
definition, a citizen is a subject that is independent and rational and that male individuals 
approximate this subject as they are imagined as capable of transcending the body. According to 
Lister (2002), women are constructed as incapable of being disembodied, independent and 
rational subjects as they are conceived of only as sexual. Furthermore, these logics conceive of 
Others - by race, ability and age - as sexual in order to further exclude bodies that are not 
heterosexual, white, male, and abled (Lister, 2002). 
This exclusion of Others in neoliberal citizenship occurs as inclusion into liberal 
subjectivity becomes increasingly partial and premised on exclusion through differences in the 
colonial present. Legg (2006) describes this as the condemnation-difference paradox: an 
assertion ofthe difference ofthe Other with an insistence that they assimilate, which I argue, is 
strongly present in liberal forms of citizenship in the colonial past and present. Traditionally, 
liberalism has been preoccupied with improving the "less-advanced" through governing them 
into proper liberal citizenship - albeit in practice its actors hold much disdain for these duties to 
include, and often colonial rationalities and strategies have limited the degree to which liberal 
subjectivities are developed in colonized Others (Hindess, 2002; Legg, 2006). In the colonial 
present, racist/nationalist cultures inspired by neoliberal discourses demand that othered bodies 
become ideal neoliberal subjects. Nevertheless, these cultures attempt to make racism and 
discriminatory practices invisible by highlighting one's success (or failure) as a competitive, 
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entrepreneurial being (Laurie and Bonnett, 2002; Roberts and Mahtani, 2010). Yet, in the 
colonial present, the exclusion of the Other exists regardless of how successful he or she is at 
transcending it (see Roberts and Mahtani, 2010). In the Peruvian context of exclusion, Garcia 
and Lucero suggest that by approximating the ideal neoliberal citizen one can only be an 
"exceptional Other" - more equal than some Others but nevertheless excluded: 
[the reason for further exclusion] we suggest [is], in part, due to the 'double-bind' that 
Peruvian racial formation places upon a neoliberal cholo 18: he is an acceptable Other to 
the extent that he does not act like the Other, but he can never fully cease to be Other. 
(Garcia and Lucero, 2008, p. 266) 
The impossibility for the difference of Others to be fully erased is not the only 
marginalizing factor ofthe liberal model of citizenship: it also fails to acknowledge collective 
claims for rights, or different rights claims - civil, social, political and economic rights, for 
example - that are not reducible from its tenets (Isin and Turner, 2002). The exclusionary nature 
of a narrowly defined ideal liberal citizen based on the autonomous able western bourgeois white 
male and the differentiation of those who fail to meet that ideal, are the salient weaknesses of the 
model. But the liberal model of citizenship is not the only problem for more inclusive forms of 
citizenship. Formal citizenship also fails to guarantee an array of claims for political, economic, 
cultural and civil rights possible through substantive claims to belong. Holston and Appadurai 
highlight: 
[M]uch of the turmoil of citizenship derives from the following problem: although in 
theory full access to rights depends on membership [to the nation-state], in practice that 
which constitutes citizenship is often independent of its formal status. In other words, 
formal membership in the nation-state is increasingly neither necessary nor a sufficient 
condition for substantive citizenship. (2003, p. 297-8; emphasis added) 
18 Cholo is by-and-large a pejorative term for people of indigenous heritage and one used commonly in Peruvian 
discourse. 
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The claims by street vendors to appropriate public space challenge formal citizenship. Not 
only do the practices of street vendors transfer into claims for economic and social guarantees, 
they are claims made by predominantly gendered, racialized and classed Others to collective 
rights. Thus their claims for inclusion and their everyday life practices are antithetical to 
liberalism. Sevenhuijen suggests that people who do not approximate the dominant liberal 
subjectivity hold responsibilities not just to themselves but also to other people: they are 
imbricated in relationships of dependency because they both care for and are cared for by others 
(2000, as cited in Lister, 2002, p. 197). Street vendors are thickly embedded in relationships of 
dependency and collectivism not just in their workplaces (see Bayat, 2004; Crossa, 2009) but 
also in their homes. As municipal diagnostic reports show (created by the very polities that 
attempt to produce vendors as liberal subjects!) street vendors are predominately female, often 
from Andean origins, and live in situations of poverty with responsibilities to kin whether as a 
primary caretaker or as a part ofa household (Municipalidad Distrital de Comas, 2005; 
Municipalidad Distrital de Independencia, 2008). They are excluded by the racist logics of 
liberalism, and struggle for inclusion and belonging in conditions different than those of 
neoliberal citizenship. 
Street vendor's appropriation of public spaces effectively challenges formal citizenship 
and exercises substantive citizenship. Substantive citizenship challenges the inflexibility and the 
exclusionary logics and practices of the combination of formal and liberal citizenship. It does so 
through a practiced-based approach - claiming rights and guarantees - rather than relying on 
privileges granted by the state. Substantive citizenship is useful for excluded and oppressed 
popUlations in claiming citizenship in the city. Painter and Philo (1995) note that the distinction 
between spatial practices and practices in space is useful for indicating inclusion or exclusion: 
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through socio-cultural relations in space (practices in space), certain populations appear invisible 
- unable to act their identities because of the inability to engage in certain practices - or are 
relegated to symbolically differentiated spaces. By appropriating spaces (spatial practices) that 
are deemed for those who are fit for formal citizenship, street vendors make political claims on 
grounds of the right to difference, right to participation and right to appropriation (Lefebvre, 
2002; Purcell, 2003). These insurgent practices of substantive citizenship challenge the 
homogenizing logics and practices of formal citizenship. Street vendors include themselves in 
spaces of the city where they may be made invisible (or there are attempts to make them 
invisible) by those aligned with the dominant racist/nationalist order and where their practices 
are not welcomed. Street vendors precisely produce the type of city that Berman (1982) 
envisions is necessary for dialectical change and new possibilities. For Isin (2005) the city is a 
generator of difference and identity formation, and a site of struggle for space, citizenship and, 
belonging of a multitude of actors. In this sense, vendors exemplify the type of citizenship 
necessary for heterogeneous spaces like cities, and, in theoretical terms, make claims to (the) 
right(s) to the city by producing the city in different ways through their participation (Isin, 2002; 
Mitchell, 2003; Purcell, 2008). 
At a more immediate level, vendors' appropriation of space is a claim to security. Roy 
(2005) suggests claiming public space is a significant claim to right-of-use and economic 
security, which challenges the promise ofthe alienable rights to property and the duties of 
autonomy and rationality in formal liberal citizenship. In practical terms street vendor claims to 
space may be humble attempts at surviving at or below minimum wage (Municipalidad Distrital 
de Comas, 2005; Municipalidad Distrital de Independencia, 2008). They are also precisely the 
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types of activities required for ensuring that individuals, families and communities obtain 
resources for survival and for visibility in their struggle for those immediate outcomes. 
The following sections demonstrate that the homogenizing logics of formal and neoliberal 
citizenship produce exclusionary outcomes through the concatenation of street vendor policies 
developed through neoliberallogics and practices. In each section, the colonial legacies are 
considered as constitutive ofthose exclusions. 
3.3 The Production of Formal and Neoliberal Citizenship through Street Vending Policy 
In this section I describe a contextually-embedded version ofneoliberalism through examining 
street vending policy in contemporary Lima, Peru. I explain how street vending policy has been 
shaped by neoliberallogics and practices, which coincide with modernist logics oftotal 
eradication (see Cross, 2000) as well as racist colonial logics and practices, in order to argue that 
a new marginality is produced through governing, compliance and the production of norms. To 
elucidate this contextually-embedded neoliberalism I describe three responses to street vending -
formalization, temporary permission to occupy public space, and prohibition - that differentiate 
vendors based on their ability to respond as "neoliberal subjects". 
I use the case studies of San Martin de Porres, Villa EI Salvador and Comas to highlight 
the similarities ofneoliberallogics and practices in street vending policy. In particular, I study 
both the "new" use of eradication as a catalyst to formalization and the lack of economic and 
social security that emerges from formalization as an answer to street vending. The effects of 
treating vendors as purely economic subjects, I argue, ignores previous structural inequalities 
and oppressions and thus reproduces them in a different form when there are failures in 
formalization strategies. Not only does framing street vendors as economic subjects subject them 
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to further marginalization through market forces, but it limits their practices of citizenship to 
those determined by state rationalities under market fundamentalism. 
3.3.1 San Martin de Porres: The Case of Caquetti 
The District Municipality of San Martin de Porres, from 2002 to the present, has used a 
combination of eradication, formalization, and some temporary permissive regulations as a 
strategy. In San Martin de Porres, and mostly in the area of Caqueta (Figure 3.1), formalization 
is a new strategy alongside decades-old strategies of permissive regulations to appropriate public 
spaces and eradication schemes 19. In initial attempts at formalization, schemes were not as 
elaborate although they advocated that a permanent solution to eradicate street vending would be 
possible by evicting them from public spaces and offering them assistance to become 
independent, autonomous entrepreneurs in marketplaces or commercial centres. In early attempts 
at formalization, such as in 2003, vendors were expected to be in private property marketplaces 
in a matter of months after the announcement of the first of two by-laws, By-Law 042-2003-
MDSMP. The law established prohibited zones in the public spaces of the Caqueta area, and 
eviction notices were given to all vendors not in the rigid zones ofCaqueta. The municipality 
expected vendors to vacate public spaces within a 90 day grace period and to enter private 
property to engage in commerce upon the termination ofthat period (Article 2, By-Law 042-
2003-MDSMP; Article 3, By-Law-049-2003-MDSMP). 
During this grace period the municipality established a neoliberal rationality to combat 
street vending. The municipality omitted any reference to socio-cultural or economic structural 
oppressions that produced the material conditions of street vendors, or that street vending is a 
19 See By-Law 002-1985-MML; de Soto, 1989 for examples of decades to centuries-old regulations affecting Lima 
in general: see Council Accord 014-1995-MDSMP; Council Accord 047-1996-MDSMP; Decree 002-1998-
MDSMP; Decree 003-1999-MDSMP; Council Accord- 058-2000-MDSMP for example of prohibited zones for 
street vending that covered portions of San Martin de Porres, mostly in or near Caqueta, in recent years. 
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day-by-day survival strategy. Yet, it suggested that poverty could be removed ifthe.municipality 
made the appropriate interventions to make vendors "free" in the market. The municipality 
claimed that it would "foster the development of social sectors that were naturally dynamic but... 
caught in a culture of poverty and stuck in their development" (Article 2, By-Law 042-2003-
MDSMP). In order to be free in the market the municipality would have to stress that street 
vendors are "rational market actors" who engage in progressive economic development by being 
formal "rational economic actors". In the second of two formalization by-laws from 2003 known 
as Recuperation of Public Spaces and Development of the Informal Sector (PROMREP, or By-
Law 049-2003-MDSMP), the municipality claimed vendors made these claims: 
"PROMREP will be implemented ... [by] recognizing [street vendors] as economic 
subjects ... but also, and especially, [by] recuperating [vendors] as formal economic 
agents incorporated into a program of modernization" (By-Law 049-2003-MDSMP, p. 
11) 
The municipality perceived that the best way to govern these citizens into prosperity was by 
providing and securing the right conditions for street vendors to be "rational economic subjects". 
It did so in two ways. First, the municipality provided incentives, exonerations, short-term grace 
periods, distribution of information such as the real estate market and the health and safety of 
potential buildings to vendor associations (By-Law 049-2003-MDSMP, p. 12). Second, it 
provided technical and social services, both through the municipality and through NOOs 
"directed to the integral development ofthe new businesspeople": capacity-building (for 
formalization), business plans, business promotion, marketing, and micro credit fmancing (By-
Law 049-2003-MDSMP, p. 12). 
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In order to qualify for these incentives and state/NGO services, which include the grace 
periods for temporary conditional authorizations to be in public spaces, vendors had to agree to 
the following conditions: form part of a vendor association, agree to a plan for formalization that 
included a time line, and, at the association level, have their leaders join a special mixed 
committee for street vending administered by the district government (Directorial Resolution 
008-2003-DPDL-MDSMP). For associations that complied only with minimum requirements 
established by the municipality, penalties and corrective actions would be applied for failures to 
meet conditions of the agreement and time frame requirements. Vendor associations that did not 
attempt formalization would be eradicated from public spaces (By-Law 049-2003-MDSMP, p. 
12; Article 1, Directorial Resolution 008 -2003-DPDL-MDSMP). 
The transition to formality, and thus to a formal and neoliberal citizenship, produces a 
series of differentiations that exclude vendors based on their ability to comply. First, street 
vendors who do not belong to associations are automatically subject to eviction and eradication 
programs. Second, vendors and their associations have no choice but to comply with 
formalization measures to receive minimal benefits such as grace periods or face the possibility 
of eradication. Third, there are consequences to formalization, which remain unstated in the 
po licy. If street vendors fail to meet the conditions of formalization then they face eradication. If, 
for example, they manage to formalize, then they have accepted the risks and possibilities of 
failure as autonomous market actors: the only assistance they will receive is technical, and any 
claims to security beyond the alienable right of property are not possible. To claim rights under 
formal citizenship is contingent on passing through a series of exclusions built into policy. To 
avoid punitive measures of the state, vendors have to become governable through vending 
associations, compliant to municipal policy as a vending association, and successful in achieving 
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the goals of formalization, which include having sufficient funds to rent market stalls or to pay 
off loans. 
PROMREP, like other earlier formalization attempts, was executed without success. 
Aside from noting bureaucratic inefficiencies, optimism in timelines, and communication issues 
with associations, vendors and other agencies, the municipality highlighted that the failure was 
due to partial vendor and vendor association compliance. The problem of lack of compliance was 
determined as a problem of attitude of vendors looking to avoid eviction (Report 472-2003-
MDSMPIDPDL) without hypothesizing why those attitudes existed. Beyond the cited legal 
antecedents cited, the municipality claimed that the reason for ratifying a blanket prohibition for 
street vending in public space 18 months after initiating PROMREP was for reasons of 
compliance: ''the results of PROM REP are minimal and there exists very little will in the 
informal sector to advance towards formalization" (Decree 016-2004-MDSMP). For reasons of 
failure to become neoliberal citizens through formalization the municipality mobilized punitive 
measures: evict street vendors not covered by special rules from all public spaces, demolish their 
stands and any structures they used for selling, and confiscate their merchandise (Decree 016-
2004-MDSMP, Articles 1 and 2). 
In 2007, with the new administration2o, the District Municipality of San Martin de Porres 
developed a strategy for street vending - particularly for Caqueta - based in eviction schemes. 
The first example of policy to "eradicate in order to formalize" appeared within three days ofthe 
new administration in January: the Office of Economic Development called for an enforcement 
20 There are no published accounts of attempts at eradicating or formalizing street vendors from 2005 to 2006. 
Nevertheless, in these two years a series of conflicts internal to the local government occurred; misappropriation of 
funds implicating the mayor and councillors, and a previous corruption inquiry of the previous mayor became major 
foci of municipal government energies prior to the termination of that government and the municipal elections of · 
2006. The district by-laws, council accords and decrees from late 2004 to 2006 of the District Municipality of San 
Martin de Porres contain details of these issues. 
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ofthe technical requirements for regulated and authorized giros (types of vendor activities) and 
eradication ofthose who did not meet such requirements (Report 022-2007-
DCDC/GPDELIMDSMP). The municipality also began to eradicate street vendors in other areas 
of the district (not Caqueta) throughout 2007 as part ofa formalization plan. It is worth noting 
that the only strategies publicized by the municipality were, first, the street vendor eradications 
in the areas ofPalao (approximately 100 vendors) in May, Las Margaritas (60 vendors) in June, 
and EI Chaco (hundreds of vendors) in December and, second, the reduction in costs for a 
provisional business license at S/. 45 ($17 CAD) 21 instead ofS/. 210 ($75 CAD; Municipalidad 
Distrital de San Martin de Porres, 2007a, URL; Municipalidad Distrital de San Martin de Porres, 
2007b, URL; Municipalidad Distrital de San Martin de Porres, 2007c, URL). 
The municipality launched a project in 2008 that focused primarily on evictions in the 
Caqueta area. The project, known as Recuperation of Public Spaces, was designed ''to recuperate 
public spaces illegally appropriated by informal vending in the Caqueta area in order to initiate 
urban renewal and promote the formalization of vendors" (Report 070-2008-GPDEL-MDSMP). 
Throughout the 2008 and 2010 period the municipality executed the project. In the 
"Conglomerate Caqueta Work Plan" (Plan de Trabajo Conglomerado Caqueta), both in 
presentation and text formats (2008-2009?/n.d; Rehabilitation ofCaqueta Conglomerate, 2009) 
the municipality highlighted the goal ofthe program: three stages of eradication of vendors 
(Rehabilitation ofCaqueta Conglomerate, 2009, p. 4-5). 
The role of the municipality in formalization - not evictions - during the project 
. Recuperation of Public Spaces was primarily technical and social assistance to vendors that 
sought it. All actions of recuperation and sustainment worked on the assumption that most 
21 Conversion $1 CAD = 2.725 Peruvian Nuevos Soles on September 14,2010. Taken from http://www.xe.com 
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vendors held access to stalls22 and that evicted vendors without stalls would access the 
"sufficient real estate supply that existed in Caqueta" (Rehabilitation of Caqueta Conglomerate, 
2009, p. 5; Conglomerate Caqueta Work Plan, 2008-2009). Eviction/eradication and sustainment 
of action thus became a strategy for encouraging formalization to private property spaces as 
street vendors would, according to the municipality's recuperation plan and its actions, have no 
other place in Caqueta to work (or, ostensibly in any part of San Martin de Porres due to Decree 
016-2004-MDSMP). The actions of recuperation and sustained presence of authority of2008 and 
2009, followed by inspections and subsequent eradications in 2010 (Municipalidad Distrital de 
San Martin de Porres, 201 Oa, URL), coupled with only some vendors joining formal 
marketplaces or centros comerciales signalled that eradication worked under a rationality of 
leaving vendors with no other option than to participate in formalization if they continued to 
work as vendors. The promise of rights and security, especially the right to work, could, 
according to municipal policies and actions, only be obtained through vendors' participation as 
entrepreneurs in the formal economy in private property. 
Beyond closing options for vendors to be in public space the level of involvement of this 
administration in technical and social assistance was selective and based in the goals of 
22 The claim that most vendors held stalls is contentious and difficult to prove. In the findings in a report in 
December 2003 by then-Chief of the Department of Formalization and Entrepreneurial Development for the District 
Municipality, Amilcar Vincuna Fuente, by the end of 2003 only 10-15% of associated informal street vendors were 
believed to own a piece of property in a marketplace or commercial centre. A significantly higher level of property 
ownership, or access to private property, is claimed as happening ''years ago" in a report five years later. In the 
report, the municipality claims that in the Caqueta Area 80% of street vendors have property to work in, which they 
acquired years ago (Rehabilitation ofCaqueta Conglomerate, 2009, p. 5). The statistics contradict the assumption 
that all associated vendors have somewhere on private property to work in. Given the failures ofPROMREP and the 
crises in the administration, corruption in government offices, illicit appropriation of moneys, which were also 
acknowledged in the same report, and the "incredulous" and non-cooperative behaviours of the street vendor 
associations, not just in 2003 as highlighted in Decree o 16-2004-MDSMP but also in 2007 according to the report 
(Rehabilitation ofCaqueta Conglomerate, 2009, p. 1) how at least 65% of non-propertied street vendors acquired 
property during such a short period is not explained either. Further; no reference or calculation of non-associated 
informal street vendors that appropriate public spaces makes for further difficulties in interpreting the statistics. 
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neoliberal citizenship. In press releases the municipality suggested that it would assist in 
entrepreneurial development and formalization only. Throughout the evictions, the official claim 
of the municipality's role with vendors "[was] to coordinate with street vendor association 
leaders, and propose economic development of the [Caqueta] area through formalization and 
urban revaluation" (Municipalidad Distrital de San Martin de Porres, 2009a, URL; 
Municipalidad Distrital de San Martin de Porres, 2010a, URL; Municipalidad Distrital de San 
Martin de Porres, 201Ob, p. 7). The district municipality offered a series of programs for vendors 
(and to some degree the public-at-Iarge) that included registration of informal vendors with the 
municipality, formalization workshops, human capacity development for vendors in formal 
marketplaces, gender-specific workshops for producers, and marketing and small-business 
development programs (Municipalidad Distrital de San Martin de Porres, 2009b, URL). These 
programs were offered for those willing to be governed and gain rights to develop themselves 
with the necessary human capital development for integration into the formal economy and 
registration with the government. Otherwise, non-compliance meant the guarantee of punitive 
measures such as eradication from public spaces. Even for compliant vendors that formalized 
their practices eradication was imminent if they did not relocate in a timely manner. 
3.3.2 Villa El Salvador and the Case o(La Chancheria 
The contemporary responses ofthe District Municipality of Villa EI Salvador to street vending 
are similar to those of District Municipality of San Martin de Porres. They include a combination 
of punitive action for non-compliant street vendors through eviction strategies and a passive 
approach to formalization with voluntary involvement of compliant vendors. I rely primarily on 
the case ofthe commercial axis of Juan Velasco Alvarado and Revolution Avenues, popularly 
known as La Chancheria (Figure 3.2) where, as of2007, 80% of informal vendors in Villa EI 
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Salvador used public spaces (Report 076-2007-GSC-MVES). The site of La Chancheria has 
been appropriated by different groups of street vendors for over 25 years with some form of 
permission 23, although the area was appropriated by even more vendors, including non-
associated vendors. All forms of appropriation - permissive and non-permissive - occurred until 
at least 2008 (see Report 025-2007-CDC-GSC-MVES, item 4; Municipalidad Distrital de Villa 
El Salvador, 2009, URL). 
The municipality had two noteworthy responses to street vending in 2007 and 2008 that 
focused on eradicating vendors. These eradication schemes were justified for a number of 
reasons, not just for economic development or to produce formal vendors. The goals were to: 
"recuperate the principle of authority [in public space]" (Report 025-2007-CDC-GSC-MVES), 
evade the possibility of high risk of environmental disasters, address insecurity in the street 
(Report 076-2007-GSC-MVES; Report 001-2008-VII-DIRTEPOL-L-DIVTER-l-JEFDIS-VES-
UNINTE) and generate economic development and formalize informal vendors (Article 4, By-
Law 164-2008-MVES). The first response was designed to reorder and eradicate vendors that 
had occupied public spaces in non-regulated areas24 in order to: 
.. contribute to an improvement of conditions of security and prevention in front of the 
possible occurrence of disasters in the commercial axis of [La Chancheria], to combat 
delinquency that occurs in the area, and to find an improvement of habitat and living 
conditions for nearby inhabitants (Report 076-2007-GSC-MVES) 
23 For example, a relocation of street vendors to La Chancheria was initially authorized for 90 days through Mayoral 
Office Resolution 122-1997-ALC-MVES. Regulated zones for street vending are commonly used since they have 
been sanctioned in By-Law 002-1985-MML. 
24 Regulated areas, often campos feriales or fairgrounds, have been permitted areas for informal vending according 
to By-Law 002-1985-MML. In this case, given that vendors in campos feriales such as La Chancheria were deemed 
in regulated spaces, and no district by-law prohibited their presence in public spaces, no eradication occurred at that 
time. 
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Unlike San Martin de Porres, this closure of informal vendor markets and the eradication 
of all street vendors in public spaces (streets, sidewalks, emergency exits, security areas 
and so on) had little relationship to formalization strategies despite a similar objective to 
ensure that "[the occupation of public spaces by street vendors and the dangers they 
caused] would be a history that should never be repeated" (Report 076-2007-GSC-MVES). 
The type of exclusion produced by this response has its roots in a larger concern for 
producing secure public spaces free of some of Lima's larger perceived problems (at the 
expense of informal vendors): social insecurity, and the possibility for urban environmental 
disasters25 . Arguably, the confluence ofneoliberal rationalities with eradication was absent 
in this case as self-responsibilization, and the subjectification of vendors as homo 
(Economicus did not appear explicitly in municipal regulations. 
In 2008 the municipality passed a comprehensive by-law (By-Law 164-2008-MVES) to 
regulate all informal street vending activities. This by-law demonstrated the crystallization of 
neoliberal rationalities into law by prescribing formalization strategies. The municipality 
sanctioned the eradication of street vendors across the district along with the development of 
institutional capacity as well as programs to make street vendors formal entrepreneurs and thus 
neoliberal citizens. The objectives were: 
Suggesting proposals that give incentives and promote the formalization of street vendors ... 
through a development plan oriented towards private investment that facilitates the 
opportunities and new possibilities for entrepreneurial development (Article 2); 
25 In my undergraduate thesis (Wood, 2007) I highlight that in marketplaces (formal and informal) an environmental 
disaster is the largest concern in newspaper discourses. Disasters like the fire in Mesa Redonda in December 2001 
that left 277 dead and another 247 injured (Arce Palomino, 2008) have produced a collective memory in Lima about 
the dangers of major axes of market activity. 
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Giving vendors in La Chancheria area 90 days to retire from the boulevard and sidewalks in 
order to improve parks, boardwalks, and buildings (Article 3); 
Integrating all the informal vendors clustered inparaditas [through] initiating the processes 
of formalization and commercial management that are required, [thereby] permitting the 
recuperation of public spaces ... (Article 4), and 
Creating the appropriate conditions to strengthen [governing] capacity and promote processes for 
formalization, and opt for defmite and formal projects (Article 5). 
The municipality had two noteworthy plans for street vendors. Those in La Chancheria area 
would face a situation similar to vendors in Caqueta: an imminent eviction that would ostensibly 
initiate the process of formalization and relocation to formal markets. Vendors in smaller clusters 
would be offered assistance to formalize in conjunction with their eviction from public space, 
although whether the actual plan for these smaller groups would use eviction before relocation 
remained unclear. 
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Similar to the case ofCaqueta in San Martin de Porres, the District Municipality of Villa 
El Salvador punitively treated vendors in La Chancherfa. The strategy was to teach vendors that 
the most effective manner - and the only manner, with little exception - to work is inside a 
private property market stall that they pay for by forcing them out of public spaces. During the 
municipality's execution ofthe La Chancherfa evictions, communiques to the public 
demonstrated that formalization, like in Caqueta, was at best a secondary consideration to 
recuperation. The municipality articulated that it would act as a facilitator of projects that assist 
street vendors in purchasing properties, but without giving any guarantees that vendors will have 
a space to go in order to sell: 
Vendors will go to their new property ... which they bought with the [facilitation] of the 
Municipality. Those who are not partners in this project will have to move to their homes 
and formally begin their commercial activities so that we can give them the necessary 
facilities [to formalize]. Another option is that they go to a formal market and enter into a 
partnership there (Municipalidad Distrita1 de Villa E1 Salvador, 2009, URL) 
Informal vendors were obliged to resolve their informal status by acting like autonomous citizens 
that proactively or reactively search for market stalls. Either way, a neoliberal version of 
citizenship was expected by the municipality as vendors were only allowed to claim economic 
rights as responsible, autonomous subjects within the formally-sanctioned rules ofthe market. 
Evictions were assumed to be necessary to produce these types of citizens by removing the 
possibility of non-sanctioned practices (i.e., informal) in public spaces. 
3.3.3 Comas and FONTA-COMAS 
The District Municipality of Comas has long used formalization as a strategy to regulate and 
govern street vendors. At least on paper, the municipality has directly used formalization as the 
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way in which street vendors (in campos feriales, public spaces or as ambulantes) comply with 
conditions for appropriating public space in the long-term. Formalization provides a guarantee 
for having a place to work until the municipality deems vendors "self-sufficient" and ready for 
eviction. Institutional legacies have guided the municipality's response to informality, albeit with 
some hesitation. During the city centre evictions (1996-2000), the first major occurrence where 
vendors became responsible for their poverty and had to leave public spaces, the District 
Municipality of Comas passed a series of resolutions (Council Accord 023-1996-CIMC; Council 
Accord 08-0-1996-CIMC) that repealed previous rights to use public spaces and to relocate 
federations and associations of vendors to other public or private spaces (articulated in By-Law 
001-1996-SGC-AlMC).1t favoured instead formalization (FONTA-COMAS) and temporary and 
contingent access to the use of public spaces provided that vendors complied with the program 
(By-Law 009-1997 -CIMC; Council Accord 049-1997 -CIMC). 
The FONT A-COMAS program was designed as a fund in which street vendors would 
have to make daily payments for the purpose of purchasing or renting a market stall or for 
formalization costs26• In order to access public spaces for street vending, vendor associations-
non-associated vendors excluded - had to agree to join the FONTA-COMAS program, and 
establish a specified period of time necessary to both formalize their businesses and leave public 
spaces, which would, according to the municipality, treat the problems of relocation and assist in 
the ordering of street vending activities (Council Accord 049-1997-CIMC Acta de Compromiso; 
Council Accord 052-1997-CIMC, Article 4). 
According to the municipality, the formalization plan using FONTA-COMAS was not 
successful in achieving wide-scale compliance '-- even after its reactivation in 2002 (Council 
26 Informal street vendor association leaders would be responsible for assuring the deposits are made whereas the 
municipality would be responsible for supervising the process of formalization, including the status of deposits. 
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Accord 020-2002-C/MC). Similar to the frustrations with the failures of formalization in the 
District Municipality of San Martin de Porres, Comas used a strategy of eradication in order to 
push for formalization. The city council, in one session, without technical advice from any other 
bureaucratic channels, quickly passed a blanket prohibited zone by-law that would cover the 
entire district of Comas (By-Law 113-2004-C/MC). The blanket prohibited zone was justified as 
a tool to assist in formalization and to address an eviction of one area where neighbour 
complaints were made against street vendors. City Councillor Antunez Lopez justified the act as 
a way of bringing non-compliant vendors and their associations to meet with the municipality's 
committee for street vending given that vendors apparently had not followed through with their 
promises to formalize (Act of the Ordinary Session of Council, Februrary 27,2004, 
Municipalidad Distrital de Comas, p. 113). Likewise, the Mayor suggested that the by-law would 
send a message to the street vendors that ''their time frames [for leaving public spaces] are now 
expired and they need to relocate and take the [issue of formalization] seriously" (Act ofthe 
Ordinary Session of Council, Februrary 27,2004, Municipalidad Distrital de Comas, p. 113). 
Unlike the legal norms and plans for eradication passed in Villa EI Salvador and San Martin de 
Porres, the municipality's use of eradication policy was, at least in the short-term, a negotiation 
tool to restart wide-scale dialogue for vendor formalization27• 
The degree to which non-compliant vendors would be punished was unclear given lack of 
information in following documents. Nevertheless, it is known that the municipality abandoned 
using the FONT A-COMAS program for non-compliant vendors (i.e., vendor associations and 
vendors that did not make monetary deposits into a FONTA-COMAS account). Even after the 
27 Within six months of the threat of eviction, the municipal government began to renegotiate with the vendor 
federations and associations on other issues, such assanitationlhealth cards for poor formal and informal vendors, 
demonstrating an interest to ensure safety in street vending over eradication, at least in the short-term (Report 155-
2004-S/G SCA-GDAlMC; By-Law 129-2004-CIMC) 
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reactivation of FONT A-COMAS in 2002, there was an attempt within the administrative level of 
the municipality to revive the program/or all vendors. A by-law much like Council Accord 020-
2002-C/MC was drafted (see Memorandum 147-2007-GAJ/MC; Memorandum 049-2007-
GDE/MC) but never enacted as a legal norm. Instead, the municipality opted for an 
interinstitutional agreement between the municipality and La Caja Metropolitana, an enterprise 
ofthe Municipality of Metropolitan Lima designed to encourage savings and offer "popular 
credit" (i.e., credit for those living in some form of precarity). The conditions ofthe 
interinstitutional agreement were limited as they omitted vendors that did not participate in 
FONT A-COMAS: "[The municipality] will promote and direct the granting of credit [for 
formalization] through La Caja Metropolitana and through their associations to those vendors 
who make deposits to FaNTA-COMAS" (Interinstitutional, Cooperation Agreement, 2007, 
Clause lip. 1, emphasis added). 
Meanwhile, through the inter-institutional arrangement, the municipality agreed to take a 
role in facilitating formalization. In order for vendors to access credit products through La Caja 
Metropolitana, the municipality had to assure that there would be a strategic plan for teaching 
vendors to be self-sufficient formal vendors. This included po licies for expanding micro and 
small entrepreneurial development, capacity-building for vendors entering into formalization, 
accessory and technical assistance for vendors, joint studies on expanding investment projects 
directed towards formalization of informal street vendors, assistance in soliciting formalization 
and registration of private property spaces for vendors, and providing an onsite location for La 
Caja Metropolitana to offer banking-and credit products to street vendors28 (Interinstitutional, 
Cooperation Agreement, 2007, Clause 4/p.2). As in the case of San Martin de Porres 
28 fudeed, there is a Caja Metropolitana branch located in the municipal office in Comas. 
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formalization was a project with a series of inclusions for compliant vendors, which held off the 
threat ofthe municipality's eradication plans (as articulated in By-Law 113-2004-CIMC). 
3.3.4 Reflections on District Municipalitv Cases on Formalization 
In each municipality, the use of exclusionary and punitive measures alongside technical and 
social assistance policies to strengthen entrepreneurialism demonstrates precisely what 
Wacquant (2009) argues is a "new" way of shaping citizenship from above under neoliberalism 
using four salient logics: re-regulation that favours the market and market-based solutions; the 
retraction ofwelfarist policies; individual responsibilization, and the reassertion of authority and 
the punitive arm ofthe state. In their own local contexts and at their particular scale, district 
municipalities share these characteristics Wacquant describes as they produce scenarios "from 
above" that demand vendors' compliance in order for vendors to receive the rights and 
protections of formal neoliberal citizenship. Vendors must respond to market conditions such as 
local property values, they must adjust to the relegation of former rights to relocation to campos 
feriales and special rights to appropriate space (e.g., By-Law 002-1985-MML), and they must 
conform to new policies that demand ofthem property ownership and entrepreneurialism. They 
become responsible for the conditions of social insecurity produced by a lack of welfarist 
policies by participating in entrepreneurialism, and, in the case of many vendors, they are 
subjected to the expansive punitive arm ofthe state that attempts to produce "order" out ofthe 
policy failures ofneoliberal economic restructuring policy failures and the subsequent rise of 
social insecurity. 
The modem historical practice of evictions against racialized street vendors, who are 
deemed by the state to be undesirables in public spaces, meets with neoliberal policy imperatives 
ofresponsibilization of vendors who depend on public space for their families' social 
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reproduction. The confluence of evictions and formalization produces this new marginality by 
making it increasingly difficult for vendors to appropriate public space without formalizing. 
When there are barriers to formalizing that are beyond the scope of government and NGO 
assistance then street vendors who are not able to take the risks demanded ofthem face reprisal 
from the state and either must return to their homes to start a new survival strategy (as suggested 
by the District Municipality Villa EI Salvador) or search for "new" and less invigilated spaces to 
appropriate for street vending (Bayat, 2004). 
Formalization policies can be contrasted with the mounting evidence of exclusion they 
cause. One noteworthy problem has been pointed out by three entities. The Municipalidad 
Distrital de Independencia (2008) and NGOs Centro de Estudios y Promocion del Desarrollo 
(desco) and Altemativa (2001) have all suggested that the growth in supermarket chains and the 
aesthetically pleasing environment and lower costs they provide produce conditions that are 
difficult for vendors to compete with. According to desco and Altemativa (2001) the competition 
demands higher capital investments in modernizing infrastructure and in marketing from 
vendors. By probing deeper, the very problem of subjecting street vendors as neoliberal citizens 
to the rules of the market emerges. Either vendors are not able to formalize as expected ofthem, 
or the infrastructure developed by street vendors that can afford to formalize and "compete" in 
the formal market is hardly competitive enough. A case of relocation in San Martin de Porres 
highlights the frrst problem of subjecting vendors to market forces; very few actually make it to 
the marketplaces. In the Conzac marketplace, a formal market, a total of only 890 informal 
vendors out of2500 managed to formalize and relocate; the number that stayed in the market 
months after relocation was unknown (desco/ Alternativa, 2001). Of the vendors who can afford 
to formalize and relocate, the spaces they can afford are deemed simple and ''unattractive'' (see 
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descol Altemativa, 2001), which disadvantages them as they compete in market conditions of 
aggressive expansion of corporate-financed commercial centres29 (Habra mas de 100 centros 
comerciales, 2011 - April 14, URL). 
In the local context, treatments of Others as hard-working, progressive, rent-seeking 
actors has contributed to this problem of expecting formalization to be a major success. 
Gromprone (1990) suggests that there has been a common belief in intellectual circles and 
popular discourse that street vendors are successful entrepreneurs that merely operate outside the 
law. Gromprone (1990) suggests such beliefs overlook the number of ways that marginality, 
obstacles and oppressions produce survival strategies that are short-term, immediate plans for 
those living hand-to-mouth. The work that is performed by racialized people surviving day-by-
day becomes narrated through imaginaries of them as hard-working labourers of economic 
progress. When street vendors failure to meet the conditions ofthe neoliberal subject, produced 
by masculinist, racist, classist, ableist, and sexually discriminatory accounts of the disembodied 
rational actor, the same rationality explains those failures in terms of whether or not vendors 
successfully engage in rational practices of self-interest and competition with their human capital 
(see Read, 2009). 
3.4 Conditional Authorizations 
Neoliberal citizenship in Lima disallows the substantive practice of appropriating public space in 
any way that is not formal. Conditional authorizations become the means through which any use 
of public space can occur as eviction and formalization strategies are employed. District 
29 Private investments in commercial centres are planned to increase. Currently, Peru has about 25 large commercial 
centres. By 2015 this will quadruple to over 100 according to the President of the Association of Commercial 
Centres and Entertainment in Peru (ACCEP; see Habra mas de 100centros comerciales, 2011-,ApriI14, URL). 
ACCEP represents multinational and domestic corporations such as Peru's richest families the Romeros (Grupo 
Romero), the Wieses (Grupo Wiese), and Chilean real estate company Parque Arauco SA. These commercial 
centres include the investments of powerful foreign retail corporations such as Cencosud SA. 
84 
municipalities grant vendors conditional authorizations - temporary use of public space under 
stringent regulations - whether as part of a formalization strategy or as state assistance. Such 
authorizations are used to differentiate based on who can be a proper neoliberal subject - abled -
and who is worthy of state support due to inability to participate in the market - disabled. Yet, 
even when determining who is worthy of support, there have been tendencies under neoliberal 
logics and practices to treat the "deserving poor" as the ''undeserving poor" and thus subject 
them to scrutiny as though they are truly "abled" and fail to meet the ideal neoliberal citizenship 
(Chouinard, 2006). Furthermore, these practices unfold through racist colonial mentalities that 
further attempt to produce bodies in public space that are clean and moral (Sibley, 1995; 
Swanson, 2007). Among the main dimensions of exclusion that are produced through regulations 
that follow wide-scale prohibition of being in public space are lack of affiliation with an informal 
vendor organization, the types of goods and services sold, levels of wealth, defmitions of ability 
and disability, and cleanliness and proper behaviour. 
3.4.1 Differentiating Vendors Using Conditional Authorizations 
Outside of formalization strategies most municipalities share a similar two-fold process of 
exclusion in determining who is appropriate for authorization in public space. First, they require 
that informal vendors engage in only certain types of street vending activities. Second, they 
require vendors to be either a part of a limited-sized association or one of a limited number of 
people who can exercise street vending in public. Third, they differentiate between the deserving 
and undeserving poor based on categories of ability and wealth; only those who are deemed to be 
destitute or without options for gaining wealth are allowed to work in public space on the 
condition they do not breach the conditions of authorization. 
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The blanket prohibition of street vending in all public spaces in the district San Martin de 
Porres in 2004 had the ostensible effect of prohibiting all vendors with few exceptions. The 
remaining permissible street vending activities in San Martin de Porres were the everyday life 
essentials for social reproduction: selling newspapers, magazines, lotteries and candies, or 
preparing and selling hot and cold non-alcoholic beverages (By-Law 038-1999-MDSMP; By-
Law 032-2001-MDSMP). In By-Law 032-2001-MDSMP, beverage vendors must have been 
previously organized into a vendor association to be authorized, and furthermore, must have 
been previously installed in public space (Articles 2 and 17). Likewise, for vendors of 
newspapers, lotteries, books, candies and similar items, membership to the Union o/Newspaper, 
Lottery and Magazine Vendors was a requisite for authorized vending (Article 8, By-Law 038-
1999-MDSMP). In order to be authorized in public space, street vendors must demonstrate some 
degree of disability, whether a physical disability or poverty-as-disability. Preference would be 
given to individuals who ''because oftheir physical condition, economic resources andlor social 
situation require this type of subsistence and do not have an additional income" (Article 8, By-
Law 038-1999-MDSMP). 
Similarly, the District Municipality ofIndependencia developed a series of regulations 
that based authorizations on street vendors' perceived economic capacities and ability to generate 
wealth. The municipality had already established a blanket prohibition on street vending across 
the district for all non-authorized vendors (By-Law 009-1999-MDI), which allowed for 
authorizations to be individualized. First, the municipality used By-Law 035-2002-MDI to 
differentiate between ability and disability in order to provide authorization. The law permitted 
people who could present a certificate oftheir (physically) disabled status andlor a report oftheir 
socioeconomic status in order to obtain the necessary authorization to be in public space 
86 
(Articles I and 3, By-Law 035-2002-MDI). The support program featured relatively little detail 
of what types of authorizations were allowed or what conditions would be placed on vendors. 
However, a more comprehensive by-law was passed in 2004 that stipulated which types of street 
vending activities were permitted. Instead of authorizing vendors based solely on disability, 
authorizations would be limited to those selling candies, hot non-alcoholic beverages, 
newspapers and magazines, fruit stands, or offering services such as shoe-shining and key-
making (Article 1, By-Law 082-2004-MDI). 
Similar to By-Law 035-2002-MDI there were only two ways that vendors could be 
authorized to be in public space: they had to demonstrate their poverty-as-disability at the 
individual and familial scale and/or be a person with a physical or mental disability (Article 8, 
By-Law 082-2004-MDI). The conditions of authorization further restricted poor families from 
accessing other forms of support from the state and subjected them to further monitoring and 
recurring evaluations. The conditions stipulated by the municipality were as follows: First, the 
municipality established its right to determine the number of authorizations throughout the 
district (Article 9, By-Law 082-2004-MDI). Second, families deemed sufficiently impoverished 
to receive authorization were allowed only one authorization per family, not to be shared with 
others, which could be revoked due to any complaint by a community member (Article 5, By-
Law 082-2004-MDI). Unlike By-Law 035-2002-MDI vendors were subjected to constant 
evaluations in order to determine if they were sufficiently disabled to receive support. Third, the 
authorizations granted by the municipality were provisional for one year, and vendors needed to 
reapply for authorization by declaring their impoverished status and resubmitting the necessary 
documents for provisional authorization (Articles 5 and 13, By-Law 082-2004-MDI). 
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The District Municipality of Villa E1 Salvador used similar practices as Independencia 
and San Martin de Porres to differentiate based on economic necessity, type of street vending 
activity, and level of ability to participate as an ideal neoliberal citizen. The municipality's 
comprehensive by-law allowed a series of activities highlighted in Article 1030, which were 
temporal in character and available on a probationary and individual basis. In order to qualify for 
authorization to work in public space, vendors had to demonstrate that street vending is their 
family's only source of income, that they are over 18 years of age and that they are part of a 
recognized vendor association (Article 12, By-Law 164-2008-MVES). 
The historic practice of excluding vendors from public spaces by using a combination of 
prohibited zones on select streets, permitted areas (camposferiales), licensing fees and "right to 
work" fees has been replaced by a new set of policies in Lima. Authorizations exist within a 
policy landscape of blanket prohibitions on street vending which permit municipalities to 
discriminate who may appropriate space and under what conditions (Roever, 2005). Temporary 
authorizations under formalization strategies exist alongside permissions that determine which 
street vendors are worthy of receiving authorization based on the state's determination oftheir 
inability to participate as neoliberal citizens. Yet, the regulations reduce the number of ways that 
street vendors can legally appropriate public spaces outside formalization programs through 
more intense scrutiny of vendors' lives and more rigid definitions of who can appropriate space. 
3.4.2 The Colonial Present in Conditional Authorizations 
30 Article 10 of By-Law 164-2008-MVES allows the following sales and services in public space: 1. Newspapers 
and magazines; 2. Hot beverages; 3. Candies, cakes and breads; 4. Cold, non-alcoholic beverages; 5. Prepared 
sweets that represent culinary art from the different departments of Peru; 6. Artisanal products; 7. Hotdogs, 
sandwiches, and limeiio cuisine (e.g., anticuchos); 8. Popsicles; 9. Shoeshining, and; 10. Artistic expressions and 
expositions that contribute to a recuperated image of the district. 
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In this section I argue that municipalities use racist logics of the colonized Other that idealize 
public spaces as clean through questioning the cleanliness and sobriety of the Other. Pennissive 
regulations thus are manifestations of the confluence ofneoliberallogics and practices with the 
racist colonial present as they "allow" poor and racialized groups access to state assistance on the 
conditions they meet Western and bourgeois norms. 
Separating the dirt from the individual is perceived as having a moralizing effect (Sibley, 
1995). Discourses of the dirtiness of indigenous people prevalent in Andean countries reflect the 
colonial present in these places. Swanson suggests that the fear of contamination of city spaces 
has its roots in conceiving of indigenous bodies as diseased or contaminated, which lends to a 
hygienic racism that idealizes city spaces - particularly in former colonial cities - as clean (2007, 
p. 717; 2010, p. 17-8) and thus as having a moralizing effect. 
The city centre of Lima was ''purified'' by recuperating the contested landscapes and 
conceiving of space with a historical-geographical colonial imaginary in order to bring about 
progress (see Gandolfo, 2009). As Mayor Andrade claimed after the urban renewal project ofthe 
historic city centre in Cercado de Lima, it was about recuperating a "great city" that was affected 
by "complete chaos and dirt" of migrants who had "cultural values that were not [Creole]" 
(Gandolfo, 2009, p. 64). This discourse of the dirtiness of street vendors operates in the daily 
lives of limenos. But days after Mayor Andrade's death on June 19,2009 the discourse was 
prevalent in reflections of the legacy of Mayor Andrade. Two newspaper articles highlight the 
"dirt discourse" in relation to Andrade's legacy of urban renewal: 
The capital of Lima in the 1970s and 1980s was an immense pigsty, full of streets appropriated by 
itinerant vendors, with barren land (terrales) ... [in] an atmosphere full of flies given the large 
quantity of garbage thrown in the streets and thieves in all parts ... Andrade, among other things, 
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beautified and cleaned Lima, [and] reordered ... and controlled the plague of itinerant vendors. 
(Adios Andrade, 2009 - June 20, p. 2) 
With [Andrade] the capital began to recuperate order, cleanliness, authority and spirit, as well as 
clear the public spaces chaotically occupied by informal commerce of many decades. (La Huella 
de Alberto Andrade, un politico digno, 2009 - June 21, p. a6) 
In the article Adios Andrade written in Correo, vendors were represented as a plague that 
produced dirty conditions - garbage heaps, flies and pigsties - and contributors to the immoral 
conditions of criminality and disorder. Likewise, cleanliness was portrayed as a product of 
Andrade's clearing of street vendors from public space during the urban renewal project; street 
vendors were related to the dirtiness that existed with their presence. On June 20, 2009 an article 
appeared in El Comercio unrelated to the death of Andrade but which nevertheless highlighted 
how the dirtiness of vendors was part of everyday newspaper discourse and also of state 
administration. The study by the General Office of Environmental Health (Digesa) of the 
Ministry of Health (Minsa) stated that the Ministry of Health found 74% of parks in Lima's 
conurbation "contaminated by parasite eggs, irrigation water of doubtful quality, the presence of 
rodents, garbage and itinerant [informafJ vending, which put the health of people that visit these 
green spaces, especially children, at risk" (EI 74% de parques esta contaminado, 2009 - June 20, 
p. a18, emphasis added). Street vendors in public spaces were not just perceived as a moral threat 
but also a physical threat to the health of citizens, and their removal and containment under these 
perceptions is a major constituent of street vending policy. 
The legal norms of municipalities attempt to contain the dirtiness of colonial Others by 
assuring their bodily cleanliness and the cleanliness of the spaces they use. Street vendor 
regulations demand the internal and external cleanliness of the body. The most noteworthy 
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regulation for internal cleanliness is the requirement of the "health card" for those in the lowly-
paid service sector. In 1998, Mayor Andrade passed a by-law obliging all people in Metropolitan 
Lima that work with the public and handle food for public consumption to hold a "health card". 
In order to obtain the card and thus in order to work, all individuals would have to test negative 
for infectious diseases, and subject themselves to clinical, serologica~ denta~ and tuberculosis 
exams (food preparers would also have to test negative for a parasitological exam; Article 8, By-
Law 141-1998-MML). This Metropolitan-wide regulation affecting primarily low-paid workers 
has complementary regulations in district municipalities which either assure the internal 
cleanliness ofthe body (Article 6, By-Law 009-1999-MDI; Article 4, By-Law 082-2004-MDI; 
By-Law 032-2001-MDSMP31), or provide incentives for the wide-scale acquisition of the 
"health card" (By-Law 129-2004-C/MC; By-Law 141-2004-C/MC). 
The by-laws ofthe district municipalities demonstrate that vendors are required to have 
cleanliness of the body, their stall and the spaces they used. The by-laws of the District 
Municipality oflndependencia directly demanded the following: "hygiene ofthe person, proper 
conservation and presentation of their workspace [and] cleanliness of the five metre radius 
around their workspace" (Article 26, By-Law 009-1999-MDI; Article 16, By-Law 082-2004-
MDI). In the case of the Municipality of San Martin de Porres, authorized vendors were to 
"strictly keep the habits of cleanliness and hygiene, as much as for the product [they sell] as for 
themselves (for men, by having a shaved face and short hair; for women, pulled-back hair with 
hats, clean hands and short nails, etc.)" (Article 9, By-Law 32-2001-MDSMP). Further, they 
were obliged to maintain a "minimum level of cleanliness and hygiene in the work area" defined 
31 The district municipality of Villa El Salvador omits stating the need to hold a health card in By-Law 164-2008-
MVES. Also, newspaper vendors regulated by By-Law 39-1999-MDSMP are not obliged to hold the "health card"; 
they receive a different health test. 
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by the municipality (Article 10, By-Law 32-2001-MDSMP). In Villa EI Salvador, street vendors 
were obliged to meet a strict uniform requirement and hygiene levels to avoid sanctions or 
annulations oftheir authorization: a work outfit consisting of a hat (white in colour), apron or 
vest, latex or single-use gloves, and a face mask for food sales, and the necessary personal 
hygiene for the products they are offering (Articles 15 and 36, By-Law 164-200S-MVES). The 
municipality also stipulated that any module (cart or mobile stand) used by street vendors would 
have to be maintained in a good state, with cleanliness ofthe module and its instruments (Article, 
27, By-Law 164-200S-MVES). 
The comportment ofthe vendor is also heavily regulated to assure that cleanliness 
transcends the cultural practices of everyday life of street vendors. In order to avoid loss of 
authorization vendors must abide by the rules of the municipality as well as social norms. In 
Independencia, vendors must not ''put additional tables, chairs or benches in public space, use 
more public space than what is allowed ... attend the public drunk or under the influence of toxic 
or hallucinogenic substances, commit acts against morality and proper customs, or against the 
public order, or use public space or nearby property for physiological necessities" (Article 19, 
By-Law OS2-2004-MDI). Similarly, in Villa El Salvador the municipality prohibits "attending 
modules in a state of drunkenness, or under the influence of drugs or other toxic substances; 
provoking public scandals, and not respecting the peace and tranquility of citizens, or; using 
public spaces, parks, gardens, sidewalks, street shoulders, or other private and unauthorized 
places for physiological needs" (Article 30, By-Law 164-200S-MVES). 
In regulating the cleanliness of vendors, their stalls, the spaces they use and assuring 
proper comportment, permitting street vendors in public spaces is a manner of assuring the order 
and morality of public spaces. The perceived danger of street vendors to the cleanliness and 
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morality ofthe city is embedded in municipal policies. In some cases street vendors are 
intentionally spread out across the districts so as to avoid overcrowding and thus over-
contamination. In By-Law 032-2002-MDSMP the municipality requires 200 metres between 
these authorized vendors, and their active avoidance of locations with contamination. All by-
laws for permissive regulations specifically state that the presence of street vendors must not 
offend the aesthetics ofthe district, or that their regulation is designed to protect the city from 
losing its beauty (By-Law 038-1999-MDSMP; By-Law 032-2001-MDSMP; By-Law 082-2004-
MDI; By-Law 180-2006-C/MC; By-Law 164-2008-MVES). 
Despite some permissivity of street vendors in public spaces, their presence is a 
preoccupation for municipalities; they must be heavily controlled and criminalized should they 
transgress the order, aesthetics or cleanliness of public space. The permissive regulation of street 
vendors not only functions with a notable preoccupation for their possible "disordering" and 
defiling of spaces claimed by those with a dominant identity, but vendors are also heavily 
scrutinized in a neoliberal era to discern whether they are worthy enough to receive permission 
to use public space. And they must face stringent rules and a limited number of charitable spaces 
before they can even appropriate spaces to meet their household needs. 
3.5 Conclusion 
The cases of the District Municipalities of San Martin de Porres, Villa E1 Salvador and Comas 
highlight how claims to rights for street vendors are highly constrained and contested by 
municipality's governing attempts to govern vendors as neoliberal citizens. The claims to 
appropriate public spaces for subsistence activities are challenged by their subjectification as 
formal citizens with the right to participate in the market through their ability to self-regulate 
upon acquisition of property. As I have illustrated through the case studies, the spaces offormal 
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citizenship are the spaces sanctioned by municipalities that inculcate vendors into 
responsibilization and homo (Economus subjectivity. These are accessible in lieu of public 
spaces, which have since become the sites of differentiation based on ability/disability, racist 
permissive regulations, and punitive actions against "able" and "non-compliant" street vendors. 
When vendors fail to meet these conditions, they face a series of regulations that represent the 
colonial present: attempts to protect ''the public" from the possible contamination of street 
vendors through spatial organization, compliance measures and health tests. 
Shaping informal vendors into neoliberal subjects is one form of citizenship that denies 
other claims to belonging that can be articulated by racialized and differentiated citizens. As 
shown in the case studies, informal vendors often face mUltiple moments and spaces of 
differentiation. First, non-associated vendors are targets for eradication measures and cannot 
access the formalization processes that are often the only options given to them. Second, 
associated vendors are subjectified to processes that are designed to inculcate them as subjects in 
ways that may not be feasible to them, and further fail to acknowledge the structural inequalities 
produced by capitalist social relations that create precarious work and informality (see Castells 
and Portes, 1989). As a corollary, third, vendors who fail to fully meet formalization processes 
are deemed and treated as failures in being a responsibilized neoliberal citizen. Ultimately, this 
means that subjects cannot appropriate public spaces without reprisal (although see Crossa, 
2009) nor access mercados de abastos formales or centros comerciales. 
Formal citizenship -neoliberal citizenship in particular - is only one mode of practicing 
citizenship (Isin and Turner, 2002). The limits to practicing claims to securities and rights - what 
Roy (2005) acknowledges as the non-property claims that do not fit into the liberal citizenship -
are hindrances of the right to difference. In order to imagine different forms of claiming 
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citizenship, which include the claims of informals, who represent subalterns that are racialized, 
gendered, classed, abled and sexualized as Others, there needs to be a reimagination of 
citizenship as based on the right to claim difference that allows for agency, and not exclusion 
based on structures determined by the dominant Self. As Lister notes, this is the ability to 
acknowledge an ideal difference: one where a plurality of claims to belonging recognize others' 
difference without sacrificing the promises of citizenship - inclusion, participation, and equality 
(2007, p. 52). This includes the spatial promise ofthe right to make claims - or at least stake 
claims - in a multiplicity of spaces, and not just what kind of claims to belonging are made 
(Lister, 2007). 
The struggles for claiming substantive citizenship are struggles for belonging amongst a 
series of claims of multiple groups. Isin (2002) suggests that the struggle for claiming rights to 
the city - participating, and appropriating the city - is a struggle of multiple . fronts, and not just a 
struggle against property regimes (although for more on the struggle for property see Chapter 4). 
Indeed, the struggles against formal citizenship pit vendors against the homogenizing logics of 
liberal citizenship that crystallize social relations around property regimes. Nevertheless, as the 
claim to belonging in the city also involvesthe struggles of differentiated groups, such as street 
vendors, who have both different needs and desires than other differentiated Others, street 
vendors' claims represent one ofthe many ways in which the city can be appropriated. 
The following chapter continues to discuss the ways that vendors can appropriate space 
while considering the reorientations of public and private property under neoliberallogics and 
practices and the challenges produced by those reorientations. The struggle for street vendors' 
belonging is resistance against formal citizenship under neoliberalism and the exclusion of 
citizens by neoliberal orientations of property, and collective claims of belonging. These 
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struggles can be understood in the current context of Lima's street vending policies, which I 
elucidate on in the following chapters using the research data. 
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Chapter 4 - The Production of Exclusion through Property 
4.1 Introduction 
In Chapter Three I discussed the exclusion produced through neoliberal citizenship in order to 
explore one co-constituent in the production ofa new marginality in Lima. Now, based on the 
argument that there is a new marginality being produced in Lima through neoliberallogics and 
practices, I examine the role of property relations under those logics and practices in the 
exclusion of street vendors. This analysis includes acknowledgement of the intersection of the 
colonial present with neoliberalization in street vending policies, which demonstrates how 
property relations are being reconfigured and enforced. My main point regarding neoliberalism 
and property is that the deepening of the ownership model reasserts private property rights as the 
norm, which is necessary both for governing individuals and for capital accumulation. Property 
rights under this model also reproduce exclusion based on race, gender and class as the legacies 
of colonialism intersect with neoliberalism. These exclusions through property reflect liberal 
versions of social organization and their practices of enclosure, which continue into the present. 
Street vending policies featuring neoliberallogics and practices reinforce property 
relations that discipline the appearance ofthe racialized poor in public properties while 
demanding that they move to private properties they mayor may not have access to or ownership 
of (with the problems that become associated with that model as discussed in Chapter Three). 
They effectively work to enclose on street vendors claims to inclusion and dispossess them of 
any collective rights. The legitimacy ofthe ownership model under neoliberalism coalesces with 
the colonial present. This coalescence reflects the historical relations between racialized and 
classed groups outside the dominant society. The prevalent logic for enforcing property that 
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dispossesses reproduces what Aguirre (2008) calls a violence that connects with a system of 
practices by the state and society of abuses and exterminations of those who are different. 
In order to proceed with the discussion I first suggest that property is a social relation that 
can be struggled over and shaped in order to change its meaning. In this discussion I highlight 
that dominant property relations can either be challenged through street vendors' claims, or 
reproduced and deepened through the ownership model- an orientation of property conducive to 
neoliberalism. I further draw links between the ownership model and its role in producing 
enclosure - a feature of colonialism, capitalism and neoliberal capitalism in the colonial present 
that dispossesses people from collectively claimed resources. Second, I provide a foundation for 
conceiving street vendors' claims to property as claims to common or collective property. I do 
this in order to contrast them with neoliberal reorientations of public and private property. I then 
describe public property as existing primarily for the interests of private property, both serving 
functions of capitalist accumulation and the governing of populations. In the third section I draw 
from existing scholarship and municipal policy documents to demonstrate that street vendors are 
represented as violators ofthe order of property, who belong in private property and rarely in 
public property, as discussed in Chapter Three. The goal ofthis empirical discussion is to show 
how street vendors are increasingly in conflict with the reorientations of property, which is most 
notable in the incongruency between their claims to common or collective property and the 
legitimate uses of public property. In the fourth and final section I demonstrate that the 
dispossession of street vendors from their claims to security occurs through the use of a violence 
that is both the product of the colonial present and neoliberalism. I argue that there are 
overzealous policies to punish street vendors for transgressing norms of public property use, and 
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demonstrate that violence is common and often brutal against street vendors in the public spaces 
of Lima. 
4.2 Property, the Ownership ModeL Neoliberalism and the Colonial Past and Present 
Property can be described as both a social relation (i.e., a way that people relate to each other 
with respect to the use of resources), and also a tangible thing someone holds legal claim to (e.g., 
"my property"). As a social relation it can be rendered tangible as a result of social relations 
unfolding in space (Staeheli and Mitchell, 2008), and it determines, given the resources available 
in society, where people can be, which resources they can enjoy and the quantity ofthose 
resources, and the conditions of enjoying those resources. Because property exists as a social 
relation the current regime of property - "prevailing systems of law, practices, and relations 
among different properties" (Staeheli and Mitchell, 2008, p. 53) - can be reproduced or 
contested. Under neoliberal capitalism, the reproduction of the current regime of property has led 
to punitive and violent logics and practices that have become naturalized, resulting in social 
exclusion and marginality (see Mitchell, 2003; Herbert and Brown, 2006; Wacquant, 2009). 
Contesting the current arrangement of property can have inclusive potential if it succeeds in 
making property open for participation by a diverse community of actors (see Staeheli and 
Mitchell, 2008; Blomley, 2008). This contestation of property relations aims to make property 
and thus space available to groups that have traditionally been excluded (more on this in Chapter 
Five). 
Although no production of inclusion is without some form of exclusion (Isin, 2005; 
Staeheli and Mitchell, 2008), and thus full inclusion is impossible, I maintain that the right to 
difference in the city requires the struggle to be included (as discussed in Chapter Three). The 
struggle to be included requires struggle over property as both a tangible thing and as a social 
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relation. Street vendors as a group facing different forms of oppression - lack of formal 
legitimacy and differing forms of social, cultural exclusion and economic impoverishment -
must struggle over the meanings and practices that produce property. Yet, in neoliberal 
capitalism the dominant model of property - the ownership model- frustrates those struggles. 
Blomley (2005; 2008) reminds us that property as a social relation is taken-for-granted in 
liberal capitalist societies due to the dominance ofthe ownership model of property. The 
ownership model works on the assumption that delimited and discrete spaces can be created as 
property in order to be owned and controlled by formally recognized single owners who enjoy 
the right to dispose of it as they please - by excluding others from accessing property, by using it 
to accumulate wealth, or by selling or trading it (Blomley, 2005). The model is premised on the 
beliefthat one's application of labour to land merits right to ownership, as those who are 
productive deserve exclusive right to the land - in short, they have the right to enclosure (Harris, 
2004; Blomley, 2005; Wolford, 2007). 
The ownership model of property is conducive to neoliberalism in two noteworthy ways. 
First, capitalist accumulation has historically depended on the ownership model. Neoliberalism is 
a new strategy for capitalist accumulation as a result of political economic restructuring (Keil, 
2002; Harvey, 2005)32. Second, the ownership model is a requisite for liberal forms of 
governing. The institutions of private property ownership and competitive markets are requisites 
for freedom. According to neoliberal theory, actors must have those institutions in order to 
realize their self-interest as rational market actors, and freedom is the pursuit ofthat self-interest 
(Mount Pelerin Society, N.D., as cited in Harvey, 2005, p. 20). Hamann (2009) argues that this 
32 In the following chapter I describe the relationship of neoliberalism to urbanism and how street vendors become 
evicted as urban spaces - including public spaces - become the sites of accumulation strategies, in particular 
through real-estate (property) markets (see Hackworth, 2007). 
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freedom - pursuing self-interest in a market society with ownership rights - constitutes the 
conditions in which subjects are governed and may govern themselves33 . 
The taken-for-granted ownership model in both Western and non-Western spaces, such as 
Peru, continue to produce physical and symbolic violence. This model would not be possible 
without enclosure - violent displacements of people by dispossessing them of property, 
resources and rights that were held in common - in both colonial and capitalist expansion. 
Capitalism and colonialism have depended on establishing private property rights for 
accumulation and settling through violent dispossessions of land from its labourers, thereby 
producing the proletariat and the colonized subject (Marx, [1867] 1999, URL; Harris, 2004). 
Therein lies an important aspect ofthe relationship ofneoliberalism to the colonial present. 
The violence that justifies dispossession under colonialism and capitalism survives. 
Harvey (2005) suggests that processes of enclosure in early capitalism and colonialism are 
continuing features in contemporary capitalism known as accumulation by dispossession. 
Neoliberalism has used strategies such as privatization ofthe commons in order to dispossess 
people from collectively held resources. Peru (and Latin America in general) is a site of 
dispossession in the colonial present - the continuation of colonial logics in the present context-
and its confluence with capitalism under neoliberallogics and practices. For many readers the 
2009 political crisis in the Peruvian Amazon that garnered international attention resonates as a 
strong example ofneoliberalism operating with the colonial present. In that case the state is 
33 Forming street vendors into governed and self-governing subjects through private property is central to street 
vending regulations in contemporary Lima. As I discuss in Chapter 3 formalization is a strategy that demands street 
vendors be owners of market stalls and thus responsible for preoccupying themselves with generating wealth via 
their property and entrepreneurial pursuits. 
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protector the interests of transnational energy consortia by attempting to violently dispossess 
indigenous Amazonians, privatize them, and sell their resources internationally (see Isla, 2009). 
The privatization ofthe Amazon is one example ofthe confluence ofthe colonial present 
and neoliberal capitalism, which is driving different enclosures occurring throughout Peru in the 
neo liberal era. The focus of my research is on the process of enclosure in Peruvian cities, 
particularly in Lima and affecting the urban poor. This enclosure is marked by the deepening of 
both the privatization of public property and private property ownership, and neocolonial beliefs 
that support the dispossession of property from the racialized urban poor in public spaces. The 
following sections show that the hard-fought battles of street vending organizations in the 1980s 
and the long-standing collective claim to property have been unravelled as a result, and 
alternative claims to property in Lima's public spaces are increasingly de legitimized. 
4.3 Enclosure, Claims to Common Property and Reorientations of Property in an Era of 
N eoliberalism 
As a theoretical context for analyzing the current process of enclosure in Lima's public spaces, 
and to understand how exclusion occurs through enforcing property rights, I emphasize that the 
claims by street vendors must be conceived as outside the traditional public/private divide of 
liberal economistic forms of social ordering (see Weintraub, 1997). Despite neoliberal economist 
de Soto's claims that street vendors in Lima attempted to gain "special rights of ownership" to 
space34 (de Soto, 1989, p. 87), street vendor actions cannot be conceived as entrepreneurial even 
iftheir struggles remain framed or textually represented within the dominant discourse of public 
and private property (see Blomley, 2008). Whether street vendors' appropriations are strongly 
politically organized, as in the case of Lima's city centre vendor associations ofthe 1980s, or 
34 Claiming that vendors tried to become "owners" of space was part of a systemic analysis that treated Andean 
migrants as capitalist and entrepreneurial. Thus, certain actions of street vendors fit into liberal-based analytical 
categories such as ''private owner". 
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disparately connected and void of organizational structure as Bayat (2004) describes, they are 
nevertheless acts of an excluded and marginalized collective that makes claims to spaces that are 
property in order to meet their needs and manifest their grievances. For Blomley (2008) these 
claims signify a collective or common claim to property: the right not to be excluded and the 
right to have a property interest in space. Such claims, Blomley (2008) suggests, challenge the 
process of enclosure that occurs from the social and spatial ordering through the ownership 
model. Once we consider the struggle of street vendors to property as collective right to the 
commons, the enforcement of private property or the presence of private interests in the spaces 
that are public property are elucidated as enclosing those collective rights. 
While public property is primarily discussed in my research due to the fact that 
regulations of street vendors are for spaces that are public property, it is still necessary to 
acknowledge how the dominance ofthe ownership model has operated to exclude street vendors. 
As I discuss in Chapter Three, formalization deepens the ownership model and builds neoliberal 
citizens by inculcating vendors into the role of private property owner. Formalization shifts 
collective rights claims to the right to (private) property. Informality is regulated by local states 
under these reorientations of public property and private property (see Alsayyad and Roy, 2004). 
As a consequence, vending in private property is acceptable and vending in public property is 
largely annihilated. 
This enclosure on claims to collective property occurs with the reorientations of public 
property and private property35. While both private property interests and the dominant 
ownership model produce enclosure, a discussion of public property regulation and its 
35 By reorientation of public and private property I refer to what Staeheli and Mitchell (2008) describe as shifting 
property regimes. Property regimes are "prevailing systems oflaws, practices, and relations among different 
properties" (Staeheli and Mitchell, 2008, p. 53). 
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relationship to enclosure is merited because street vendors primarily make claims to property in 
spaces such as streets, thoroughfares, sidewalks, alleyways and boulevards (Bromley, 2000; 
Middleton, 2003; Bromley and Mackie, 2009). These are spaces produced by the state, and 
formally recognized by the state and society as public property. As well, relocation policies from 
the 1980s in Lima prescribed moving street vendors to spaces that are public property (By-Law 
002-1985-MML; see discussion on permissive regulations in Chapter Three). The spaces that are 
public property are not just important sites for the struggles of street vendors; they are the sites 
of their struggles. 
Public property in states where some form of democracy exists (such as Peru) emerges as 
a site ofthe struggles of multiple interests (see Staeheli and Mitchell, 2008). This is a result of 
the two differing roles of "sovereign" and "landlord" that the state performs. As a consequence, 
the state must negotiate between these dialectic roles of exercising ownership of property - the 
right to exclude whichever population it wishes - and governing and adjudicating the use of 
public property by different groups (or publics) that make claims to it (Staeheli and Mitchell, 
2008, p 54-5). The different interests that make claims to space through formal and informal 
channels are negotiated by the state through the regulation of public property (Staeheli and 
Mitchell, 2008). For this reason it is possible to conceive ofregulations that have favoured the 
presence of street vendors in public property in the past, such as By-Law 002-1985-MML. Under 
neoliberal capitalism the interests of private property owners are paramount to regulating public 
property (and thus public space). This deepening of private property has led to attacks on other 
interests, such as those of street vendors. 
As a feature of classical liberalism and neoliberalism, public property functions as a 
resource that connects the interests of private property owners (see Blackmar, 2006; Staeheli and 
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Mitchell, 2008). The state, acting as both "landlord and sovereign" exercises its right to exclude 
from public property under the dialectics of property shaped by capitalist social relations. The 
dialectics of property, the pressure on the state to use public property in ways that assist in 
private property development, investment or appreciation (Staeheli and Mitchell, 2008), shape 
the claims made by publics like street vendors, especially in redevelopment processes that are 
characteristic ofneoliberal urbanization (see Chapter Five). This tension is a feature not only of 
neoliberal capitalism but of capitalism in general. Lefebvre (2009) explains that the spaces of 
public property hold together the diverse and often conflicting interests of private property 
I 
owners. In doing so, he argues, they create homogenized spaces for circulation of resources and I 
I people that connect private interests together with efficacy for the purpose of capital 
accumulation (Lefebvre, 2009). Public property's role to connect private properties together for 
capital accumulation deepens through neoliberalization. As I describe in this chapter and in 
Chapter Five, neoliberalization leads to the privatization of public property - and of public space. 
While public property serves an important function for accumulation as the state acts to 
homogenize its usage to create competitive market conditions for private property owners, the 
state also governs the population in order to assure "proper" social order. Although no public 
property solely serves market functions and private property interests, whether or not non-market 
activities are sanctioned by the state, there are regulations in the neoliberal era to assure that 
users are not actively resisting prescribed market uses or creating risks to nearby property. In 
effect, any threat, such as collective property claims, street vending and other political acts, is 
antithetical to the prescribed uses of public property. In the neoliberal era, municipal 
governments regulate public property users to assure that they are passive - sociable and 
participating in consumerism as part of accumulation strategies (Staeheli and Mitchell, 2008) -
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and that such property remains unwelcoming to people or behaviours that transgress prescribed 
uses (Beckett and Herbert, 2008). This is as much a strategy to control conduct in public property 
as it is necessary for accumulation in the private property adjacent to it (Beckett and Herbert, 
2008). Indeed, formalization and its accompanying eviction strategies are a case ofthis. In 
addition to being a strategy for compliance and governing, formalization is a strategy for capital 
accumulation by ordering those using public property and by encouraging investment 
(sometimes from street vendors) in adjacent private properties (see Chapter Five). 
4.4 Public Property in Lima 
In Chapter Three I emphasized that street vendors in Lima are prohibited from appropriating 
public space in all contexts. These prohibitions are produced by the homogenization of formal 
citizenship with neoliberallogics and practices, which are inherently reliant on a reorientation of 
property towards private ownership and its privileging in public property regulation. The 
reorientation of public and private property to serve market functions - and the neoliberal 
citizens that perform their role as entrepreneurs in private property - has been used to trump 
public spaces as a site of politics and collective claims to property in Lima. This process has 
been noticeable in Lima with discursive shifts that favour a neoliberal reorientation of public and 
private property. 
Arguments in favour of a neoliberal reorientation of public and private property attack 
the claims of street vendors and promote the ordering of property for proper social function and 
capital accumulation. These arguments often employ the idea of public property as a "common 
good" threatened by the "private" interests of vendors. As Blomley (2008) notes, justifications 
for the privatization of public property or of protecting private property interests can employ the 
language ofthe common or public good. By looking at a series of different logics and practices 
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in Lima I describe the reorientation of public and private property in Lima, which has led to the 
primacy of the right to property over both the formal rights to work, and substantive claims to 
collective rights. In the examples I develop in this section, I demonstrate how this primacy of the 
right to property comes with discourses that delegitimize, and in some cases vilify, the claims of 
street vendors. I start with the example of a legalistic reorientation of property, and demonstrate 
in following examples the relation to discursive shifts in policy and academic circles in Lima. 
An important legalistic moment in the reorientation of public and private property 
occurred through reframing vendor rights to work in public property as secondary to property 
rights in a constitutional tribunal decision in 2007. Until recently, the state has regulated street 
vendors as transgressors of public spaces (see de Soto, 1989). Although By-Law 002-1985-MML 
features some ofthe same logics of the colonial present such as assuring clean bodies in its 
conditional permissive authorizations (see Chapter Three), the by-law itself is a product of street 
vendors' political gains in the 1980s. This by-law has enabled vendors to make claims to use a 
space in public property for a very small fee (By-Law 002-1985-MML). Street vendors' claims 
to the "Right to Work" were later granted constitutional protection in Supreme Decree 005-1991-
TR and Ministerial Resolution 022-1991-TR (Roever, 2005)36. 
With the strength ofliberal and neoliberallogics and racist and revanchist policies to 
secure public space (Swanson, 2007), claims to security and inclusion by street vendors have 
been challenged and rendered illegitimate in academia and in municipal policy. This has been the 
case since the fIrst wave of urban renewal and the roll-out ofneoliberal urban renewal policies in 
36 Interestingly enough, these protections were granted under the Fujimori government, which unleashed neoliberal 
reforms with de Soto as its economic advisor in the early 1990s. Fujimori's government was not only legislating 
protections for street vendors. It also legislated for a deepening of entrepreneurialism and micro-enterprise 
development (see Roever, 2005). 
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199637• The pinnacle of these discursive shifts is the subjugation by the "Right to Property"of 
one of the most important legal tools for street vendors to claim inclusion: the "Right to Work". 
A constitutional court in the city of Arequipa in 200738 declared: 
through the prohibition [of street vending] there can be an attempt to establish public 
order, which is understood as order in the streets, [for the] legitimate goal of ... protecting 
constitutional rights [of free transit, the right to security for neighbourhood dwellers and 
people from faraway zones, and the right to property] (Constitutional Court of the 
Republic of PerU 06762-2007-AA)39 
This court decision crystallized into national law was merely a reflection of what was already 
occurring on the ground in academic circles and at the level ofthe municipality: neoliberallogics 
and practices of property in street vending policy. 
de Soto' s belief that street vendors should be performing their activities in private 
property - and not making claims in public property - proliferated as much in academia as it did 
in policy circles. In academic policy analysis following the fIrst wave of urban renewal and 
formalization po licies the criticism of street vendors' claims to property became apparent. Most 
commonly, they are labelled as disruptions to the "proper" public and private divide of property 
and are understood to privatize public property. Meanwhile, any action to "recuperate" the 
property from the claims of street vendors is deemed to make public property more collective. In 
each example I discuss below once street vendors are removed the authors argue that a common 
good and collective interest can be established alongside respect for private property rights. 
My fIrst example is Dr. Guerrero, a sociologist and a councillor of Metropolitan Lima 
during the urban renewal campaign of Alberto Andrade Carmona (1996-2002). Guerrero, in her 
justifIcation for evicting street vendors during the urban renewal scheme, suggests that they 
37 More on this in Chapter Five. 
38 A typo in the document reads 2006: the decision was made in 2007 from a solicitation in 2006. 
39 Accessible at http://www.tc.gob.pe/jurisprudencial2007/06762-2006-AAhtml as of July 9,2010. 
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"held distorted images of themselves as people that acquired rights to public areas they had 
occupied for decades" (1999, p. 129). Her conviction that street vendors illegitimately claim 
rights to public property (which are also public spaces) was followed by belief that positive 
social transformation could occur through the establishment of clearly defmed property rights as 
indicated through evicting street vendors from public property. Guerrero highlights the positive 
results that would follow the removal of vendors: public property would be invested in by private 
donors, and private property would be heavily invested in as well (1999, 139-141). 
This negation of street vendors' claims to property and their vilification is also featured in 
a second example: the works of urban studies professor Dr. Chion and urban architect professor 
Dr. Ludefia Urquizo. Chion and Ludefia Urquizo argue that informal vendors had engaged in 
activities that transgressed the ordering of public and private property: "conscious of civic rights, 
[street vendors] became unscrupulous characters that believed public space, a common good, 
was for their personal benefit. They had taken something that was the property of everyone: the 
street, public space, and the city" (2005, p. 167, emphasis added). For Chion and Ludefia 
Urquizo (2008), this "property of everyone" was achieved through city centre evictions of street 
vendors and the accompanying private investments in public and private property (and 
subsequently threatened by By-Laws banning political manifestations in public property 
regulated for private accumulation). Street vendors' property claims to be included through their 
appropriation of space are not considered legitimately "political". Street vendors are framed as 
transgressors ofa collective good, which they could share if they held private property: 
"spectators with balcony seats [to the "social theatre" that is public space] would be former street 
vendors who were fortunate enough to relocate locally. They would be barely able to see the 
action on stage but at least they had seats in the theatre" (Chion and Ludefia Urquizo, 2008, p. 
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118, emphasis added). With indirect acknowledgement of street vendors' economic ability, 
which in part explains the difficulties in accessing private property, Chion and Ludefia Urquizo 
still suggest the "common good of public property" can only be shared by a consuming or tourist 
public or a property owner or renter. The spaces of public property certainly cannot be conceived 
as sites of a political struggle for inclusion by street vendors, who lack access to these spaces 
under neoliberal urbanization 40. 
A third noteworthy example that common interests are established alongside respect for 
private property rights comes from an NGO/academic/urban planning document for the eono 
Sur region of Lima (Villa EI Salvador). Architects Takano and Tokeshi in their desco publication 
argue the importance separating street vending activities from public property for proper function 
of markets and social order. Their goal for the area they studied (Alameda de Los Jardines, a 
boardwalk in Pachacamac, Villa E1 Salvador) is to generate identifiable spaces for concrete 
activities for both the community and street vendors (Takano and Tokeshi, 2007, p. 56). 
According to Takano and Tokeshi, street vendors privatize and non-consensually use public 
property, which destroys the collective and democratic space of public property and creates 
inconveniences for formal vendors operating in private properties (2007, p. 58). Yet again street 
vendors' claims to property are assumed to be contrary to the interest of some majority, and in 
this case, damaging to the neighbourhood. For Takano and Tokeshi the prescription for the 
correct use of public property is a "commonly used area" that exists between private commercial 
properties (including marketplaces) and residents: precisely the type of space required for 
4OChion and Ludeiia Urquizo (2008) treat political manifestations such as cleaning the Peruvian flag in the plaza as a 
form of protest against the corruption of the national Fujimori government were deemed legitimate collective uses of 
property. To paraphrase their claim, the family house patio [social reproduction in private spaces as a form of 
political representation] could extend to the plaza [public property] when it related to formal politics (Chion and 
Ludefia Urquizo, 2008, p. 120); however, the table in the houses of street vendors could not. 
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circulation of people, resources, and capital in support of private property. Eviction of street 
vendors would become justifiable in order to produce an appropriate social order in public 
property that would improve the commercial dynamics in private property (see response in fold-
out between pages 58-9 in Takano and Tokeshi, 2007). 
The conclusions reached in academic circles regarding the reorientations of public and 
private property also reached policy circles in the municipalities of the case studies I analyze, 
with similar results of de legitimation of street vendors' claims. As I discuss in Chapter Three, the 
municipal governments I studied issue some conditional permits to use public property for street 
vending by those deemed deserving of charity (e.g., Independencia, San Martin de Porres, Villa I 
I 
EI Salvador) or on the path to private property through formalization (e.g., Comas). 
Nevertheless, street vendors' struggles for inclusion through claims to property, including those 
framed under the "Right to Work", have been challenged and denied through the previously 
mentioned policy responses: for charity, use of public property is authorized for those deemed 
worthy; for formalization, use of public property must be temporary and lead to ownership of 
private property. Municipalities have reinforced the orientations of public and private property 
that are prescribed by liberal capitalist forms of social organization, and, minor exceptions of 
charity and formalization programs aside, street vendors are consistently deemed violators ofthis 
reorientation of public and private property. 
Street vendors became labelled violators of property once formalization was prescribed in 
the three district municipalities Comas, San Martin de Porres, and Villa EI Salvador, and as 
examples show for Metropolitan Lima/Cercado (see the previous discussion of Guerrero, 1999; 
Chion and Ludeila Urquizo, 2005). According to the District Municipality of Comas, after the 
FONT A-Comas program was developed, street vendors created "a permanent violation of 
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property in neighbourhoods" (Council Accord 02J-1996-C/MC); in San Martin de Porres, after 
the development ofPROMREP and the "Recuperation of Public Spaces" program street vendors 
"generate [ d] negative externalities such as ... the violation of property rights" (Municipalidad 
Distrital de San Martin de Porres, 2008, URL). Despite very different strategies for eviction (no 
large-scale evictions have been implemented in Comas that I know of), both municipal~ties have 
deemed vendors violators of property rights once neoliberallogics like formalization enter street 
vending policies. 
Regarding La Chancheria in the District Municipality of Villa EI Salvador the 
municipality did not explicitly suggest a violation of property rights prior to their "recuperation" 
project. They did, however, suggest that street vendors violated the ''urbanistic norms" and 
authorizations of public property and thoroughfares prior to evictions (based on decisions in 
Administrative Resolutions 283-2008-GSC/MVES and 284-2008-GSCIMVES that cite 
violations of Report 256-2008-GDESUR-MVES and By-Law 164-2008-MVES). Once the plan 
for eviction was established the municipality suggested that the street vendors should go to ''their 
property" (Municipalidad Distrital de Villa EI Salvador, 2009, URL). The presence ofthose 
planning to stay in public spaces became framed as anti-collective, anti-development and 
disorderly: "public space is for everyone, not for a small few ... who do not want order or 
development for the district" (Municipalidad Distrital de Villa EI Salvador, 2009, URL). The 
municipality began to allude to the differences between private property and the use of public 
property that is public space. Street vendors belonged in private property (even if they did not 
have secure access to it, as I show in Chapter Three), but once they "chose" not to access private 
property they became transgressors of what was necessary for public space - development and 
order - and enemies ofthose spaces for allegedly not supporting these tenets. 
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When municipalities have used temporary conditional authorizations as a strategy for 
regulating street vending they have done so by qualifying such practices as exceptional and 
inferior in public property. The District Municipality ofIndependencia, which reordered 
informal street vendors in 1997 and 1998, has limited the number of public thoroughfares in 
which street vending can occur, and since 2004 has made some attempts to remove informal 
vendors from all public spaces (Municipalidad Distritalde Independencia, 2008, p. 21_2)41. 
Despite this, the municipality permitted some use of public property by street vendors but on the 
condition that authorizations remained a secondary right to the right of uninhibited transit. The 
municipality defmed public property as "a surface that can exceptionally permit the installation 
of street vendors provided that the infrastructure [of that area] meets requirements [determined 
by the municipality] and that the street vendor's activity does not create an obstacle for vehicular 
or pedestrian traffic ... " (Article 3.3, By-Law 082-2004-MDI). Likewise, the District Municipality 
of Comas deemed the use of public property exceptional; however, it further prescribed that 
public property function precisely as it should according to capitalist logics. Article 7 states that 
"[street vendors with] kiosks or moving modules can locate in areas where [the kiosk's or 
module'S] presence does not make difficultthe free movement of pedestrians and vehicles, nor 
damages or frustrates access to private property" (Article 7, By-Law 180-2006-CIMC). Both 
municipalities give the same prescriptions to regulate people in public property that demonstrate 
neoliberallogics: uninhibited transit with free circulation of people to private property. 
41 The details of what actions were performed are somewhat vague in the Diagnostic Report I cite. By-Laws, 
Decrees and COWlcil Accords, which are available_ through freedom of information acts, do not always represent 
mWlicipal practices. In fact, proof of evictions in the form of formal government documents comes from 
administrative resolutions. The municipalities are not obliged to release these documents (see Table 2.1 and the 
Supreme Decree 043-2002-PCM) 
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Neoliberallogics and practices that reorient public and private property have operated in 
street vending policy in Lima following the city centre (Cercado de Lima) urban renewal 
program starting in 1996. Since then, street vendors are decreasingly legitimate in public spaces. 
When they do receive temporary conditional authorization, street vendors are subject to colonial-
style regulations that disfavour their presence in public spaces. These regulations include those 
influenced by colonial discourses of inner and outer bodily cleanliness, cleanliness of space, and 
morality, as well as neoliberallogics such as the requirement to prove one's economic or 
physical disability, and the responsibility not to persecute the functioning of everyday activities 
capital accumulation. When street vendors are labelled transgressors of authority and of property 
rights - as they increasingly are - they are subject to punitive treatments. In the section that 
follows I examine the latter issue of how street vendors face punitive programs and everyday 
violence in the brutal public spaces unfolding through the colonial present and neoliberalism. 
4.5 The Violence of Neoliberalism and the Colonial Present 
Neoliberallogics and practices operate with colonial power in order to produce violence through 
practices of enclosure. Those who are marginalized by these practices are noticeably a part of 
racialized, classed, and gendered groups that have been subjected to colonial violence. In relation 
to public spaces, the growing social insecurity produced by the roll-out of free-market reforms 
and the roll-back of social programming (Peck and Tickell, 2002) has led to increasingly 
punitive treatments of perceived threats to public property (Herbert and Brown, 2006; Katz, 
2006; Wacquant, 2009). Accumulation in private property requires protection of private property 
by controlling nearby and strategic public spaces. ' 'Dangerous populations", as defined by 
intersections of race, gender and class, and referring often to informal vendors, are understood as 
one of the main threats to private property interests (Samara, 2010). Punitive strategies 
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deliberately target "dangerous populations" in public spaces ofthe city that are not as passively 
used by citizens (i.e., spaces that lack the social ordering prescribed by the state; Beckett and 
Herbert, 2008). As a result, more violent strategies are used where passive use of space is not 
common, which includes the spaces of street vendors. 
The violation of property rights - and thus social ordering deepened by the ownership 
model- has become grounds for justifying violent acts by the state authority and elements of 
society that claim to be ''protectors of authority" against the socially excluded. This is a result of 
the confluence ofneoliberallogics with the colonial present that produce a present day enclosure 
on the claims of excluded Others. Like the colonial past, it is both violent and dispossessing. 
In Peru, the violence committed against Others based on race, class and gender is often 
legitimated when Others are suspected oftransgressing authority. Violence against indigenous 
people for such reasons has been legitimate and cruel and this is in part due to the "less-than-
human" status ofracialized people (see Aguirre, 2008). This symbolic and physical violence 
from periods of colonialism takes on different forms in the neoliberal era due to the 
normalization of property ownership. The case of Lay Fung elucidates the confluence of the 
colonial present and neoliberalism and their relationship to property. In 2006, a guard dog ofa 
parking garage known as Lay Fung killed an "intruder" named Wilson Paredes Quispe, a poor 
man of Andean background with a criminal past. When news circulated ofthe death and the 
scheduled destruction of Lay Fung the public and the state intervened, heralded Lay Fung as a 
hero, and promoted him to the police force (Garcia and Lucero, 2008). The dog was celebrated 
for "liquidating a person who was ultimately deemed unworthy of life" (Aguirre, 2008, p. 18-9). 
The legitimacy of vio lence towards othered groups that violate authority - in this case property -
is apparent through the protection of Lay Fung and his promotion to the police force. 
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Punitive practices against racial minorities by the state, or on its behalf, are pervasive 
across Peruvian society. Flores Galindo (1999) has suggested that the violence necessary for the 
reproduction of authority in the colonial past have not disappeared in the post-colonial republic. 
Although whipping racial minorities in public space have given way to a more private penal 
system (Flores Galindo, 1999), acts of punitive justice still occur in public view. Indeed, 
violations ofthe order of property, and more generally the violation of authority seems to merit 
the type of public violence that has been practiced since the Spanish empire through to the racist 
Republic of Peru. In the present the effects of continuing racist violence in the neoliberal present 
is what Swanson (2007) identifies as deliberately racist policies that legitimize violent 
eradications of racialized populations such as indigenous beggars and informal street vendors in 
public spaces. 
The violence experienced by street vendors is often not reported. In this research I have 
given account of a few ofthe more publicly-known evictions - La Chancheria in Villa EI 
Salvador (2009), Caquetain San Martin de Porres (2008-2010), and the City Centre Evictions in 
Cercado de Lima (1996-2002) - to demonstrate how street vending is also targeted using 
neoliberallogics and practices. Yet unpublicized violent confrontations between municipal 
police officers (serenazgo) and ambulantes occur daily throughout Lima 42. These incidents are 
rarely-advertised or reported but nevertheless appear. In the following paragraphs I provide 
examples ofthe everyday violence experienced by street vendors in public space for 
42 While waiting to pick up documents from the Municipality ofIndependencia in July 2009 I witnessed a bandaged-
up serenazgo being pushed in a wheelchair back to the office building after what appeared to be a violent eviction of 
informal vendors nearby. As the injured serenazgo passed, I witnessed another municipal worker say to the person 
pushing the serenazgo that he should have been taken to the hospital for his injuries. I mention this to highlight that 
the municipal police working on behalf of the state are subject to the violence of street vending evictions in a 
different way than vendors - and also in this case an apparent lack of care for their well-being - despite their role in 
mobilizing state violence. 
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transgressing authority in both these incidences and in campaigns planned to eradicate street 
vendors. 
Although any intervention by the municipality is performed primarily by serenazgo, 
municipalities take active roles in constructing and setting the tone that justifies them. The 
zealousness of municipalities to enforce punitive measures is palpable. District Municipality of 
San Luis Mayor Fransisco Durand Mejia describes the district he governed as surrounded by 
dangerous zones and threats such as delinquency and street vending, which require intervention 
by placing more Peruvian National Police (PNP) in public spaces (Montalvo, 2005 - August 12, 
URL). Although PNP do not usually enforce municipal street vending policy, they may do so 
through legally-binding orders from municipalities that demonstrate the breach of one or more 
local1egal norms. The Mayor, who could not muster enough physical force to 'io close bawdy 
houses, bars, and marketplaces for stolen cars, and to capture delinquents, drug peddlers and 
informal vendors" decided to 'iake justice into his own hands" by dedicating his own energies as 
mayor (an uncommon practice as they are not his responsibilities) to plan a series of 
interventions with PNP personnel (Alcalde anuncia que "tomani justicia" con sus manos, 2006 -
June 30, URL). The Mayor alluded to popular justice, where people outside oftheir legal 
capacity, right some wrong done to society. Durand Mejia's desires were understood as quite 
legitimate in a punitive, revanchist era, and represent a very common zeal amongst those holding 
authority to mobilize violence against street vendors and other transgressors. 
A number of municipalities (as well as the PNP) have fostered the production of cruel 
public spaces for street vendors through their creation of "Robocops" (See Figure 4.1)43. These 
"Robocops" are a highly trained "elite force" dressed in armour and riot gear "always ready to 
43 "Robocops" is a locally-used term taken from a Hollywood movie, not my own. 
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intervene when the security or tranquility [ ofthe district] is altered ... [by responding to] 
emergencies, controlling gangs, or eradicating street vendors" (Municipalidad de Jesus Maria 
refuerza seguridad con "sereno robocops", 2008 - October 23, p. 14). This force has been used in 
multiple municipalities to remove street vendors from public property. One campaign titled 
"Formality Without Borders" (a multi-district plan to eradicate informal vendors) used 
"Robocops" to produce "guaranteed success" in on-the-street interventions (Municipalidad 
Distritial de Ate, 2008, URL). The resulting public spaces become militarized through the 
increasing integration of municipalities and the PNp44, and as serenazgo increasingly become 
armed and trained to use violence in order to intervene in street vending activities. 
Although the execution of violence by serenazgo often goes unreported, there are a few 
instances where this violence is reported against medium-sized groups of vendors. During the 
Christmas season of2007, informal vendors claiming the "Right to Work" tried for three days to 
appropriate public spaces in the District Municipality of San Juan de Miraflores. The 
municipality eventually permitted the informal vendors after failed eviction attempts, which 
included using water cannons against vendors who were protecting the spaces they appropriated 
in the middle ofthe night (Mayo Mendez, 2007 - December 23, p. 12) 45. Similar violent tactics 
in the neighbouring district of Santiago de Surco were employed in an act to sustain the 
recuperation of public space from informal vendors. In that district serenazgo shot water and tear 
gas at 60 vendors to stop them from returning to a space they had earlier claimed (Policias, 
serenos yambulantes se enfrentan por mercado de Surco, 2005 - January 26, p. 12-3). Less than 
44 See Buscan mejorar alianzas PNP-municipios, 2010, URL as an example of the increasing demand for integration 
between the PNP and municipalities. This news article highlights the PNP-municipal accords signed by 15 
municipalities (113 of Metropolitan Lima's district municipalities). 
4S The person accounting this violence was a woman with a notably Andean last name- Melchora Huarruin - a 
mother ofthree who is described as living in the top of a cerro (foothill) in Lima. 
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three weeks before that violent confrontation, serenazgo of the District Municipality of San 
Isidro asphyxiated a street vendor to death who was attempting to retain his merchandise during 
a medium-scale eviction (Denuncian por homicidio a policia municipal que asfixi6 a ambulante, 
2005 - January 7, p. 12). The outcry from his death was supposed to lead to stricter regulations 
according to a consensus of mayors (Hay consenso entre alcalde para crear escuela de serenos, 
2005 - January 11, URL). 
Figure 4.1 "Robocop 
serenazgo" donned in heavy 
armour and armed with 
batons and shields. (Source: 
Polemica Municipal, 2008) 
The violence and impunity that occur in daily interventions against street vendors feature 
cruel punishments, and no stricter regulations of serenazgo's actions have been implemented. In 
2007, an El Comercio article featured interviews with some victims of municipal police brutality. 
A 31 year-old female informal vendor working in Cercado de Lima denounced the Metropolitan 
Lima serenazgo for assaulting her before robbing her of money and merchandise and abandoning 
her outside the district (Informe: Denuncian abusos de serenzago contra vendedores ambulantes, 
2007 - October 16, URL). Another man in the same area selling shoes for less than minimum 
wage was assaulted by multiple serenazgo, and when a passing-by family verbally confronted 
the serenazgo about the beating, they too were assaulted (Informe: Denuncian abusos de 
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serenzago contra vendedores ambulantes, 2007 - October 16, URL). The event was a repeat of 
an earlier incident when a younger man decried the poor treatment by municipal police officers 
of street vendors selling phone calls, which left him with a haemorrhaged eye after being kicked 
in the side of the head by an agent (Informe: Denuncian abusos de serenzago contra vendedores 
ambulantes, 2007 - October 16, URL). The justification by the municipality of the need to 
commit violence against street vendors was that "although there are some problems the long-
term benefits are for everyone" (Informe: Denuncian abusos de serenzago contra vendedores 
ambulantes, 2007 - October 16, URL). 
The enforcement of property has led to violence much like that received by Quispe 
Paredes under the neoliberalization of street vending regulations. The dominance ofthe 
ownership model and its need to be enforced has been justified in the local context, with strict 
enforcement of public property for the good of everyone. The fact that removing street vendors 
from public property takes on the forms of allusions to ''popular justice", that it requires highly 
armoured police officers to commit violence, and that no serious actions are taken on beatings 
and homicides of street vendors indicates that hyperpunitive violent practices are in fact deemed 
by some parts of society as necessary to create conditions that are both good for private property 
and good for society as a whole. 
4.5 Conclusion 
Neoliberalism and the colonial present have created a new set of obstacles for street vendors 
claiming property rights, and appropriating space in Lima, Peru. The obstacles of formalization 
and eradication policies have made claiming property increasingly difficult for street vendors. As 
a result, authorizations for use of public property become exceptional and operate alongside 
punitive interventions against racialized street vendors, which often unfold violently. 
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Underpinning these policies of formalization, eradication and temporary authorizations are the 
reorientations of property in neoliberal capitalism, which are a reason for de legitimizing and 
evicting street vendors from public space. 
The reorientations of property have brought enclosure on substantive claims to 
citizenship - collective claims to property for inclusion, as Blomley (2008) notes. Substantive 
claims to belonging are disallowed by municipalities as they privilege a formal neoliberal 
citizenship and "The Right to Property" over the "Right to Work" and other claims to belonging 
made by street vendors. This process of enclosure is precisely the unravelling of common 
property claims in order to further the prescriptions ofneoliberal social organization - a 
fundamentalist free market society organized around private property - and to accumulate 
capital. Enclosure and its exclusionary consequences are more than the ordering of citizens and 
society under a liberal order; they are also contradictions of contemporary capitalism, as Mitchell 
(2003) has highlighted. According to Mitchell (2003) the structural inequalities that are produced 
by neoliberal capitalism create the conditions that make appropriation of public space necessary, 
and yet for urban renewal schemes that are part of the economic restructuring under 
neoliberalism, local governments must "annihilate space by law" for groups like street vendors. 
Property is a major component of the production of the new marginality in Lima. Yet 
property does not necessarily have to be understood by the dominant ownership model or 
conceived of in such exclusionary ways (see Blomley, 2005). Indeed, practices like those of 
street vendors can challenge the meaning of property and produce "new" and more collective 
discourses of property (see Blomley, 2008). By challenging formal citizenship that reflects 
neoliberal norms, and combating its subsequent effects, property can be practiced in ways that 
allow for difference and for substantive claims to belonging. The struggle for redefining the 
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norms of property is necessarily a struggle for public space (see Staeheli and Mitchell, 2008) and 
against processes of neoliberal urbanization that privatize these spaces. In the following chapter I 
turn to the issue ofneoliberal urbanism, which requires the the privatization of public spaces, and 
further argue that these neoliberallogics and practices are marginalizing and not conducive to the 
claims of street vendors. 
122 
Chapter 5 - The Politics of Public Space and Exclusion in Neoliberal Urbanization 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I examine exclusions at the scale of public space and the relationship ofthese 
exclusions to neoliberal urbanization in order to further articulate the characteristics ofthis 
"new" marginality in Lima, Peru.. This new marginality, as I demonstrate through the following 
case studies, is also a product ofthe Politics of public space - the formal politics that shape what 
public spaces are - in an era ofneoliberal urbanization. These case studies highlight the 
accumulation strategies that privatize public spaces that consequently challenge street vendor 
appropriations of public space and contribute to the marginality of street vendors. This chapter 
completes the third part ofthe exploration ofthe different exclusionary processes that change the 
face of marginality in Lima. 
The Politics of public space under neoliberal urbanization both produce exclusion at the 
scale of public space as I argue in this chapter, and as I outlined in Chapters Three and Four also 
produce conditions for district municipalities to exclude at the scale ofthe citizen. 
Marginalization at the scale ofthe citizen is enabled by the Politics of public space under 
neoliberal urbanization. In the previous chapter I demonstrated that the reorientations of public 
and private property that exclude street vendors are a product of the ownership model. The 
ownership model and the dominance of private property rights are necessary conditions for 
capital accumulation, a key feature of urban renewal strategies in neoliberal urbanization. The 
presence of private interests in public property is supported by reorientations of property under 
the ownership model. Consequently, private property interests in public properties exclude 
vendors from these spaces that are public property, challenge and negate their common property 
claims, and privatize public spaces. In Chapter Three I demonstrate that compliance to street 
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vending policies excludes vendors who do not fit the ideal neoliberal citizen. In the context of 
Lima, neoliberal citizenship appears necessary in order to generate accumulation during urban 
renewal strategies through policies such as formalization. As a strategy, formalization operates 
both to produce capital accumulation and as an impulse of urban renewal strategies by ostensibly 
moving vendors to private property marketplaces. 
In developing my argument about neoliberal urbanization; I first review the literature on 
public space, to highlight the connection of the struggle for public spaces to substantive 
citizenship claims and claims to common property advocated in Chapters Three and Four. I do so 
by defining "public space" as a useful po litical tool for the excluded. The struggle for public 
space, as I articulate, is for appropriation and participation by all city dwellers. These rights are 
necessary for substantive citizenship in general, and in particular for the struggle for common 
property for street vendors. After articulating this argument, I examine how the Politics of public 
space in Lima have unfolded through neoliberal urbanization. Using government municipal 
policy documents, municipal press releases and newspaper articles, I demonstrate that public 
spaces have become exclusionary through their privatization. I examine the discourses of 
authorities at the district and metropolitan municipal levels that make problematic street vendors 
in urban renewal, which is dominated by large-scale commercial investment schemes. 
5.2 'Public', Public Sphere and Public Space 
Public and private form a potent dichotomy in liberal thought, where the private refers to ''what 
is hidden or withdrawn", as well as ''what is individual or only pertains to an individual", and the 
public to ''what is revealed and accessible" as well as ''what is collective, or affects the interests 
ofa collectivity of individuals" (Weintraub, 1997, p.5). In the realm of politics, the public is the 
realm of collective decision-making and the determination of what is possible, or even desirable, 
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for the public. Critical theorists have long recognized that excluding certain groups from 
membership in the public - often in the name of the private - is one ofliberalism's principle 
modes of oppression. Habermas developed his notion of the universal public sphere as a way to 
overcome the problem of exclusion in liberal conceptions of the public, but according to Fraser 
(1990) and others (Low and Smith, 2006; Staeheli and Mitchell, 2008) his formulation remains 
exclusionary in a substantive sense. 
In this section I summarize Fraser's critique of Haber mas , public sphere, and then 
explain how this critique has been extended by geographical explanations ofthe production of 
public space. The latter provide a rationale for arguing that the struggle for public space is a 
useful political tool for the excluded. The struggle for public space prescribes that all individuals 
appropriate space for political representation and material use, which are conducive to 
substantive citizenship claims and struggles for inclusion. 
Habermas wanted to construct a public sphere that produces inc1usivity in po litical 
matters among all citizens in liberal societies. Habermas' public sphere has two noteworthy 
conditions: open access, and integrity from manipulation by preference and particular interests. 
In order to realize the inclusion of citizens in politics Habermas (1991) prescribes that a sphere 
be formed between society and the state that would emerge from individuals congregating under 
the conditions of universal accessibility, equality and critical rational debate to discuss their 
private interests, to concede on consensual interests (i.e., the common good) and communicate 
those interests to the state. According to Habermas (1991), particular subjectivities must be 
defended through communication in order to maintain the critical rational de bate that constitutes 
the foundation of the public sphere. This prevents the suppression of the public sphere by 
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individual preferences, and assures that consensual interests are fonned through open negotiation 
and debate. 
The ideal ofthe universal public sphere developed by Habennas has been criticized by 
Fraser (1990) for its substantive exclusionary outcomes. Fraser (1990) argues that "public 
formation" in masculinist liberal societies is antithetical to the concept of public, and in fact 
public formation is exclusionary. For Fraser (1990), the liberal public sphere as conceived by 
Habermas is procedurally exclusionary and overlooks the historical realities of non-bourgeois 
and non-liberal publics. According to Fraser (1990), the procedures in the Habennasian public 
sphere produce hegemonic truth(s)-as-consensus by ignoring power relations in both the 
formation of consensus and the exclusion oftraditionaUy-marginal groups. A corollary to this 
line of critique is that Habennas' analysis ofthe public sphere overlooks the possibility of (a) 
non-bourgeois and non-liberal public sphere(s). The public sphere as conceived by Habennas 
(c.£ 1991) fosters the growth ofthe bourgeois and homme -the ideallibera~ rational, propertied 
and (traditionally) male subject -but ignores individuals that have been historically excluded, but 
nevertheless have contested or manifested beside the bourgeois public as counterpublics (Fraser, 
1990). 
The Habermasian public sphere is substantively exclusionary by favouring an elite, 
propertied, masculine class - literally, the bourgeois and hom me - whose interests are deemed 
those of a wider public. Public consensus and the common good, ostensibly produced through 
the public sphere, bracket power relations and obscure the realities of social inequality. Thus, 
contrary to Habennas' discourse of a public sphere built on truth not authority by "free men" 
(and not the rulingsofthe sovereign/state; Habennas, 1991, p. 52-3) the public's truthis actuaUy 
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the authority of a particular group, whose deliberations reproduce that public's interests while 
concealing the interests of other publics. 
In order to combat the inequalities and exclusions produced in and through the public 
sphere Fraser (1990) argues that ''the public" as conceived by Habermas be reconceptualized as 
"multiple publics". Acknowledging that different interests exist in ''the public" elucidates that 
those excluded participate in their own particular forums. By forming a public, dominated 
groups can then struggle for access to and inclusion in the actually-existing public sphere in 
order to publicize their inequalities and oppressions. 
Political theories on ''the public", "multiple publics" and ''the public sphere" do not fully 
account for the geographies of the public sphere and the materiality of space. Low and Smith 
(2006) note the failure of the literature to recognize the spaces of publicity and "publics" and 
how their geographies are produced. Staeheli and Mitchell (2008) argue that Habermas 
universalizes the private, exclusionary and bourgeois space of a coffee shop in a particular time 
to conceptualize the public sphere. Exploring how the public sphere is produced in and through 
space, what individuals or groups can access these spaces, and the conditions of access to these 
spaces is imperative to the geographies of the public sphere. 
The spatiality of the public sphere is of particular importance in conceiving of public 
space and its production. Spaces are produced by actors, who give meaning to space, conceive of 
meaning from space and engage in material practices in space (see Lefebvre, 1991). Because 
actors are dynamic, spaces are dynamically changing: both the practices and the perceptions of 
actors perpetually reorder the symbolism and the materiality of spaces. Public space is thus 
actively produced and experienced. The meanings and practices that determine what is public 
(e.g., what the norms are ofthat space, what can be said and done in that space) and who is 
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''public'' (i.e., who is to appear) are based on the struggles between the different actors that 
produce space. These practices produce different fonns of exclusion as the meanings and 
practices of different spaces at different times determine who has the right to appear and how. 
Ifwe are to consider that "public" signifies "fully accessible" and "collective" then the 
contestory and exclusionary outcomes of the production of public space, much like the 
exclusionary outcomes of public formation described by Fraser (1990), challenge the ideal of 
public space. Substantively, truly public space does not exist. Yet, as Staeheli and Mitchell 
(2008) state, public space is an ideal to be struggled over. This struggle is particularly important 
for groups that are marginalized and seek po litical representation in space and accessibility to 
spaces in order to be public (Mitchell, 2003). The struggle for public space allows for the 
contestation of uneven power and inequality produced by more dominant publics (Staeheli and 
Mitchell, 2008) and also produces space that is conducive to the material practices of those 
publics that contest inequality and exclusion. The practice-based, substantive citizenship I 
advocate for in Chapter Three reflects this struggle for public space. My representation of street 
vendors' citizenship is an exercise of claims to belonging and security by being in and producing 
public spaces. 
The concept ofthe "Right to the City" frames the struggle for public space as part of a 
larger political project. As Mitchell (2003) notes, the struggle for public space is necessary in 
order to realize the "Right to the City". The "Right to the City" also fits with the prescriptions I 
make in earlier chapters for substantive citizenship and inclusion through collective property 
claims. The "Right to the City" promotes access and use of space for all citizens, fosters 
practiced-based citizenship through the appropriation of space, and thereby challenges the 
exclusionary consequences of formal property rights that are embedded in the meanings of 
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public spaces. By redeveloping urban space in ways different than the current social relations of 
property reinforced by capital accumulation strategies, the excluded can be empowered as 
producers of urban space to reorder space materially and symbolically. There are two salient 
ways that the "Right to the City" empowers urban inhabitants (citadins), in particular the 
excluded, to participate in the production of public space, and urban space more generally. First, 
Lefebvre conceives ofthe city as oeuvre - urban space in construction through the creative 
process of its inhabitants - where it is the obligation of all citadins to be producers of their 
environments and themselves (Lefebvre, 2002; Purcell, 2003). The right for the urban dweller to 
be a producer of her environment is inalienable and ostensibly equal amongst dwellers. Second, 
Lefebvre (2002) conceives of the "Right to the city" as an entitlement of all citadins to the right 
to the appropriation of and participation in urban space in order to produce the oeuvre. The right 
of appropriation guarantees the citadin the right to exist and be present in material space, and the 
right to participation enables them to act in space in order to shape space both materially and in 
its meaning. 
The struggles for public space, when including the prescription of "Right to the City", are 
struggles over the immediate, lived-in spaces of people's everyday lives for the pmpose of 
actively engaging in political representation and shaping their lives and city. These struggles 
must recognize the plurality of publics, who are differentiated but nevertheless share the same 
urban spaces. Multiple publics have the right to make claims under the "Right to the city" as a 
universal right of all but as differentiated groups. Yet, as no inclusion is without exclusion 
(Mitchell, 2003; Isin, 2005), the struggle for public space with rights to appropriation and 
participation for all cannot be substantively realized. Nevertheless, city dwellers' struggles for 
public space are struggles that all can engage in so that they are publicized. This is the key tenet 
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to public space: a constant, dialectical struggle of all differing groups to produce space 
physically and symbolically in some way as their own. 
5.3 Neoliberal Urbanization and the Politics of Public Space in Lima. Peru 
The struggle for public space unfolds through the intersection ofa variety of politics. Politics 
may refer to politics outside the state and its traditional venues. Analyses ofthis type of politics 
have emerged from post-colonial, queer, feminist and environmental disciplines and are referred 
to as ''politics with a 'p'" (Flint, 2003). Second, it may refer to Politics or ''politics with a 'P': the 
policies ofthe formal state and its regulations (Flint, 2003). In this chapter I discuss Politics for 
analysis of the case studies about municipal regulations of street vendors in public spaces. 
The Politics of public space have changed significantly at an international scale as a 
result of the commercialization, privatization and militarization of public spaces through 
neoliberal urbanization (Smith, 2002; Staeheli and Mitchell, 2006; for international examples see 
Atkinson, 2003; Swanson, 2007; Bromley and Mackie, 2009; Samara, 2010). Neoliberalization 
has driven the roll-back of social welfarist policies and the roll-out of market-oriented neoliberal 
policies (Peck and Tickel~ 2002). In turn, this has produced a rise in social insecurity that has 
generated fear of public spaces and hyper-punitive policies in public spaces (Katz, 2006; Beckett 
and Herbert, 2008; Wacquant, 2008). The municipal policies following formalization schemes in 
Lima described in Chapter Three illustrate precisely how punitive measures follow the roll-out of 
neoliberal policies. The everyday violent practices produced by the confluence of 
neoliberalization and the colonial present described in Chapter Four demonstrate that Lima has 
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been a site of punitive measures against Others - a characteristic of social insecurity in neoliberal 
urbanism 46. 
The consequences of neoliberal urbanization have been largely discussed in previous 
chapters. Indeed, the dominance ofneoliberalism as a discourse shaping everyday life in urban 
spaces has been characteristic of this urbanization process (Keil, 2009). This discursive 
dominance includes the importance of private property ownership and the naturalization of 
enclosure (Chapter Four), and governing strategies such as producing compliance through the 
prescription ofneoliberal citizenship in street vending policy (Chapter Three), both of which 
have come with the restructuring of everyday life under neoliberalism. In this section and the 
case studies that follow I highlight the state regulation of public space as a result ofneoliberal 
urbanization, which also shape the everyday life experiences. In particular, I focus on what 
neoliberal urbanization is, what its characteristics are at the level ofthe local state, arid how it 
has shaped public space. I include empirical examples from three case studies: the Metropolitan 
Municipality ofLimalDistrict Municipality ofCercado de Lima, and the District Municipalities 
ofIndependencia and San Martin de Porres. 
Neoliberal urbanization is a process that reflects the neoliberalization of urban space. 
Neoliberalization is an uneven spatial process of differing degrees of market-oriented policy 
changes that have affected the political-economic and state-institutional landscape (Peck and 
Tickell, 2002). It has produced macroeconomic and macropolitical changes that consequently 
cause interlocal competition between cities (Peck and Tickell, 2002), the result of which is 
neoliberal urbanization. Neoliberal urbanization is the process of urban development, decline and 
46 A good example of the rise in preoccupation of social insecurity is Lima's Bratton Plan. The plan recommends 
similar tactics as those of New York City in the 1990s, in order to secure the conurbation of Lima (The Bratton 
Group LLC, 2002, p. 13-4). 
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change in the neoliberal era. In this process localities become the sites of regulating and 
attracting market competition, and subsequently there are institutional shifts towards rigorously 
promoting opportunities for capital accumulation in urban centres through new governing 
strategies at sub-nat ion-state levels (Jessop, 2002; Peck and Tickell, 2002). Neoliberal 
urbanization has increased relevance within municipal po litical territories as capital inve stment 
and state strategies for increasing those investments are increasingly localized. As Hackworth 
(2007) suggests, neoliberal urbanization is a shift towards local (neighbourhood) responses to 
attract increasingly mobile capital. In these attempts to attract foreign capital the state assumes a 
new role as market facilitator (Smith, 2002; Hackworth, 2007). 
Local states must take on the role of market facilitators to attract increasingly mobile 
capital, and because they depend in part on bonds in order to pay for city projects (Hackworth, 
2007). Neoliberallogics and practices such as profit-seeking, market-oriented entrepreneurial 
behaviour are forceful and disciplining practices caused by macroeconomic shifts and the 
strengthening of global fmance, which demand profitability and low risk conditions for capital 
accumulation. The emergence of growth-first strategies at the municipal level- conditions for 
profitability in urban spaces under competitive market conditions - results from the shift to 
global fmancing and the emergence of loan and bond rating agencies, which force cities to use 
borrowed money to spend on projects that are ostensibly profitable (Hackworth, 2007). 
In Peru, national-scale policies have reconfigured the scale of investment strategies and 
have redefined the local state as market facilitator. In 2003, the Republic of Peru established a 
new Organic Law of Municipalities (Ley Organica de Municipalidades) that increased the 
municipal responsibility for local development. Under this law district and metropolitan 
municipalities have become responsible for promoting local economic development and job 
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creation, and fostering private investments and development projects in the interest of the 
locality (Arts. 73.2.8, 73.4, Law 27972-2003, Congress of the Republic of Peru). Specifically, 
district municipalities have become responsible for promoting entrepreneurial activity through 
public sector activities and environments that foster good business climates with the end of 
encouraging productivity and competitive environments (Art. 86.3, Law 27972-2003, Congress 
of the Republic of Peru). 
This responsibility to promote local development and a good business climate has been 
put into law by the majority of the (district and metropolitan) municipalities studied. With the 
exception ofIndependencia, all have formally legislated attracting private investment - from 
local, national and international sources - and creating agencies that foster conditions for private 
investment (By-Law 101-2004-MVES; By-Law 245-2007-MlMC; By-Law 223-2007-MDSMP; 
By-Law 171-2009-MDSJL). Further, By-Law 867-2005-MML implemented by the Metropolitan 
Municipality of Lima legislated that all district municipalities in Lima incorporate a municipal 
fund into their budgets in order to help with costs attributed to encouraging private investments. 
This fund has since been adopted by the Municipality of San Martin de Porres (By-Law 269-
2009-MDSMP). These formal laws manifest the imperative for encouraging development at the 
level ofthe municipality. Furthermore, they highlight institutional shifts towards market 
facilitation by municipalities as government offices create accounts and agencies that dedicate 
resources to private investment. 
Internationally, neoliberal urbanization is characterized by urban renewal47 as a strategy 
for market-oriented economic and urban growth (Smith, 2002; Samara, 2010). Urban renewal is 
47 Like Samara (20 I 0) I opt for the term urban renewal to refer to what is called "gentrification" elsewhere. As well I 
suggest urban renewal has the same characteristics of gentrification: real estate investment and investment in public 
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not patently neoliberal. In fact, these programs predate neoliberal urbanization and have served 
non-market oriented purposes such as building social housing (Smith, 2002). Nevertheless, urban 
renewal as a strategy for neoliberal urbanism is characterized by a process of investment and 
accumulation in disinvested or (perceived) stagnating urban spaces, that connects global 
fmancial markets to real-estate developers of all sizes, and those who lease or purchase the 
buildings for commercial or residential purchases (Smith, 2002). Urban renewal is for private 
sector gain and accumulation despite the role of the state in facilitating it. States will subsidize 
the private sector by providing favourable market oriented policies, special agencies to attract 
investors and developers, public money to encourage projects, and police and security for these 
investment spaces (see Smith, 2002; Hackworth, 2007; Samara, 2010). 
The Politics of public space unfold in the current context of urban renewal. In cities, 
public spaces become important sites of accumulation strategies as they can be used to secure 
mobile capital (Mitchell, 2003). In Chapter Four I suggest that the use of public property is 
largely to serve private property interests in a neoliberal era. The state engages in the regulation 
of public spaces in order to secure mobile capital, by maintaining safe spaces for spectacles, 
sociability and consumption (Staeheli and Mitchell, 2008). The exclusions that are consequences 
ofthe accumulation strategies ofthe state that control who and what appears in public spaces 
have been particularly cruel and punitive, as discussed in Chapters Three and Four (also see 
Mitchell, 2003; Harvey, 2006; Swanson, 2007; Staeheli and Mitchell, 2008; Samara, 2010). In 
neoliberal urbanism, the state becomes a facilitator not only of the market but also of 
spaces, heavy policing to assure security of the investment and displacement of and exclusion of the poor and 
Others. 
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exclusionary practices by deciding, or letting private interests decide, who cannot appear in these 
public spaces. 
Pressures on the state to encourage private investments may not necessarily have the 
same characteristics as the privatization of public spaces when considering what type of property 
is used to facilitate these investments. While the privatization of public space may occur on 
sidewalks, streets, boulevards, parks on public property, such as the cases of Cercado de Lima 
and San Martin de Porres, there can also be the privatization of public space in private property. 
For example, by encouraging the development of public spaces on privately-owned and operated 
property, such as the large scale projects in Independencia, local states encourage spaces for 
encounter, accessibility and political representation to occur in private property. Staeheli and 
Mitchell (2008) suggest that, ultimately, functions that are normally regulated by the state on 
public property that is public space become assumed in private property commercial spaces that 
act as public spaces. This particular issue, while cited as an American example, may be a 
"new" concern for those struggling for public spaces in cities like Lima, as I explain in the case 
of Independencia. 
In the following case studies I demonstrate that the production of urban space through 
neoliberallogics and practices compromises the 'publicness' of space - the right of multiple 
publics to appropriate and to participate in space in ways that redefine what constitutes public 
and private. The Politics of public space demonstrate that state regulation of people in public 
spaces produce exclusions of differentiated Others such as street vendors. In the three case 
studies of Cercado de Lima, Independencia, and San Martin de Porres local state authorities have 
implemented growth-first policies to attract capital following neoliberalization. In these growth-
frrst policies, street vendors have been adversely affected in their ability to produce space due to 
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the prioritization of large-scale investment projects as a means of attracting capital. The result is 
state policies and practices that control access to public spaces, or significantly neglect the 
decline of public spaces caused by their pursuit of large-scale investments. In order to argue 
these points I review policy documents, news articles and municipal press releases. 
5.3.1 Case Study: Cercado de Lima 
Cercado de Lima (see Figure 5.1) represents a precedent in neoliberal growth-first municipal 
policies in Lima. At the municipal level is the "Historic City Centre Urban Renewal Campaign" 
started in 1996, emerging from the UNESCO designation ofthe historic city centre of Lima as a 
World Heritage Site in 1991 (see Ruiz de Somocurcio, 1999). The District and Metropolitan 
Andrade (1996-2002) administration, which had executed neoliberal strategies to encourage 
private investment and to create a leaner state (Gandalfo, 2009), implemented an urban renewal 
program for the Historic City Centre. Its goals were similar to other Historic City Centre urban 
renewal strategies in Latin America: capitalize on the cultural heritage of the Historic City 
Centre, improve some of the lower valued properties in order to attract a tourist class, and clear 
out the working and housed poor populations from the city centre (see Swanson, 2007). The 
municipality intended to create a competitive environment for economic development through 
policies to revalorize the cultural and economic value of historic spaces and nearby buildings for 
tourism, and thereby increase tourism spending, create a modem (policy) environment for 
competitive economic development, regenerate slum areas, and ban itinerant vendors from the 
city centre (Decree 015-1998-MML; Ruiz de Somocurcio, 1999; Art. 2, Master Plan for the 
Centre of Lima, 1999, as cited in Ruiz de Somocurcio, 1999, p. 149-50; Ludefia Urquizo, 2002; 
Chion and Ludefia Urquizo, 2008). 
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District Municipality of Cercado de Lima, 
Peru and the Historic City Centre 
Rimae River 
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Figure 5.1 A Map of the District Municipality 
of Cercado de Lima with the Historic City 
Centre identified with a star. 
(Source: Ian Wood, 2011) 
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The Politics of public space in Cercado de Lima unfolded with particular interests-those 
of old and new investors, real estate developers and their consuming publics - appropriating 
public spaces. But these interests did not necessarily directly appropriate public space. The state 
facilitated urban renewal beyond policies to encourage investment and impulse tourism as 
suggested in the Master Plan for the Centre of Lima. It secured space for private interests 
through evictions of street vendors, and the establishment of municipal security officers in 
''recuperated'' zones. It was the violent removal oftens of thousands of street vendors that 
initiated urban renewal. As Gandolfo (2009) notes, the city centre during the urban renewal 
campaign had juxtaposed sceneries: street vendors and police physically struggling with each 
other during evictions and daily (state-sponsored) tourist scenes of colonial wear, criollo music, 
theatre, dance and other spectacles. Ultimately, as street vendors lost access to the public spaces 
they appropriated, the state began to place police to control space from any transgressors such as 
street vendors. The appearance of street vendors in public space became forcefully constrained 
under the guise of welcoming a mixed public for tourism and consumption (Figure 5.2). 
As the securitization of public space for tourism and private investment occurred in part 
through substantive removal of informal vending and a declaration of the Historic Centre as a 
rigid zone for street vending, the subsequent Metropolitan and District Municipal administration 
ofCastafieda (2003-2010) implemented further restrictions on the use of public spaces for any 
congregation of the public in the Historic Centre (Decree 060-2003-MML), paradoxically 
justifying such a response as "acting in defence of the rights of citizens, of thousands of workers 
and small-businesspeople ... and we defend the right to workfor thousands of people ... " (Alcalde 
Luis Castaneda reitera que hani respetar zona rigida, 2003- February 20, p. 2, emphasis added). 
The layers of restrictions - in the name of the rights of citizens and the right to work - shaped the 
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Historic Centre's public as one for production and consumption in the name of private-property 
and accumulation interests at the expense of the right to appropriate and participate in space. 
Street vendors were not only excluded through such policies, but their ability to appropriate 
space for work could not be mobilized through a "Right to Work". Rather, their ability to be in 
public space was contingent on the "Right to Property" or the status of a worker for an employer 
who held that right. 
Figure 5.2. Serenazgo dressed in yellow and blue, or 
florescent green and blue, vigilating in the Historic City 
Centre in Cercado de Lima. 
Photos taken by Ian Wood, June 2009 
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5.3.2 Case Study: Independencia 
Neoliberal urbanization in the District Municipality oflndependencia has taken on a different 
form than that ofCercado de Lima and San Martin de Porres, as the majority of urban renewal in 
the district has been large-scale private investment projects for retail and commerce. The 
municipality is adjacent to Los Olivos, which has the highest number of middle class limeiios in 
Lima and Peru (Arrellano CJ,nd Abugattas, 2004; Figure 5.3). This large base of consumers, and 
the high population concentration in Cono Norte (now branded Lima Norte, or "Lima North") 
have driven the development oflarge shopping centres such as Royal Plaza, Megaplaza and 
Plaza Norte, which are some ofthe biggest shopping centres in the country. The municipality has 
celebrated the transformation of the district into "a principal strategic axis of commerce for the 
Lima North (eono Norte) area, and, later, to shape [Independencia] as an Economic Centre [of 
Lima]" (Municipalidad Distrital de Independencia, 2009a - March-April, p. 24). 
The Politics of public space in Independencia as a result ofthis growth-fIrst urban 
renewal strategy have unfolded in state-led privatization of public space. The local municipality 
has encouraged real estate developers and large retail chains to build retail spaces that also 
function as spaces of encounter on private property. The result is the attempt by large retail 
chains to wrestle away the share of revenues from traditional marketplaces and street vendors by 
attracting publics to their complexes. This policy of encouraging public spaces in private 
property is coupled with municipal policies that limit the ability of vendors to appropriate public 
spaces, encourage formalization, and scrutinize who is economically and physically "disabled" 
enough to use public space (Chapter Three). In this case, it becomes apparent that municipal 
policies to encourage private investment work alongside street vendor regulations thus limiting 
vendors claims to public spaces, and reducing their options of spaces to appropriate while 
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attacking their livelihoods under the guises of economic and urban development that apparently 
will help the poor. 
District Municipality of Independencia, 
Lima, Peru 
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Figure 5.3 A map of the District Municipality of Independencia with the 
commercial centres and the District Municiplaity of Los Olivos identified 
(Source: Ian Wood, 2011) 
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The shopping complexes and nearby development zones ofthe district have been celebrated 
by the district municipality for attracting private investments that have generated revenues 
(Municipalidad Distrital de Independencia, 2009a - March-April, p. 34) and have increased local 
property values: 
The Supermarket Metro, the shopping malls Royal Plaza and Megaplaza and important 
brands like McDonald's, Cassinelli [a home improvement and home renovation box 
store], as well as many medium and small businesses have established themselves [in the 
district] ... Now the parcels of land cost $1000 (US) per metre squared, before they were 
just $40 (US) ... " (Municipalidad Distrital de Independencia, 2009a - March-April, p. 23) 
The large-scale investments have been largely foreign investment and some smaller 
retailers and merchants. The increasing land values in the commercial sector of the district have 
effectively created prices that are too high for street vendors to pay. These commercial 
developments encouraged by the municipality are enclosed spaces that have effectively 
privatized public space. Part of the retail space has become used for other public functions, 
further enclosing essential public spaces from certain publics. As Staeheli and Mitchell (2008) 
describe in the case of Syracuse, New York, USA, social necessities in adjacent public spaces 
(e.g., bus terminals, meeting places, municipality services to citizens, public spectacles, etc.) 
begin to operate as normal functions in private property spaces, which are subject to the 
regulation ofthe property owner. These commercial spaces, that are actually public spaces, are 
entitled to keep unwanted populations out, and can effectively do so through design by closing 
offpedestrian access to the space with few controlled access points (Figure 5.4). 
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Figure 5.4. A picture of 
Wong (supermarket chain) 
that forms part of Plaza Norte 
in Independencia. The 
shopping centre is entirely 
gated with few access points. 
(Source: Prensa Lima Norte, 
2010, URL) 
Large-scale private investment is justified using arguments that the poor will benefit from 
work opportunities and corporate responsibility. The recent Plaza Norte shopping mall has been 
celebrated for creating "4200 jobs where youth looking for work will have frrst priority, and for 
this reason the municipality has begun workshops and capacity training to aid them in their 
entrance to the job market" (Municipalidad Distrital de Independencia, 2009b - June-July, p.17). 
Municipal news articles (Figure 5.5) that appear more like advertisements for the recent private 
commercial investments give statistics about the employment benefits and the subsequent 
opportunities for local residents to gain employment through direct and indirect benefits. Such 
large-scale investments have been promoted as fostering benefits for microenterprises -
including street vendors - and the urban poor. In the case of the inauguration party ofthe 
Maestro Home Center (a home improvement store and home renovation store owned by U.S. 
Ace Hardware Corporation), the Mayor of Independencia declared: 
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This alliance between the private company, the municipal administration and the 
population will permit us to collectively channel the efforts of social corporate 
responsibility towards the least favoured in the district. (Municipalidad Distrital de 
Independencia, 2009b - June-July, p. 12) 
Further, the large investors and retail businesses in the Megaplaza and Plaza Norte shopping 
centre projects have been celebrated by the Municipality for their Education and Business 
Promotion Sponsorship program "through which the most vulnerable social sectors will be 
assisted ... " (Empresarios oficializaron patronato de educaci6n y promoci6n empresarial, 2009b-
June-July, p. 4). 
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Figure 5.5. The article 
"Megaplaza continues to grow" is 
an example of this practice of 
advertising the growth of private 
investments in the district. 
(Source: Municipalidad Distrital 
de Independencia, 2009a) 
These rather celebratory claims minimize the material realities of competition in the 
effort to attract large-scale investments to Independencia. Policy analysts working for 
Independencia have warned that large-scale commercial centres have caused a reduction of sales 
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for the roughly 2000 street vendors working in Independencia, 78% of which already earn less 
than the minimum living wage (Municipalidad Distrital de Independencia, 2008, p. 80-2). 
Although municipal policies that attract young prospective workers to the commercial centres for 
retail and service sector employment are congratulated by local government, adult street vendors, 
including the 32% over the age of 50 that work in Independencia (Municipalidad Distrital de 
Independencia, 2008), are excluded from this alternative. Policy documents are reframed to 
downplay the negative effects of competition on street vendors not only through their 
contradictory celebration of aiding the poor, and their neoliberal trickle-down logic: 
The apparent improvement of the district's commerce due to the large capital investments 
through the mega shopping centres has to be analyzed carefully as the large gains 
obtained by these businesses benefit the development of our district in a tangential 
manner. (Municipalidad Distrital de Independencia, 2008, p. 81-2) 
While urban development policies focusing on growth-frrst policies have not been 
favourable to street vendors, they have been selectively inclusive of street vendors on the basis of 
their investment capabilities. Street vendors who can compete with these large-scale investments 
are expected to do so and are given assistance in order to reach their potential as formal vendors. 
Yet street vendors are ultimately alienated by the municipal policies enacted during this growth 
of investment. They must compete in a market where local state policies favour and foster large-
scale development over street vendors, and vendors are constantly pressured to formalize or 
leave public spaces due to tightened regulations on them in public space. 
5.3.3 Case Study: San Martin de Porres 
Street vendors in public spaces in Caqueta are portrayed as the foil to growth-first strategies in 
district municipalities, both inherently and as a consequence of being in public space. Criticisms 
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by the Mayor oflndependencia Yuri Vilela (2003-2006) regarding San Martin de Porres's local 
development demonstrate that neoliberallogics and practices are working in justifications of the 
removal of street vendors. In reference to a territorial struggle for land between the two 
municipalities, Vilela states: 
[San Martin de Porres] looks dirty and disorganized, while we are generating investment 
and development... We have generated confidence in the private sector, everyone 
supports me. It appears that the mayor of San Martin de Porres should promote the 
formalization of informal vendors and put an end to informal street vending. It is the only 
way to move forward. (Alcalde Yuri Vilela lamenta incidentes y recomienda a 
burgomaestre Alvaro Veliz ... , 2005 -December 8, p. 6) 
In fact, when this criticism was made the District Municipality of San Martin de Porres 
had already implemented strategies such as PROMREP to attract private investments. Similar to 
the case ofthe Historic Centre of Lima in Cercado de Lima, these investments were central to 
plans to remove street vendors from the public spaces in the area of Caqueta in order to promote 
investment in private property. In this urban renewal project, however, those evicted were 
designed to be the investors in the nearby properties. PROMREP, implemented in 2003, included 
a formalization scheme for itinerant vendors that would have them be the "retailers" investing in 
an identified $12340000 (USD, 2003 value) of nearby property for sale, which included a $10 
million (USD) property owned by Peru's largest domestic holding company/family The Romero 
Group (By-Law 049-2003-MDSMP). 
The failure ofPROMREP (see Chapter Three) was followed by another urban renewal 
project in 2008 known as "Recuperation of Public Spaces" that operated under the same logics of 
evicting street vendors and encouraging investment in private property. The objective was to 
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"achieve the recuperation of public space, the relocation of street vendors of Caqueta and 
promote economic development of the area through formalization, accompanied with an urban 
revaluation understood as public works and improvements to the aesthetics" (Plan de Trabajo 
Conglomerado Caqueta, 2008-2009). Similar to the previous PROMREP plan, the removal of 
street vendors from public space required property re-development for the success ofthe project 
(Plan de Trabajo Conglomerado Caqueta, 2008-2009). 
Addressing the perceived problems of economic stagnation and urban decline that street 
vendors allegedly produce has been used as a justification for evictions to resolve the problem of 
market-based economic growth. The rhetoric claimed that because street vendors persecute the 
formal (private) sector they must be removed in order to allow private investment and 
development to take-off. In 2009, after a series or large-scale ambulante evictions in Caqueta, 
the municipality stated: 
these informal vendors persecute the formal sector, bringing to a standstill its potential 
for development, with the consequent economic, urban-planning and aesthetic 
backwardness. (Municipalidad Distrital de San Martin de Porres, 2009a, URL). 
The justification was that the removal of street vendors from public space was necessary for 
formal sector growth and the economic development of neighbouring private properties, 
regardless of who the investors were. The central goal was to assure that public spaces would be 
free of street vendors to allow for private investment, and this was established into law through 
redevelopment plans, blanket prohibited zones and zero-tolerance policies (see Chapter Three). 
As of April 2009, the evictions had left all spaces recuperated with the exception of one 
space occupied by 200-300 street vendors (En un ano Caqueta tendria nuevo rostro y mas 
inversion privada, 2009 - April 20, URL). The evictions sent very clear indications, both in 
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rhetoric and in planning, about the zero-tolerance approach to most types of street vending in 
public spaces. The role of street vendors as investors in private property remained less clear once 
the evictions occurred. 
Following the evictions, the municipality focused on increased securitization of public 
space as they deepened their investment in it. The municipality planned to have better lighting, 
video cameras and quick assistance security posts in the public spaces of Caqueta (Plan de 
Trabajo Conglomerado Caqueta, 2008-2009) 48. This security would protect the users permitted 
by security and the stone walking boulevards, and benches and green areas that formed part of a 
$2 million (USD) investment in public space by the municipality (En un afio Caqueta tendria 
nuevo rostro y mas inversion privada, 2009 - April 20, URL; Retiran a 1,500 informales de 
Caqueta, 2009 - April 21, URL). Once these investment announcements were made, and public 
spaces were clear of almost all street vendors, large-scale investors appeared. The Romero 
Group, the wealthiest domestic family and corporation, planned a medium-term project for their 
branded shopping centre "Minka" (En un ano Caqueta tendria nuevo rostro y mas inversion 
privada, 2009 - April 20, URL; Retiran a 1,500 informales de Caqueta, 2009 - April 21, URL). 
Firm warnings suggested that in this new era of Caqueta as an aesthetic public space for 
shopping, street vendors will not be welcomed: ''the message has been clear: the continuity of 
these informal actions that have caused such damage to the district will not be permitted" 
(Firmes en la recuperacion de la avenida caqueta, 2008 - June, p. 18). The intentions of larger-
scale investors, once the project was realized, sent the second message about who is entitled to 
appropriate that public space. Street vendors might be able to come back to Caqueta as property 
48 These security posts (puestos de auxilio nipido) are locations of security forces. They may include a combination 
of neighbourhood watch groups, municipal police and national police. 
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owners. Nevertheless, those who could afford to invest large sums of money in private property 
in Caqueta could take advantage ofthe large sums of money spent in securing and beautifying its 
public space. 
The policies of San Martin de Porres, prior to the Mayor oflndependencia's criticism of 
the lack of private investment, demonstrated growth-first logics coupled with regulation of 
public space and the removal of street vendors, that favoured private investment. Indeed, the 
words of then-Mayor Yuri Vilela in Independencia must be taken as criticism of the efficacy of 
urban renewal and not a lack ofpolicy for private investment. What remained questionable was 
the mayor's degree of commitment to assure the formalization of street vendors. In 2008, the 
Mayor's tone was very clear on his position to securitize and to regulate public spaces ofthe 
district as well as to attract investment for the interests of larger business fIrms - not street 
vendors: 
"We have full openness for private enterprise ... We know by placing measures that 
improve the security in the district the companies will invest." (Despegue del distrito se dani 
con la participacion vecinal, 2008 - June, p. 10-11). 
5.3.4 Reflections on Case Studies 
The municipal policies ofCercado de Lima, San Martin de Porres and Independencia 
demonstrate that local state-led policies to facilitate private investment have enclosed public 
space from vendors, albeit in a different way in Independencia. Municipalities in San Martin de 
Porres and Cercado de Lima have attempted to secure investments for tourism and commercial 
property development by evicting street vendors, spending money on public space improvements 
and security, and courting quality capital investments. A bourgeois and leisurely public that 
serves these investors in private properties adjacent, such as foreign tourists and more affiuent 
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Peruvians and those that can pass as such (see Harvey, 2006; Swanson, 2007), are to use these 
public spaces once urban renewal projects mature. 
Both cases of San Martin de Porres and Cercado de Lima demonstrate that with the goal 
of investments in public space more regulations on public space have been implemented. In 
Cercado de Lima attracting and securing investment led to increasing security in public space 
and more layers of restriction and regulation on publics once the renewal project was 
consolidated. The public spaces of the Historic City Centre have become non-accessible for any 
public that acts noticeably political in those spaces as a result of regulations following the 
termination of the frrst recuperation project in 2000. In San Martin de Porres, the municipality 
rolled out more investments in public space, as well as money for sustaining evictions (see 
Chapter Three), once street vendors were removed from the spaces they appropriated and 
investors became interested in the nearby properties. 
The policies for growth and urban renewal in Independencia have created a different 
struggle for accessing public spaces for street vendors. The municipality has made being in 
public spaces more difficult for street vendors (see Chapter Three). Meanwhile, many ofthe 
public spaces ofthe district are now entirely enclosed in private property spaces in the large 
commercial centres that have emerged in the past ten years. The municipality has encouraged 
this process as they become preoccupied with increasing the property values ofthe district and 
working with investors. Meanwhile, those subject to the market forces and institutional strategies 
ofthe municipality under neoliberal urbanization have little option but to continue competing 
against shopping centres while losing significant numbers of clients and revenues (see 
Municipalidad Distrital de Independencia, 2008). 
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5.4 Conclusion 
Public spaces are becoming closed off for political use and for use by differentiated Others that 
form marginal publics vying for representation and the right to be heard in public spaces. Street 
vendors are one public that is constantly challenging the ordering of publics and of public spaces 
in the neoliberal era, although examples show that they are increasingly punished, evicted and 
physically attacked for appropriating space. While their claims to space may approximate goals 
of substantive citizenship, claims to the common and the right to the city, street vendors are still 
in the midst ofthese struggles and are being displaced and moved further away from the sites 
they claim. 
Urban renewal strategies promoted by municipalities operate under neoliberallogics and 
practices, and alongside other neoliberal strategies. The concatenation of strategies for regulating 
street vendors, such as formalization, conditional authorizations, and prohibition/eviction, 
alongside neoliberal urbanization strategies such as urban renewal, and the liberal reordering of 
property produce an effect of exclusion that is new. It is clear that urban renewal strategies on 
their own create an impetus for street vending evictions, but they also work with other neoliberal 
strategies such as formalization that create further exclusion by subjecting vendors to market 
forces and blaming them for disastrous results. 
Urban renewal works in conjunction with the reorientations of property under the 
ownership model and neoliberal citizenship discussed in this thesis. First, urban renewal supports 
neoliberallogics and practices of strengthening private property ownership and the right to 
ownership. Real estate developers and private property investors are privileged by municipalities 
in their ability to bring investment and accumulation to the city under neoliberal urbanization. 
Urban renewal also works through the reorientations of property by using the state rationality of 
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good governance and market facilitation that causes public property to be privately used by the 
propertied for governing and accumulation strategies (see Chapter Four). Neoliberal citizenship 
is reproduced as a dominant form of formal citizenship under urban renewal. The local state as 
the new nexus of citizenship and market regulation privileges entrepreneurialism and profit-
seeking actions over the practice-based claims of inclusion performed by street vendors. As 
neoliberal governance requires private property for proper social function, urban renewal in turn 
operates under the assumption that order in public spaces is possible by having strong private 
property ownership. 
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Chapter 6 - Conclusion 
On the night of April, 10,2011, hours after the closure ofthe polls of the fIrst round ofthe 
national election in Peru, candidate and former president (2001-2006) Alejandro Toledo made 
comments about his low popularity, and the unwillingness of Peru's most economically and 
socially marginalized to vote for anyone but a populist reactionary or a left-wing candidate. 
Toledo stated that ''the elections were a wake-up call to the economic and political forces that the 
[neoliberal] economic model is not reaching the majority of Peruvians ... there have been ten 
years of growth and no distribution ofthat wealth" (Montero, 2011). Toledo was responsible for 
five ofthose ten years ofthose neoliberal reforms, which he implemented using "cholo" 
characteristics: thin and broken compromises to the indigenous and social movements that he 
claimed affmity to through his ethnicity (Garcia and Lucero, 2008). 
Toledo referred directly to the rise in popularity -for the second time - ofOlIanta 
Humala, the left-wing nationalist candidate constantly under a barrage of media attack by the 
limeiio elite and other western foreign interests, whose platform has been to change the current 
economic model. The rejection of the neoliberal model had the same geographies in 2006 as 
2011 at the national level- an overwhelming base in the southern, central and northern Andes, 
and strong popularity in some Amazonian regions. In the coastal regions of Peru, candidates that 
supported the economic orthodoxy received the majority of support, and in Lima the racist, 
former Wall Street lobbyist and Minister of Economy and Finance (2001-2002; 2004-2005) 
Pedro Pablo Kuczynski won the popular vote (there were similar trends in 2006; see Garcia and 
Lucero, 2008). Yet, parts of eono Norte and eono Este in Lima, particularly large districts like 
Comas and San Juan de Lurigancho, voted in majority (30%) for Humala. The rejection ofthe 
status quo in these districts had one major competing force: support for a populist candidate 
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Keiko Fujimori, who promised the poor that she had the magic formula for job growth and 
poverty reduction. The votes ofthat majority living in los conos of Lima demonstrated both 
concern with the effects of inequality and precarity associated with neoliberal reforms that were 
instrumental in the production oftheir exclusion, and change away from the orthodoxy. 
But the night of the election did not only show the deep discontent with the status quo, it 
also showed a society whose anxieties against the differentiated Other unfolded through racist 
comments about Andean voters and the poor, ultimately questioning the legitimacy of their votes 
(see Elecciones y redes socials mostraron racismo en el peru, 2011, URL). This was a repeat of 
the same anxieties of the traditional middle and upper classes of Lima five years earlier, who 
desired to create social order that reflected the race, class and gender dimensions of colonial 
power - whether by supporting Lay Fung as a hero, or degrading Humala and the social 
movements of the indigenous and the urban and rural poor (Garcia and Lucero, 2008). The 
electoral results and the racist expressions that erupted demonstrate the polarization of Latin 
American society, which has been exacerbated by class inequality under neoliberalism (Portes 
and Hoffman, 2003). Because neoliberalism as a logic and practice complements and "seduces" 
racist logics and practices (Roberts and Mahtan~ 2010), and thus the colonial present, this 
polarization can be seen as the product of both the support for both colonial relations and 
neoliberalism by those who obtain power from them, and the opposite - an alternative political 
economy that empowers Others that face the exclusion and violence of the colonial present. 
The hopes of the informal sector integrating into the rest of society and revolutionizing 
the traditional state, as envisaged in Matos Mar's 1984 Desborde Popular, have not come to 
fruition in Peru:. Instead, social and economic insecurity have been produced by neoliberal 
reforms, whose consequences are violence, exclusion and more inequality for marginalized 
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Others in Latin America and Peru. (Koonings and Kruijt, 2007). Yet the stability of neoliberalism 
and colonial power relations is suspect given the crisis tendencies ofthe current political 
economy and the social relations that are produced in part by it (see Peck, Theodore, and 
Brenner, 2009). Alternatives to neoliberalism appear in national electoral Politics in Peru, and 
they are being chosen again in 2011 by othered groups and their allies. 
More specific to this research, are everyday acts by poor people that both resist 
neoliberalism and represent alternatives to neoliberalism. I have argued that the substantive 
citizenship, collective claims to property and the struggle for public space - all practices of street 
vendors - are in fact important strategies for inclusion. They also challenge neoliberal forms of 
citizenship, property, and the privatization of public space through neoliberal accumulation 
strategies. Although these claims may not be motivated by politically organized resistance to 
neoliberalism, or colonial power (see Bayat, 2004), they nevertheless represent practices that 
undermine the dominance ofneoliberalism. If the legacies of Latin American political urban 
movements still hold true (Bayat, 2004 suggests they do), street vending can be a powerful 
practice for challenging neoliberalism in urban spaces. 
The struggle for public space, substantive citizenship and collective property claims are 
important concepts for challenging the marginality produced by neo liberalism· and making 
claims for inclusion. I have reviewed these concepts, suggested their utility and demonstrated 
that, on the contrary, neoliberalism is an important constituent in the production of exclusion of 
street vendors through neoliberal formal citizenship, the reorientation of property and the 
privatization of public space. 
In this research I highlighted a new marginality produced in Lima. It remains to 
summarize the salient characteristics of this new marginality under neoliberalism. First, political 
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representation by street vendors through the appropriation of public space is being increasingly 
challenged by the state and in ways different than the past. I say increasingly challenged because 
appropriation of space and the right to work were concessions made to street vendors by the 
municipalities in the 1980s. Since the implementation ofneoliberal reforms and urban renewal 
strategies there have been unprecedented large-scale evictions of street vendors from public 
spaces (e.g., Cercado de Lima in 1990s, Caqueta from 2008 to 2010, and La Chancheria in 
2009), more regulations for street vendors public spaces, (see Chapter Three) and the practice of 
state violence on street vendors in public spaces (see Chapter Four). The lack of political 
representation in public space is in part a product of the discursive changes caused by 
neoliberalism. Street vendors have been redefined as "responsible, autonomous, market actors" 
who can generate enough wealth to be property owners and successful business people. 
According to neoliberallogics any non-rent-seeking market action is a wrong pursuit. Collective 
claims to property are de legitimized as they are seen as political claims that challenge the norms 
of liberalism: private property ownership as the base upon which society is organized, and the 
liberal citizen as a property owner. As a result, property ownership becomes the basic condition 
in which one can appear as any type of vendor, and street vending violates that norm thereby 
leaving no formal right-to appropriate space without ownership of that space. 
Second, economic marginalization of street vendors results from the combination of 
formalization, eviction and conditional authorizations that connect with norms of property, 
neoliberal citizenship and urban renewal strategies. The replacement ofthe ''Right to Work" with 
authorizations that. differentiate vendors based on the ability to participate in the market obliges 
"able"street vendors to start the process of formalization if they want a temporary authorization 
for public space. These authorizations are stringent: they demand that vendors save a certain 
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amount of money daily and then enter private property marketplaces within a specified period of 
time (see Chapter Three). Eviction policies threaten or remove non-compliant vendors and 
vendor associations that have "successfully" saved enough money to fmance or purchase stalls. 
If and when vendors cannot legally return to public space due to the realization of formalization 
policies, they either face the uncertainty ofthe high costs of formal licensing and property 
ownership or rental, unknown commercial traffic flows, and fixed spatial and temporal vending 
practices that are not conducive to their street vending practices (see desco/alternativa, 2001; 
Donavan, 2008), or the risk of returning to public space without authorization. Formalization 
policies have produced a lot of uncertainty for street vendors. It is more common for formalizing 
street vendors to leave the stalls they purchase or rent due to economic pressures 
(desco/alternativa, 2001). The loss ofthe "Right to Work" and its subsequent replacement by 
market-oriented policies persecutes the "able" in acquiring income necessary to take care of 
themselves or their families precisely by denying that right and subjecting street vendors to either 
market forces or state-sanctioned evictions or both. For "disabled" vendors, there are increasing 
regulations that limit their legal ability to use space and how they can use it. Those regulations 
contain both numerous conditions just to obtain authorization and numerous threats to revoke 
authorizations due to non-compliance. All unauthorized vendors, whether defmed as "abled" or 
"disabled" by municipal policy, are subject to more difficult conditions in which they can obtain 
income through street vending, putting more stress on their finances. 
This new marginality unfolds inthe colonial present, which exacerbates the effects of 
neoliberalism on those who are racialized, classed, and gendered as Others. The economic and 
political deprivation that has been apart of colonialism is directed, now through neoliberal 
policy, against rural migrants from the Andes, in particular women. These policies responsibilize 
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vendors for their marginality and mobilize violence against them for failing to meet the 
conditions placed on them by authority. These expectations that vendors become responsible 
neoliberal subjects further differentiates them when they in fact cannot reasonably meet the 
conditions placed on them in an era of social and economic insecurity. In particular, this 
differentiation masks the classism and racism ofthe colonial present under neoliberalism by 
framing the poverty of differentiated Others as questions of "mismanaged lives" and "failed 
entrepreneurs" thereby further de legitimizing them and their struggles49 • 
If street vendors are to wage a struggle against the characteristics of this new marginality, 
they must address the exclusion produced by neoliberal citizenship, the ownership model and 
urban renewal strategies. The production of a new marginality unfolds through the different 
concepts I have reviewed in this research. First, neoliberal citizenship is a condition of belonging 
granted by the state when the citizen participates in market-oriented activities successfully. If one 
fails to do this - through failing at formalization, by appropriating public space and making 
alternative claims to property - they lose the right to enjoy belonging and, substantively, become 
targets of state policy. Second, the ownership model of property encloses on the very substantive 
claims of street vendors as well as hard-won formal rights (i.e., the "Right to Work", collective 
claims to property) in order to promote accumulation and social order. The result is public 
property that is no longer accessible to street vendors, and brutal public spaces where violence 
becomes normalized. Private property ownership drives both governing and accumulation 
strategies, which are irreducible to each other, and is an important component of both neoliberal 
citizenship and accumulation strategies such as urban renewaL It remains one the prime areas of 
49 As one middle class limeiio reminded me on numerous occasions, the poor were merely resentidos sociales -
resentful towards society - because they could not manage to lift themselves out of poverty like others did 
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struggle, alongside the struggle for public space (see 8taeheli and Mitchell, 2008), in order to 
challenge the exclusionary outcomes ofneoliberal capitalist orientations of property. Lastly, 
urban renewal projects in Lima have been instrumental in mobilizing both measures to deepen 
private property ownership and private property interests in public space and the roll-out of 
formalization po licies. As municipalities attempt to attract capital to the city, regulating who 
appears in public spaces is done by considering the interests of property owners. These 
regulations in public space include those who appear as passive users connecting from one 
private property to another or consumers, and exclude street vendors and other "dangerous 
publics". Urban renewal thus connects with neoliberal citizenship, which demands that only 
responsible citizens - as producers and consumers - participate in both the private property 
market and public space. Formalization strategies coupled with eviction policies appear as viable 
answers to the issue of successfully representing private interests in public spaces while 
removing the problem of street vendors. Neoliberallogics in street vending policies are what 
generates long-term solutions for urban renewal that, apparently, resolve the problem of street 
vending while generating prosperity and more private ownership. 
I started this thesis with three different quotations: one from the chicha group Los Shapis, 
another from Hernando de 80to, and a third from Hunt in reference to informal street vending in 
Bogota, Colombia. These quotations fit in a chronological order of discourses on street vendors: 
frrst, street vendors as working class people, followed by their subjectification as entrepreneurs, 
and lastly, the erasure of marginality from an entrepreneurial subjectification of street vendors, 
and the affrrmation of the neoliberal economic model through this erasure. They also 
demonstrate a major shift that is characteristic of informality and marginality under 
neoliberalism - the dismantling of a subjectivity of street vendors as a precarious working class 
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living day-to-day with the everyday threat of violence for one that assumes vendors individually 
responsible for their poverty and thus their prosperity. There are serious consequences ofthe last 
quotation: 
Th[e] pedagogicalization of vendors' citizenship [through formalization] denies structural 
inequalities by framing them as questions of culture that can be eradicated through 
education, while contributing to the stability of current political and economic models ... 
informality is a product of the formal market, and poverty is an inherent outcome of 
capitalism; these are thus structural problems that cannot be overcome by educating 
individuals or groups to surpass their cultural limitations. (Hunt, 2009, p. 347-8) 
Neoliberal rationalities replace and mask the question oflabour, social inequality and all other 
aspects of life with questions of performance in profit-generating activities - whether economic 
improvement or the improvement of oneself (Hamann, 2009). As Hunt (2009) warns us, this is 
the erasure of legitimate questions of unjust structures by framing them as questions of teaching 
vendors to be better market citizens ~ better performers in the market. 
Erasing the identity of street vendors as proletariat - a working class produced by 
capitalist social relations - obscures the connection ofthe material and political conditions of 
street vendors to economic and political processes. Because street vendors' poverty is a structure 
of capitalism (Hunt, 2009), and survival strategies are the response of groups made "redundant" 
- and thus underemployed or unemployed - under capitalist social relations (Stepick, 1989), 
their economic conditions require them to engage in self-exploitation. The political mobilization 
of street vendors in the 1980s represented in part a consciousnness-raising of the realities of 
street vendors' material and po litical condition, which has since been lost by formalization 
policies and entrepreneurial strategies. Neoliberal discourse has in part erased this identity, while 
deepening the marginality ofa precarious working class (see Wacquant, 2008). Struggling for 
spaces of political representation and material spaces for social reproduction, while challenging 
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neoliberalism through substantive claims to space, property and society requires a 
repoliticization of street vendors. 
By engaging with geographic theories on citizenship, property, and the struggle for public 
space, I suggest a few possibilities for engagement of street vendors in political action. I believe 
that geographic theory requires a reflection of the past subjectivity and subjection of street 
vendors as proletariats, and not neoliberal subjects, in order to renew the struggles for inclusion 
and the rejection ofthe marginality ofthis largely racialized, othered group. The current political 
landscape suggests that neoliberalism is being challenged by those experiencing marginality and 
inequality under it: in los canas and the interior of Peru. A renewal of the shared subjectivity of 
workers must be coupled with the possibility of other spaces and futures through the struggle for 
belonging. As Read (2009) notes, any challenge ofneoliberalism requires the same promise of 
possibility and alternative that neoliberalism denies. New practices of citizenship and property 
through practiced-based claims, and a shaping of public spaces that are the sites of these 
alternative futures, are some ways that the new marginality produced by neoliberalism can be 
challenged. 
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